Lessons from Burma — A Personal View
By Wg Cdr (Retd) Guy Edwards OBE
Today’s challenges around innovation, and integration are nothing new. WW2’s Burma Campaign has many lessons for today’s commanders encompassing topics as diverse as A2AD, logistics, diversity, and adaptation.
‘The reconquest of Burma by the 14th Army under Slim remains a classic in the art of generalship. Only a man of the highest judgement, nerve and skill could have achieved this tour de force. History may well decide that there are more important lessons to be learned from Slim’s handling of this campaign than from some of the larger and more spectacular battles on other fronts…’[1]
Earl Mountbatten of Burma, 15 December 1970.
On the Back Foot
On re-reading Slim’s Defeat into Victory[2] after many years, it is easy to be struck by how relevant the Burma campaign and its lessons remain today. As well as providing some tremendous leadership insights, it contains major lessons about adaptation, logistics, doctrine, and domain integration. The limited focus for this article is the British-led campaign in Central Burma, which therefore does not examine the considerable Chinese and American endeavours elsewhere in the theatre.
In Burma in 1942, Britain and her allies were unprepared and, only after many set-backs, defeats and a retreat during which over 13,000 British and Indian troops were killed or wounded[3] were the British able to turn the tide against the Japanese. ‘The 900 mile retreat from Burma in 1942, the longest ever carried out by a British Army, was an epic unparalleled in British military history.’[4] The most recent British campaigns have, arguably, been ‘elective’ in nature, and largely orchestrated in accordance with a so-called ‘Western way of war’[5]. In these campaigns, the West chose where and when to intervene (at least initially) and, as well as enjoying technological superiority, had the great advantage of not being ‘on the back foot’ as was the case in Burma. The West may not be so lucky in future, and indeed, in the longer view, British war-fighting history all too often seems to start with an unpleasant surprise and a major setback, followed by adaptation and eventual success. If the UK is to learn from history, then perhaps it is a good time to reflect on some of the wider lessons from the Burma campaign.
The recently launched UK Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC)[6] envisages UK forces conducting operations and, potentially Warfighting, in a highly competitive and contested environment. Even so, it is hard to imagine democratic Western European nations initiating outright military action against an assertive and aggressive Russia or China, both of whom are challenging Western technological superiority[7] (and, by extension, the ‘Western way of war’). Consequently, if an adversary such as Russia were to misjudge Western resolve and trigger a military response, it is quite likely that the West would, once again, find itself ‘on the back foot’ and having to restore territory, influence, or democratic values in an over-run battlespace not of its own choosing, and possibly having already suffered significant losses. If anything, the forward-positioning of forces which might arise from implementing the IOpC could make such a scenario all the more likely.
The campaign in Burma presented a number of challenges in terms of finding a shared Allied strategic aim.[8] For example, American Allies saw British objectives as linked to the restoration of Empire. The American focus was more about ensuring a secure base from which to support Chiang Kai-Chek’s Nationalist Chinese, thus drawing into China, Japanese forces that might otherwise oppose them elsewhere in the Pacific region. In all multi-national alliances such tensions exist, and within present-day Europe would certainly provide exploitation opportunities for hostile information campaigns aimed at shattering NATO cohesion. However, although tensions remained throughout the Burma Campaign, success was possible due to the personal relationships and trust established between senior commanders such as Wavell, Mountbatten, Stilwell, Slim, and Du Yuming.
Reserves, Diversity, and Manoeuvre
Of course, it would be a mistake to draw too many parallels between Burma in 1942 and a future Europe. For a start, one of the few advantages that Britain and her Allies had in the Burma campaign was the ability to trade space for time in order to re-structure, re-arm, and re-train. In short, the British needed time in order to adapt to the enemy’s way of fighting, and thankfully, in Auckinleck, Slim, and others, the British had leaders who were quick to drive through the necessary adaptation. Britain was also fortunate in being able to call upon huge reserves from the British Indian Army and, to a lesser extent, from Africa. ‘By 1940 it was accepted that Burma had to be reinforced, but by then, of course, scarce resources were largely committed to the European theatre.’[9] Consequently, Indian soldiers formed the bulk of the Allied fighting force[10] in Central Burma and, in itself, the Indian contribution to Slim’s XIVth Army was extraordinarily diverse.
