Degrowth: Prospects for Realisation
Future Developments
Social mobilisation, the development of alternative practices in the form of grassroots initiatives and institutional reforms, shifts in consciousness and political framing are four important components of a degrowth transition. In light of the scale of the social and political obstacles that such a transition faces — from the entrenched interests of corporate and political elites to the continuing (though gradually loosening) stranglehold that the growth imaginary holds over our mental infrastructure — these four dimensions are not enough on their own to ensure the political realisation of degrowth. Given this, the future prospects of a degrowth transition are likely to be contingent on existing social, environmental, economic and political conditions evolving in a manner that makes them more favourable to the realisation of degrowth. I identify four potential developments which could have such an impact.
1. Degrading Ecological Conditions
The first of these is rapidly degrading ecological conditions. At present rates of greenhouse gas emissions it is highly likely that global temperatures will rise above 2°C on pre-industrial by the end of the century (Raftery et al. 2017). While the specific impacts of warming beyond 2°C are uncertain, such changes are expected to cause significant destabilisation to human civilisation: extreme weather patterns, significant changes to water availability, declining international food stocks, life-threatening sea level rises, large-scale human displacement, biodiversity and ecosystem loss and increased geopolitical conflict (Hickel 2017; IPCC 2018). The transgression of other planetary boundaries threatens similar risks.
2. Limits to Growth
A second development is the various limits to continued economic growth. As has been argued throughout this series of articles, infinite economic growth on a finite planet is a biophysical impossibility. External limits, declining marginal returns and secular stagnation have contributed to declining rates of growth in advanced capitalist economies since the 1970s. It is likely that low rates of growth in Western countries will continue into the twenty-first century (Bonaiuti 2014; Piketty 2014).
3. Open Commons Production
A third development could emerge from the growing scale of ‘open commons’ modes of socio-economic production. As Bauwens & Kostakis (2018) note, when it comes to the provision of digital and knowledge goods, the emerging open commons mode of socio-economic production is outperforming the capitalist model. While there are clear instances where the open commons model has been superseded by capitalist logic (peer-to-peer platforms like Airbnb and Facebook are prime examples), cases such as Linux, Wikipedia and Open Source Ecology illustrate its potential to dominate the capitalist model in turn (Fuster Morell 2015; Bauwens & Kostakis 2018).
4. State & Market Failure
The fourth development which could make future conditions more favourable for a degrowth transition is the declining capacity of existing state and market institutions to effectively respond to the systemic complexity of the interrelated ecological, social, political, economic and spiritual crises of our time. As Monbiot (2017) and Berry & Guinan (2019) both observe, people across the political spectrum are desperately searching for alternatives as the discredited ideology of neoliberalism fails to adequately provide for people’s fundamental human needs.
This dynamic can be seen in the upward-trend in right-wing nationalism that has taken place throughout the world. While this international populist movement only problematises particular aspects of neoliberal ideology, whilst radicalising others, through constructing a narrative of national empowerment partnered with racist, religious, anti-feminist and anti-ecological resentments, conservative movements have been able to provide an ideological alternative for masses of discontented (Decker 2018).
I see these events as illustrative of electorates’ growing dissatisfaction with the current political and economic status-quo. There appears to be great potential, and need, for progressive movements to capitalise on this political restlessness by formulating an alternative political vision of their own, one which addresses the growing frustrations with the centrist consensus on neoliberalism while advancing a platform of social justice and ecological sustainability. There is great scope for the ideas encompassed in the vision of degrowth to be incorporated into such a counter-hegemonic narrative.
Theory of Change
Is it feasible to suggest that the interplay of any of these four developments — degrading ecological conditions, limits to growth, the expansion of open commons modes of production and failing political and market institutions — or any other emergent event for that matter, could bring about shifts in the dominant common senses of growth, thereby fostering social and political conditions that are more favourable to the realisation of degrowth? As Kallis (2018) notes, dominant cultural assumptions and ideas are subject to change in times of crisis. While history is unpredictable, emergent and indeterminable, we can offer speculations. My theory of change for how a degrowth transition could be brought is as follows.
Holding actions and social mobilisation, grassroots practices and institutional reforms and shifts in consciousness are three dimensions of activity which are currently embodying, practising, prefiguring and incubating principles of a degrowth future. Currently, these three dimensions can be seen as pockets, or seeds, of a degrowth future, existing on the margins of contemporary capitalist societies. Although these dimensions are working to change common senses around degrowth, on their own, they are not enough to bring about a transition in the direction of degrowth.
But as the interplay of the four developments outlined above contribute to a declining ideological aura surrounding the growth paradigm, the ground for the seeds of a degrowth future becomes more fertile. With a broad social base of support and effective political framing and strategy responding to the opportunities that are opened up by evolving social, ecological, economic and political conditions, it is not inconceivable to imagine that these degrowth seeds might just branch out in the near future. As Geoff Eley (2002: ix) writes:
“Very occasionally, usually in the midst of a wider societal crisis, the apparently unbudgeable structures of normal political life become shaken. The expectations of a slow and unfolding habitual future get unlocked. Still more occasionally, collective agency materializes, sometimes explosively and with violent results. When this happens … the present begins to move. These are times of extraordinary possibility and hope. New horizons shimmer. History’s continuum shatters”.
Such a time might just be upon us. It is essential that a broad social base be mobilised and the policy proposals of a degrowth transition be continually refined so as to build political pressure and seize the opportunity for when the ecologically necessary and socially desirable become politically possible.
References used for this article:
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Fuster Morell. (2015) ‘Digital Commons’. In: D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F. & Kallis, G (eds). Degrowth: A Vocabulary For A New Era [Kindle version]. London, Routledge, pp. 512–520.
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Raftery, A. E., Zimmer, A., Frierson, D. M. W., Startz, R. & Liu, P. (2017) ‘Less than 2 C warming by 2100 unlikely’. Nature Climate Change, 7, pp. 637–641.
