Does this look like precision to you?
“No” said my 20-year-old nephew, Harry. I had to agree.
I was trying to explain what I had just been doing in Iraq for six months. I used all the “right” words, accurately, explaining that I had involved in a campaign against the barbaric so-called Islamic State, or Daesh; we had been precise, supporting the Iraqis, it had been kinetic for them but, in the end, we had degraded Daesh command and control and diminished their forces. Harry looked blankly at me, so then I turned to YouTube to show him what I meant.[1]
That didn’t help matters much.
Were I being more provocative I would have titled this blog “Is Defence failing the Nation?” In a document called the Armed Forces Covenant,[2] to which we will return in greater detail, The Ministry of Defence undertakes to explain its actions to the public, so that they understand what is being done in their name. My experience with my nephew made me wonder if we, Defence and wider Government, really do justice to this self-imposed obligation.
In short, I wonder whether by using military terminology and euphemism I had failed in my obligation to explain what I was doing, so that my nephew could exercise his democratic responsibility to understand and scrutinize the actions of those fighting on his behalf. And I wonder if this is the case more broadly. This worries me because if this is the case, then we, Defence, could be undermining the very support and understanding we need to sustain our operations (if you believe Clausewitz).
It is worth worrying about, Lord Chilcot is emphatic in the report of his Iraq inquiry
“In a democratic system, public support and understanding for a major military operation are essential.”[3]
In this, the first of two blog posts, I’ll address some theory that underpins my research. In the second, I’ll give a sense of what my (sadly limited) investigation has thrown up. The question posed for my academic research, the foundation for these blogs, is “What is the role of sanitized language (think euphemism or abstract language) in explaining state-sponsored violence; is it a deliberate strategy by public authorities?”
To answer it, we ought to first look at the nature of government-public relations when it comes to making war. It is worth getting into a bit of detail of how this relationship between public and government could theoretically function, and how it actually might be in reality.
So, the first brief instalment of theory… Karl von Clausewitz, described his famous primary trinity [4] and a secondary trinity, which Beatrice Heuser, the great doyenne of Clausewitzian analysis, says “could usefully be developed much further.”[5] This so-called secondary trinity is made of up the humans associated with war: the people, the government and the military. The two trinities cannot really be separated but for ease of explanation and to home in on the key areas, we will focus on the secondary trinity.
The value of Clausewitz’s secondary trinity as a tool or analysis is contested. Of course it is.
Two great detractors of Clausewitz, Martin van Creveld and John Keegan, argue that Clausewitz doesn’t address “the people” in sufficient depth in his work.[6] And indeed even if he had examined them in sufficient depth, they argue that in reality the people, the government and military are not always visible as distinct groups in wars. This is particularly the case, they claim, in modern insurgent wars. Van Creveld submits that in fact:
“the most characteristic fact [of modern wars of the people]… is precisely that these distinctions did not exist.”[7]
So is Clausewitz’s depiction useful?
“Pro-Clausewitzers”, of which there are many, argue yes, it is. They say that any organized armed violence has leadership, a support base, and fighters, and that these looser categories are worthy synonyms of the concept that Clausewitz describes.[8] Putting it to the test, Harry J Summer’s used the trinities as a framework for his seminal analysis of American failure in the Vietnam War, concluding it was in fact a failure of successive Presidential administrations to get the American public to identify with the wars aims that made the war unsustainable.[9] Clausewitz’s secondary trinity has some traction.
But how visible is the secondary trinity in the United Kingdom?
The secondary trinity provides inspiration for the Armed Forces Covenant, a document published by the Ministry of Defence, that sets out how the relationships between the nation, the military community and the Government should function. And also sets out the obligations that each has to the others. Defence undertakes to explain and justify its actions and associated costs of war to the public, and then lead them, while in return, the public are expected to understand and sustain the Government’s policies as seen in the diagram below (from the document).[10]
So, in theory there is a contract between government and public, a relationship that exchanges transparency for support.
But is this the case in reality? Huw Strachan and Ruth Harris’s 2020 paper for RAND Europe examines the reality of this relationship through three lenses; public oversight of Government, communications between the public and Government and the distribution of the costs of war.[11] Let us pick up on one here.
Strachan and Harris argue that Members of Parliament (MPs) are unable to represent the public effectively when scrutinizing and overseeing the Government’s use of force. Few MPs have enough military experience to meaningfully challenge the Government, Minsters can wheedle out of Defence Select Committees, and debate in the House of Commons lacks penetration. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones agrees, lamenting the Government’s lack of transparency on such issues.[12] So mechanisms exist for MPs to examine the Government, on the public’s behalf, but the reality is underwhelming.
So, if the reality in the UK does not fit the theory, is there another theory that fits the bill?