‘Slim’s new command would eventually become the biggest, and most ethnically diverse, army in the world’[11]: ‘…there were men from every caste and race — Sikhs, Dogras, Pathans, Madrassis, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Assamese, Kumaonis, Punjabis, Garhwalis, Naga head-hunters…’[12]
and all were considered effective, respected, and supplied appropriate to their beliefs, something which arguably holds lessons about diversity in today’s forces. Superficially, Slim’s XIVth Army was one where diversity was valued (at least by its commander)[13]. Indian troops comprised the bulk of the Allied Forces in Central Burma contributing 340,000 troops compared to 100,000 British, and 90,000 Africans.[14] However, Martial Race Theory,[15] rooted in ideas from the preceding century[16], still drove recruiting policy in India, with certain ethnic groups or geographical populations seen as less ‘martial’ than others. If recruited at all, these ‘less martial races’ were usually destined for roles in support rather than direct combat roles. It was nonsense: ‘Indeed that some troops were racially better suited to the jungle proved another myth of war in Burma’.[17]
In Europe today, we have neither extensive reserves of fighting power nor are we able to trade space for time as the idea is politically unpalatable and deeply divisive. For political reasons, NATO may be forced to fight to hold ground even on unfavourable terms, something that Slim acknowledged could be fatal: ‘Our lack of preparation in Burma, military, administrative, and political, made it difficult for our commanders even to bid for the initiative…. [and] to merely try to hold ground, unless relief and reinforcements are at hand, is fatal.’[18]
Today, with the advent of effective long-range weapon systems and cyber attack capabilities, there may be no ‘safe haven’ in which reorganization can occur and from where a counteroffensive can be mounted. As DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends work observes:
‘Few would dispute that the character of conflict is changing, for example, distance is becoming increasingly irrelevant as a security buffer and the West’s technological advantage is reducing.’[19]
Nevertheless, there are plenty of lessons to be learned from the Burma Campaign. The situation in 1942 was compounded by Burma’s topography with its great rivers, mountain ranges, monsoon season and dense jungle, all of which presented significant obstacles to mobility, re-supply, and communications. Although taking a different form in Europe, these three obstacles can exist in almost any battlespace and can just as easily arise as a consequence of enemy action. In Burma, these factors affected both sides, but made the greatest demands on manoeuvring forces. More importantly though, as Slim points out, at the start of the Burma campaign the British regarded the jungle as an impenetrable and hostile environment that somehow the Japanese had mastered.[20] This had a profound psychological effect on the British soldier and the resulting myth of Japanese superiority in jungle fighting sapped British morale more and more with every defeat.[21] At the start of the campaign, Britain and her allies relied heavily on Burma’s tenuous road and rail system for mobility and re-supply, making them highly vulnerable to the Japanese tactic of fixing British positions with frontal attacks whilst hooking around in strength through seemingly impassable jungle to cut British lines-of-communication, block any retreat, and prevent reinforcement. Undoubtedly, the Japanese were determined fighters, but arguably, the psychological damage inflicted on the British was even more damaging and undermined British self-belief. However, the Japanese over-reliance on this tactic was eventually to prove their undoing once the British became more adept at jungle warfare.[22] Furthermore, once on the offensive, Slim’s use of what could be described as tactical ‘boxes’ turned the battlespace from a very linear one into something much more akin to the fluid battlespace we know today.
Bogeymen and Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD)
Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) as a concept is nothing new and history can provide numerous examples of innovations designed to keep enemies at arm’s length or negate their strengths. The A2AD systems of today undoubtedly present a range of challenges to the ‘Western way of war’, and in many ways, have had a psychological effect on some Western thinking far in excess of their actual potency. Over-hyping A2AD capabilities may risk inadvertently reinforcing a very convincing Russian (mis)information campaign. Arguably, the West has been slow to respond to the challenge, but as Keir Giles[23] has pointed out, drawing range rings on maps can be very misleading. It can be argued that any inclination to view A2AD defences as creating ‘no-go’ areas, risks ceding the battlespace to our adversaries and is somewhat akin to being afraid of the jungle and propagating the mythology of the Japanese as invincible bogeymen. Solutions may not be easy (they weren’t in 1942 either), but the number of options for tackling the A2AD challenge is steadily growing, many of which are reliant on leading edge technology. Examples of evolving approaches to the challenge include the USA’s now dated ‘Third Offset Strategy’ that stressed (inter alia) ‘the strategic imperative for securing a new competitive operational edge through technology’.[24] Standoff capabilities, electronic warfare, cyber attack, and swarming offensive weapons, coupled with autonomous systems that can take on the ‘hottest’ of zones are obvious responses. Exploiting the synergies of these novel capabilities, in concert with more traditional means, can be made all the more effective through multi-domain integration. Approaches such as the UK’s IOpC[25], when properly developed, have the potential to overwhelm or neutralize even the most sophisticated A2AD systems. Just as the XIVth Army in Burma adapted to fight in a hostile environment, so too must today’s forces adapt, but what is required goes beyond mere technological solutions: it requires a determined and positive mindset that is willing to confront and overcome such challenges. Nurturing that mindset in today’s leaders has never been so important and is rightly a key objective of Professional Military Education and live training.
Attitudes to A2AD may be an example of where the West is in danger of losing the battle in the cognitive domain even before a shot has been fired. But it also presents an opportunity if potential adversaries rely too heavily upon, and make assumptions about, their own supposed invulnerability under their ‘A2AD umbrella’, or any perceived reluctance of Western forces to contest the battlespace. The Japanese dogmatically clung onto their initially successful tactics in Burma, long after the Allies had learned how to defeat them. Integrated multi-domain operations hold much promise for the future and will be necessary if the West is to defeat layered A2AD defences, but the West must also be able to meet mass with mass and operate in digitally-austere environments where networks and space systems have been denied or degraded.[26] In other words, although multi-domain integration offers an attractive way of dealing with adversaries, it is not, and can never be, a panacea. The solution in Burma was not predominantly technological, but grew from properly addressing the conceptual, physical and moral components of fighting power as outlined in current British Defence Doctrine[27], which Slim articulated thus: ‘…morale, which enabled men to endure the brutality of combat, was founded on three factors: material, intellectual and spiritual’.[28] Like a three-legged stool, all three components need to be strong and in place in order to support the stool. It can be argued that conceptually and morally, the West is in reasonably good shape, but without a strong physical component, the stool will fall over. Slim addressed (as best he could) all three in equal measure, and placed great emphasis on leadership, training, adaptation, and simply doing the basics well. The latter included ensuring, in what was predominantly an infantry war, that the infantry was well-led. The Infantry Committee, formed in 1943, observed that many of the best officers were being ‘creamed off’ by the technical arms and services, and that the infantry had been ‘…starved of intelligent, well-educated recruits and good junior leaders capable of mastering complex infantry tactics, skill-at-arms, and other specialized skills required to handle heavy weapons, signals equipment and maintain vehicles, in addition to mastering knowledge of jungle craft and jungle lore.’[29] This situation was addressed in the Burma campaign, but only after some costly set-backs. As the complex demands of multi-domain operations inevitably compete (both within the military and the wider employment market) for talent, we should be very careful not to allow a similar situation to arise in the infantry of tomorrow. Of course, intellect alone does not guarantee success, and as Field Marshal Wavell observed: “No method of education, no system of promotion, no amount of common sense ability is of value unless the leader has…fighting spirit”.[30] Slim actively sought to develop an offensive spirit in the Allied forces by focussing his leadership on motivation and morale.[31] He recognized the demoralization amongst his troops following defeat and knew ‘he had to restore their will to fight on when everything was going wrong…’[32]
Logistics
Throughout the Burma campaign, logistics were a major challenge, both in terms of the amount and quality of equipment being supplied to theatre, and in its onward transmission to those who needed it in theatre. At the outset, India was poorly placed to act as the logistic base from which to sustain operations in Burma. Its weak economy was supporting just 180,000 troops, but over the course of two years, it adapted and evolved to support Allied forces comprising more than 2 million personnel.[33] The XIVth Army, of necessity lower down on the priorities list compared to the armies in Europe, initially had to ‘make do’ with obsolete equipment (often ill-suited to the theatre), and inadequate supplies of food, front line medical care, and ammunition. As Slim often remarked, the ‘Forgotten Army’ had to help itself and be creative about how it used its scarce resources, at times improvising and using local alternatives to military equipment or traditional construction materials.[34] Of course,
‘the Army’s [eventual] success was due to the skills and efforts of a great many men: Auchinleck and Giffard, although not wearing 14th Army shields on their arms, gave tremendous support to Slim, and put in place much of the support and resources the Army required.’ [35]
In the present day, given the UK’s growing budget deficit due in part to COVID-19 and its impact on all Government spending (and notwithstanding recent announcements of additional funding for Defence[36]), it is hard to see how any significant wartime reserves can be maintained, or how the ‘just-in-time’ logistics chain could cope with demand in time of war. The problem is exacerbated by the multi-national nature of defence materiel procurement and the strong likelihood of supply-chain interdiction. Like Slim’s army, the West is likely to have to get by with minimal support or reinforcement in the initial stages of any conflict, and even when and if reinforcements do become available, having sufficient sea- and air- lift to get them to where they are needed is likely to be an enormous challenge to which there is no easy solution.
Intelligence and Deception
In one area in particular, ‘self-help’ improved greatly the lot of the British and their allies in Burma. At the outset, there was hardly any effective intelligence gathering organization[37] that could detect Japanese force dispositions and consequently, on numerous occasions, the Japanese were able to surprise the British, often through flanking attacks and the use of blocking forces that had infiltrated through the jungle. The limited amount of air reconnaissance available was rarely able to identify Japanese columns moving under the dense jungle canopy, and Japanese communications intercepts were of minimal use given the lack of Japanese linguists in Allied formations. Slim lamented that at the start of campaign, the Burma Corps could call upon the services of just one Japanese linguist.[38]
Slim set about building an intelligence network (part of which grew from the ‘V Force’[39]) drawing on former colonial officers and their networks in Burma. The Force was well-placed to report on Japanese movements. ‘As the retreat of 1942 got under way, volunteers were recruited for special duties behind enemy lines…’.[40] Communications remained problematic though, and the information provided by this ad-hoc network often did not reach his headquarters at all, or arrived too late to action. However, as British training in jungle warfare improved, fighting patrols were used to collect a range of valuable intelligence materials from the Japanese forces they ambushed.