In the concept of “surrogate warfare”, Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli’ suggest that rather than trying to create a bond with the public (as per the Armed Forces Covenant), government ‘cuts the socio-political ties” traditionally associated with war. And in so doing, they also offload public interest and scrutiny onto the surrogates. Surrogates can be human or technological — think proxy forces or drones. [13] Could this then explain how the UK Government actually sees its relationship with the public?
What is the evidence? Let us first return to the campaign against Daesh in Iraq; local forces fight Daesh, while we provide support, steering clear of the close-in combat.[14] It is now the case in Afghanistan.[15] in Libya.[16] The UK has deployed drones, as well as manned aircraft, to all. Looking to the future, Defence procurement plans are heavy on autonomy and unmanned platforms — new aircraft fleets, minesweepers, resupply drones to name a few.[17]
The evidence looks compelling. But there are those that wonder if surrogacy really is as major a step away from Clausewitz as the authors claim.[18] And there is a breadth to the concept that leaves it vulnerable to being accused of being so broad as to be effectively meaningless.[19] Despite these challenges, surrogacy does appear to be a part of the UK’s way of war, for want of a better expression.
Given all this, can these two theories of Government-public relations, the trinities and surrogacy, coexist? Maybe. Evidence from the UK suggests that the Government is wary of completely disconnecting from the public (and throwing out the Clausewitzian framework) but seeks exploit the benefits of surrogacy.
“What on earth has this got to do with language?” I hear you ask.
Well, if the Government is committed to the Covenant, and a Clausewitzian framework, it must be sufficiently clear in its language to ensure the public understands what is being done on their behalf. I return to my opening comments, I had failed to do this for Harry; does Defence do any better?
Defence thinks carefully about its words, we have a whole department whose job it is to communicate effectively (Directorate of Defence Communications). But Defence communications are littered with euphemism, jargon, and abstract terms, all of which could be thought of as sanitizing the reality of war. Kill is not a word we use often, certainly not about our own actions. But it is what happens.
Is the sanitizing language actually a form of surrogacy, a break of socio-political ties between Government and public? If it is, then is it deliberate? And what are the consequences?
I hope to offer you something like the beginnings of an answer in my next blog.
Lieutenant Colonel Matt Fyjis-Walker is a British Army officer with significant operational experience in recent campaigns amongst the people.
This BLOG is an academic study conducted as part of the KCL Master by Research programme on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. The views expressed are those of the author; they do not constitute the opinion of, or a representation by the British Army or the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
[1] Associated Press video through https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QneVmfFlt8Q
[2] Ministry of Defence. Armed Forces Covenant (2000)
[3] J. Chilcot, The Report of the Iraq inquiry. (UK: House of Commons. 2016):129.
[4] `’tendencies that dominate within [war], a fascinating trinity — composed of (1) primordial violence, hatred and enmity (2).. the play of chance and probability.. (3) its element of subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason” in C. Bassford “the primacy of Policy and the Trinity” in Clausewitz’s mature thought” in Strachan, H, Herberg-Rothe, A Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007):78
[5] B Heuser. Reading Clausewitz. (London: Pimlico. 2002): 56
[6] M. van Creveld, Transformation of War, (New York Free Press. 1991): 63
[7] M. van Creveld, “The Transformation of War Revisited.” In Small Wars & Insurgencies 13, no. 2 (2002): 8
[8] C. Bassford and E. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity” in Parameters. Autumn. (1995): 15 and 17
[9] Heuser. Reading Clausewitz: 56
[10] Ministry of Defence, The Armed Forces Covenant (2000): 10
[11] R. Harris and H. Strachan The Utility of Military Force and Public Understanding in Today’s Britain. (RAND Europe. 2020): 19–22
[12] All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones. The UK’s Use of Armed Drones: working with partners. www.appgdrones.org.uk (2018): 8.
[13] A. Krieg, and J-M. Rickli,, “Surrogate warfare: the art of war in the 21 Century?” in Defence Studies. 18, no2. (2018)
[14] Houses of Parliament. Defence Select Committee report: UK military operations in Syria and Iraq
[15] Operation TORAL explained: Striving for peace in Afghanistan
[16] Houses of Parliament. Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee 27 April 2011.
[17] Ministry of Defence. Defence in a Competitive Age. (2021).
[18] V Rauta. “Delegation in distress; an ever-growing semantic field?” in Rauta, A. et al. “A Symposium -debating ‘surrogate warfare’ and the transformation of war’ in Defence Studies. 19, no4 (2019): 417–418
[19] C. Rickland “Iran’s surrogate warfare and the future of the concept in Rauta, A. et al. “A Symposium -debating ‘surrogate warfare’ and the transformation of war” in Defence Studies. 19, no 4 (2019): 420–421