Fast-forward to today, and as the UK’s IOpC highlights, in the digital age it is ‘extremely hard to hide today’s military signature anywhere on the globe’,[41] but even in an environment saturated with sensors, it will still be difficult to understand an adversary’s intentions. Slim knew his enemy: he had learnt their tactics and methods the hard way[42], understood their intentions, and exploited this knowledge effectively, often deceiving the Japanese[43] and setting traps for them into which they readily fell. Operation EXTENDED CAPITAL was one of the best examples of his art, in which he convinced General Kimura (Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Burma Area Army) that the Allies’ intended target was Mandalay, when in fact the bulk of Slim’s forces were concealed and subsequently struck against the vital Japanese line-of-communication hub at Meiktila.[44]
In addition to traditional intelligence sources, the contemporary operating environment produces great quantities of open source intelligence (OSINT). Under such circumstances, it may not be so important to create ad-hoc information networks (although it certainly wouldn’t do any harm), but OSINT depends heavily on civilian mobile and internet networks which would be targeted by adversaries determined to conceal their force movements. The Russians in particular, have learnt to their cost that their own troops using VKontakte[45] or other social media, can inadvertently identify units and force movements during live operations just as easily as local civilians sharing smartphone footage. The work of OSINT organizations such as Bellingcat[46] demonstrates what can be achieved through such reporting, however, the lesson here, is that the West cannot afford to under-invest in intelligence gathering capabilities and should not overly rely on OSINT. When it comes to language skills, hopefully, it safe to assume that, in the UK at least, the priority for language training has already swung from Pashtun to Russian.
Domain Integration
As in the Land domain, the Allied air forces in Burma started out at a significant disadvantage. The RAF had too few aircraft, and those they did have, such as the ageing Buffaloes and Hurricanes that comprised the mainstay of the RAF’s fighter force, were no match for the Japanese Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (known as ‘Oscars’)[47]. In early 1942, the RAF was still operating Vildebeest biplanes against the Japanese, with the last of the type being destroyed by the Japanese as the British retreated from Java. Even the more up-to-date Blenheim and Hudson bombers were easy prey for the Japanese, but their crews nevertheless pressed home countless attacks against well-defended Japanese targets in spite of the odds. In Burma, the RAF gave a good account of itself despite being outnumbered about 400 to 37 in terms of frontline aircraft[48], but of course, could not prevail in the face of the onslaught. The Oscar had a much greater range and so could operate from airbases beyond the reach of RAF fighter cover, and the pace of the Japanese advance on the ground quickly saw RAF bases in Burma being overrun. The few remaining aircraft and crews retreated to India from where they mounted a desperate defence hampered by a shortage of serviceable aircraft, accurate target information, range, and suitable weaponry. The Allies were unable to conduct meaningful offensive counter-air operations owing to a lack of suitable aircraft, and defensive counter-air operations against the Japanese were also problematic for the same reason, exacerbated by the lack of an effective early warning system.[49] It is interesting (and possibly rather depressing) to see how often recent combat aircraft design has traded range for manoeuvrability or weight in a world where information and soft-power is regularly wielded to coerce neutral governments into denying over-flight, passage, or basing rights. In Burma, the situation gradually improved as decimated squadrons were reinforced and re-armed with more capable aircraft, better tactics developed, a workable early warning system created, and the war fighting skills of the aircrew improved.[50] The reversal of Japanese air superiority over Burma was the key that unlocked much wider use of air support[51] that, in turn, helped to address the logistic challenges posed by an Army going on the offensive. By late 1943, Slim was using air re-supply as a major means of sustaining his forward combat units[52] and was thus able to significantly reduce his Army’s dependence on vulnerable and poorly-found land lines-of-communication.
‘The fabric of our campaign was woven by the close intermeshing of land and air operations…’[53]
In 1943, tightly integrated Land and Air headquarters made for effective air support and campaign planning, a frequently recurring lesson the West would do well to learn, and yet arguably, in peacetime UK (with the possible exception of Joint Helicopter Command), insufficient effort is dedicated to building the key relationships by co-locating Land and Air Headquarters (or indeed Maritime Headquarters).
‘Air power was crucial to British success in Burma. Whether attacking Japanese bunkers in support of a rifle company, dropping sea mines to destroy enemy shipping bringing in reinforcements and supplies, or bombing ports and the bridges on the Thai-Burma railway to interdict the line of communication, air power made its indispensable contribution to victory’.[54]
Whether it could have done so without such a high level of integration is doubtful, and yet, as the UK currently ponders how to apply the military instrument effectively in an integrated way across five domains, peacetime headquarters remain largely stove-piped, and with inadequate embedded cyber and space expertise.
The Manoeuvrist Approach
For many years now, the British armed forces have espoused what Sun Tzu described as the ‘indirect approach’, a key element of manoeuvre warfare: seeking to exploit and attack an adversary’s weakest points rather than attacking his strength. Undoubtedly, Basil Liddell-Hart and others had laid the conceptual foundations for the ‘manoeuvrist approach’. ‘By the mid-1930s, based on the Home Army’s ongoing examination of its First World War experience, certain elements of mission command thinking were creeping into formal British doctrine”[55] even if such ideas were not yet widespread. However, Slim was one of its greatest early practitioners. It is very clear that Slim sought, wherever possible, to use the indirect approach[56] and, perhaps encouraged by the communications challenges and rapidly changing situation he and his commanders faced in Burma, he was also a leading proponent of manoeuvre warfare, long before it gained wider traction in British defence doctrine. With his defensive boxes or flying columns often cut-off from the rest of the army, it was imperative that his commanders could exercise their own judgement in achieving the mission. Slim’s ultimately successful approach in Burma helped create (or at very least, lent impetus to) the manoeuvrist approach of today. As Robert Lyman observes:
‘Just as Slim’s conduct of operations mirrored in close detail the tenets of the ‘indirect approach’, they also provided a clear foreshadowing of the principles of ‘manoeuvre warfare’. These ideas inter alia are that warfare must jointly combine sea, air and land powering the planning and conduct of operations; that combat power should be applied to exploit enemy weaknesses, rather than his strength; that the principal focus of commanders should be the enemy rather than the ground; that the enemy’s will to win must be attacked constantly and that the tempo of friendly operations must dominate and overwhelm those of the enemy’.[57]
For today’s ‘mission command’ to be successful, senior commanders must be able to trust their subordinates (and vice-versa), and it is worth noting how often Slim recounts in his own narrative, the value of his network built up over many years. Several of his commanders had served in the same battalion as Slim, and many more he had already worked with extensively in the British Indian Army[58]. His time instructing, both at Camberley and in the Indian Staff College, had also allowed him to meet and gauge a great many officers. (Such networking also facilitated the informal or ‘horizontal’ spread of ideas and adaptation in much the same way as it had in World War 1.[59]) Mission command, and by extension, the manoeuvrist approach, is fundamentally dependent upon trust, and trust is built through competence and familiarity. In a confused and fluid contemporary battlespace with a high likelihood of electro-magnetic spectrum denial, the manoeuvrist approach remains as relevant and essential today as it ever was. If the UK is to depend on the manoeuvrist approach in future wars, then it would do well to give appropriate recognition to the value of networking; nationally, across all Services, and with allies, as a fundamental pre-requisite for success; and the vital role of face-to-face engagement in settings such as staff and officer training colleges.
Slim’s early adoption of the ‘manoeuvrist approach’ demonstrates recurring themes in his leadership: those of adaptation and innovation. In his own words, necessity was the mother of invention.
“In Burma we fought on a lower scale of transport, supplies, equipment, supporting arms, and amenities than was accepted in any other British theatre. Yet, largely because of this lack of material resources, we learned to use those we had in fresh ways to achieve more than would have been possible had we clung to traditional methods.”[60]
Adaptation and Innovation
Slim’s XIVth Army is often held up as an exemplar of adaptation, and rightly, much of the credit for this is attributed to Slim himself who undoubtedly promoted it both as a means of countering Japanese modus operandii, and through necessity. Tactical-level examples of innovation in the XIVth Army (such as ‘parajutes’ and bithess road surfaces) abound, however, without wider structural and organizational innovation, local initiatives alone would have been insufficient to turn the tide in Burma, and lessons learned the hard way may not have been disseminated across the rest of the Army. Despite today’s fairly sophisticated ‘lessons identified’ processes, the task of learning and responding to those lessons remains a key challenge.[61] Even before Slim had taken command of the XIVth Army, Field Marshal Auchinleck (Command-in-Chief, India) reported,
“…much attention was given to the organisation of the Army in India. Many of the changes and innovations were the result of experience gained during the fighting of the previous dry season, and some were far-reaching in character.”[62]
He goes on to describe the major changes in officer training and selection within the Indian Army, initial soldier training, jungle fighting, collective training, engineer training, and combined operations training and organization.[63] In addition, rapid infrastructure improvements were set in hand both in terms of road- and rail-building, improving inland waterway navigation, and constructing new airfields.[64] He concludes by stating that “…in this theatre, our men have to acquire an almost entirely fresh technique in the tactics and stratagems of jungle warfare.”[65] Clearly, for adaptation to be effective and enduring, it requires both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ impetus as well as an effective means of sharing ideas ‘horizontally’ throughout the organization. The Japanese however, contributed to their own defeat by failing to adapt even when it became obvious that their tactics were increasingly less effective.
‘In marked contrast to its opponents, the Imperial Japanese Army moreover had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, still clinging to fighting methods that had largely outlived their usefulness.’[66]
The importance of an adaptive culture at all levels is well understood: ‘Doctrine, technology, and leadership are the three most critical components of military adaptability’[67] although there remains debate about the role played by ‘organizational culture’ and whether it is a separate component of adaptability or an integral part of doctrine, technology, and leadership. Some would contend, perhaps more intuitively, that ‘corporate culture determines how an organization responds to change’.[68] One thing is certain though: ‘militaries with adaptable doctrine, technology, and leadership have a critical wartime advantage that may spell the difference between victory and defeat’[69]. Consequently, understanding how to promote that adaptive culture must remain an important focus for Professional Military Education and field training, especially as wartime adaptation always entails some cost in resources or time.[70]
Leadership and Self-Awareness
Much has already been written about leadership in the Burma Campaign. In his own account, ‘Bill’ Slim provides some fascinating and very apt reflections on his own leadership and decision-making, never flinching from admitting (at least to himself) his doubts and anxieties, and ‘wrong’ decisions, and remaining honest to himself and those with whom he worked.
‘Bill’s searing honesty was very much a pillar of his character and he never hesitated to tell the troops that they would almost certainly be ‘buggered about’ every now and then’.[71]
Most importantly though, learning from past errors is key to successful adaptation, and requires self-awareness. Throughout the campaign it is clear that Slim possessed enviable levels of self-awareness and humility: two traits that the UK Defence Academy and training organizations seek to promote in future commanders today. He also understood very well the importance of effective administration (logistics) and it underpinned everything he did. In Defeat into Victory, he says ‘I knew that the campaign in Burma would above all be a supply and transport problem…’[72] although he seldom had enough of either. But perhaps Slim’s greatest attribute was to remain level-headed[73] when others were panicking and, when given the opportunity, adapting to meet the enemy threat.
Conclusions
The Burma campaign can teach many lessons and this article has touched upon just a few. In Burma, the British ceded the initiative to the Japanese during the opening stages of the campaign through a lack of preparation at every level. Troops tended not to view the jungle as a permissive environment for operations and lacked the training and psychology to exploit it. Today, we should avoid the psychological trap of supposed ‘no-go’ areas, particularly where they result from the challenges posed by A2AD systems or hitherto off-limits information environments.
Initially in Burma, equipment and logistic resilience were woefully inadequate; command and control structures were not fit for purpose; and Japanese tactics were unexpected. In order to win, Britain and her allies traded space for time in which to adapt, reinforce, re-organize and re-train. In modern day Europe, arguably, we have neither the luxury of trading space for time (not least because of Alliance political considerations), nor the comfort of using distance as protection. Therefore, the ability to rapidly adapt ‘in contact’ is essential for force survival and the skills that facilitate rapid adaptation must be encouraged in today’s leaders. Logistic resilience in terms of materiel reserves, supply-chain, and transport is fragile, so units will need to fight largely with what they have and to improvise and adapt where there are shortfalls.
Although potential adversaries will nowadays struggle to conceal significant conventional military forces from surveillance platforms, investing in effective intelligence capabilities remains vital if our ‘lean’ forces are to be deployed effectively and avoid surprise attacks.
The British experience in Burma makes a strong case for the rapid and effective dissemination of new ideas, tactics, and ‘lessons identified’. Doctrine must be accessible and keep pace with the lessons learned. The Imperial Japanese Army enjoyed initial successes that played to their strengths, but their predictability turned those strengths into weaknesses. They failed to adapt and were defeated. In recent times, the ‘Western way of war’ has played to our strengths, but in many ways, has become predictable, and our adversaries are already adapting to it.
Successfully integrating capabilities across multiple domains can act as a force multiplier, and the UK’s IOpC is a step in the right direction. Whether progress is fast enough or goes far enough is debatable, with many organizations remaining ‘stove-piped’, and with space and cyber expertise being thinly-spread in many headquarters. IOpC initiatives could also lead to increasing reliance on technology and networks, a Western strength that could easily become our Achilles heel. Technology is not a panacea and we must be able to fight effectively with degraded or denied networks and systems.
Arguably, the Burma campaign, where it parallels contemporary Defence challenges, holds useful perspectives and deserves to be studied in greater depth. Above all however, the campaign demonstrates the need for rapid adaptation in time of conflict: it is the difference between success and failure, although the lesson is far from new.[74] The Japanese in Burma were slow to adapt and paid the price. The Imperial Japanese Army possessed many formidable characteristics, ‘together with the doctrinal rigidity which contributed to its downfall’.[75] Barno and Besahel[76] see adaptability as ‘one of the most, if not the most, important attributes of military forces’ and highlight the role that PME should play in encouraging an adaptive mindset:
‘Professional Military Education (PME) programs provide critical opportunities for officers to discover new ideas and ways of thinking. Yet most of these programs need to do a far better job helping their students develop the skills that they will need to adapt to the fast-moving and complex environment of the future.’
The agile mindset necessary to adapt successfully in conflict requires both a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach within organizations that are ‘learning-minded’, and leaders who are well networked. Training future commanders to be resilient and flexible enough in their thinking to adapt quickly to new challenges is a key factor in achieving successful outcomes, and as Defence develops tomorrow’s commanders and works towards implementing the UK’s IOpC, it must redouble its efforts to nurture and develop such talents.
Wg Cdr (Retd) Guy Edwards OBE served in the RAF for 35 years as a Navigator; including roles as Directing Staff on the Advanced Command and Staff Course and at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Guy currently is a Civil Servant and course developer at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
The author would like to extend his sincere thanks to Dr Alex Wilson of the Defence Studies Department at Kings College London for his support and advice in the production of this article.
[1] Lyman, Robert. Slim, Master of War: Burma and the Birth of Modern Warfare. Preface. Robinson, London. 2004
[2] Slim, William, Field-Marshal Viscount. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945. Cooper Square Press, New York. (2000 edition).
[3] Keane, Fergal. Road of Bones: The Siege of Kohima 1944. Harper Collins London 2010. p323.
[4] Miller, Russell. Uncle Bill: The Authorised Biography of Field Marshal Viscount Slim. Phoenix 2014. p201.
[5] Arguably a ‘concept of fighting [that] emerged from the Cold War… centred on a belief that technological superiority could overcome mass. (e.g. See https://rusi.org/content/western-way-war.)
[6] MOD. Introducing the Integrated Operating Concept 2025. Published online Sep 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-integrated-operating-concept-2025. Accessed 1 Oct 20.
[7] ‘The geopolitical shift to multipolarity and the extensive conventional force modernization of many actors has degraded the West’s traditional technological advantage.’ DCDC — Study Draft Joint Doctrine note on Integrated Action. (Not yet published.)
[8] Gupta, Ashwani. Military Lessons of Burma Campaign: World War II. Scholar Warrior, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Spring 2015. p109.
[9] Dunlop, Graham. The Longest Retreat: Burma 1942. The RUSI Journal, 153:4 15 Sep 2008. p70.
[10] Throughout this article, for ease of understanding, the Allied forces are generally referred to as ‘the British’, whilst acknowledging the forces comprised Indian Army and Air Force Units, West African, Burmese etc.
[11] Miller. Op. Cit. p234.
[12] Masters, John. The Road Past Mandalay.. Michael Joseph, London. 1963. p157.
[13] e.g. General Sir William Slim’s Last Order (2 Dec 1945) ‘…Many races fighting and working in comradeship learned to appreciate one another’s values. Carry that mutual respect into the future, wherever you may be called…’ https://burmastarmemorial.org/history accessed 11 Nov 20.
[14] Thompson, Julian. The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma, 1942–1945. Sidgwick & Jackson, London. 2002. p402.
[15] Martial Race theory was a British idea based on racial and cultural stereotypes that saw certain ethnic, religious, or caste groups as possessing greater fighting character and loyalty than others. Prompted by the 1857 Indian Uprising, the concept provided the British with a means of excluding from the British Indian Army those groups seen as potential agitators.
[16] e.g. from 1800–1914 ‘…a new policy that disparaged the soldiers from Bombay, Madras and large parts of Bengal and sought to recruit only from the areas in the north ands northwest increasingly believed to produce the subcontinent’s most ‘martial races’’. Streets, Heather. Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857–1914. Manchester University Press. 2004. p93.
[17] Moreman T. R. The Jungle, the Japanese and British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941–1945: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare. Frank Cass. 2005. p216.
[18] Slim. Op. Cit. p537.
[19] UK MOD. Doctrine, Concepts & Development Centre. Global Strategic Trends (Sixth Edition) MOD. October 2018. p19.
[20] Lewin, Ronald. Slim the Standardbearer. Wordsworth Editions, Hertfordshire 1999. (First published by Leo Cooper Ltd 1976.) p115.
[21] The Australians were the first of the Allies to prove that the Japanese Land Forces could be beaten when they repulsed a Japanese landing in late 1942 at Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea.
[22] Lewin, Ronald. Ibid. p127.
[23] Giles, Keir and Boulege, Mathieu. Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined. Parameters, Volume 49, issue ½ (Spring/Summer 2019) pp21–36.
[24] Hicks, Kathleen and Hunter, Andrew. What will replace the Third Offset? Lessons from past Innovation Strategies. DefenseOne online March 2017. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/03/what-will-replace-third-offset-lessons-past-innovation-strategies/136260 accessed 20 Sep 2020.
[25] MOD. IOpC. Op. Cit.
[26] Barno. Op. Cit. Key recommendations: ‘Design, train, and test units to operate under analog and degraded conditions’. p.275.
[27] Joint Doctrine Publication 0–01: United Kingdom Defence Doctrine (Fifth Edition), Chapter 2. The Characteristics of the Military Instrument.
[28] Miller. Op. Cit. p238.
[29] Moreman. Op. Cit. p81.
[30] Ibid. p24.
[31] Shelley, Matthew. Military Culture, Learning and Adaptation during the Burma Campaign. 1942–1945. The Forge. 24 Oct 2018. https://theforge.defence.gov.au/publications/military-culture-learning-and-adaptation-during-burma-campaign-1942-1945Accessed 10 Nov 20.
[32] Hickey, Colonel Michael. The Unforgettable Army: Slim’s XIVth Army in Burma. BCA, London,1992. p190.
[33] Dunlop, Graham. Military Economics, Culture and Logistics in the Burma Campaign 1942–1945. Routledge Press 2009. p193.
[34] e.g. ‘Parajutes’ and bithess (bitumen and hessian) road surface: Slim. Op. Cit. pp225 and 398.
[35] Borton, N R M. The XIVth Army in Burma: A Case Study in Delivering Fighting Power. Defence Studies, 2:3 Oct 2007. p49.
[36] BBC News website https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-54988870 accessed 19 Nov 20.
[37] McLynn, Frank. The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph 1942–1945. Yale Library of Military History 2011. p69.
[38] Salmi, Derek M. Slim Chance: The Pivotal Role of Air Mobility in the Burma Campaign. p26. Air University Press. 2014. http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13911.9 accessed 23 Sep 20.
[39] The ‘V Force’ was originally formed as a guerrilla organization but became an invaluable source of intelligence. Thompson, Julian. The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Burma, 1942–1945. Sidgwick & Jackson, London. 2002. p94.
[40] Hickey. Op. Cit. p150.
[41] MOD. Introducing the Integrated Operating Concept 2025. Op. Cit. p6.
[42] Lewin. Op.Cit. p178.
[43] For example with the plan to seize Meiktila (see Slim Op.Cit. p395).
[44] Lewin. Op. Cit. p210.
[45] VKontakte is a Russian social media platform, broadly similar to Facebook.
[46] Bellingcat exposed the movement of the Russian BUK surface-to-air-missile into Ukraine that was used to down Malaysia Airline Flight MH17 in 2014.
[47] Preston-Hough, Peter. Commanding Far Eastern Skies: A Critical Analysis of the Royal Air Force Air Superiority Campaign in India, Burma and Malaya 1941–1945. Published by Helion & Co. 2015. p278.
[48] Armitage, Michael. The Royal Air Force: An Illustrated History. p133. Cassell, London 1993.
[49] Preston-Hough. Op. Cit. p.190.
[50] Preston-Hough. Op. Cit. p175.
[51] Preston-Hough. Op. Cit. Introduction xxv.
[52] AP3003. A Brief History of the Royal Air Force pp167–169. HMSO 2004.
[53] Slim. Op. Cit. p543.
[54] Thompson Op. Cit. p354.
[55] Jefferys, Alan and Rose, Patrick. The Indian Army, 1939–47: Experience and Development. Ashgate Press 2012. Chapter 2. Indian Army Command Culture and the North West Frontier 1919–1939.
[56] Lyman. Op. Cit. p.254.
[57] Lyman. Ibid. p254.
[58] e.g. Lewin, Ronald. Op. Cit. pp138–139.
[59] Fox, Aimee. Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918. Cambridge University Press. 2018. p243.
[60] Slim. Op. Cit. p541.
[61] Foley, Robert T, Griffin Stuart, and McCartney Helen. Transformation in Contact: Learning the Lessons of Modern War. International Affairs 87:2 Blackwell Publishing. 2011. p268.
[62] Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude: Second Supplement to the London Gazette of 27 April 1948 (Operations in Indo-Burma Theatre based on India from 21 June 1943 to 15 November 1943.) p2664.
[63] Moreman Op. Cit. p.211.
[64] Ibid. paras 26–29 and 35.
[65] Ibid. p2681.
[66] Moreman. Op. Cit. p206.
[67] Barno, Lt Gen David and Besahel, Dr Nora. Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime. Oxford University Press 2020. p47.
[68] Fox. Op. Cit. p250.
[69] Ibid. p47.
[70] Van Ess, Brett. Wartime Tactical Adaptation and Operational Success: British and Japanese Armies in Burma 1941–1945. p223. King’s College London (PhD Thesis) Febraury 2019. Accessed online 3 Nov 2020.
[71] Miller. Op.Cit. p238.
[72] Slim. Op. Cit. p169.
[73] ‘Those who matter don’t worry, and those who worry don’t matter’ (One of Slim’s favourite sayings). Lewin, Ronald. Op. Cit. p176.
[74] ‘The need to learn from mistakes, to exploit new opportunities, and adapt to complex situations in order to defeat an adversary on the ‘other side of the hill’ are enduring and timeless.’ Fox, Op. Cit. p3.
[75] Hickey. Op. Cit. p17.
[76] Barno. Op. Cit. Chapter 12.
