Military Discipline: is the British Army Ready to Reform?
The British Army conceived its current disciplinary process in an era of attrition-based conflict requiring punitive practises to regulate mass. According to the historian Foucault, it moulded machine-like soldiers through the Machine and Industrial ages, increasing their utility as it secured their obedience. As the Army sets a course through the untrodden fields of the Information age, the recent publication “Future Soldier” highlights the need for its people to be agile, skilled, and feel increasingly valued. Military discipline, therefore, must produce a very different soldier, whose obedience and professionalism will increasingly require sustained self-motivation. This questions whether its current emphasis on punishment needs to be re-balanced with enhanced reform opportunity to ensure that military discipline enforcement maximises operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century.
Such re-balance is argued for in “Swapping Carrots and Sticks for Treasure: Enhancing the Reform of Military Offenders in the British Army.” The blog contends that Commanding Officers’ (COs) disciplinary powers at Summary Hearing and through Administrative Action are too punitive, correctional and exclusionary, which prevents transformation of behaviours plus denudes the empowerment and upskilling required of the future force. It advocates the formal adoption of Ward’s “Good Lives Model” in units, which is a strengths-based framework of offender rehabilitation. The model encourages practises like mentoring, goal setting and the provision of holistic, multiagency support to help offenders tackle barriers to self-advancement. It is designed to reduce re-offending by increasing individuals’ self-belief and autonomy, in turn unlocking their potential and will to change. Such internalised approach arguably better supports operational effectiveness than punishment by inculcating and sustaining the self-discipline and professionalism required of the future force.
A survey of COs who enforce discipline and Detainees Under Sentence (DUS) at the Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) who have received it, tests the validity of this argument. This sought out opinions and experiences of the current balance between punishment and reform at unit level plus gathered respondents’ views on the impact that these two methods have on offenders’ morale, sense of belonging, and subsequent motivation to desist from re-offending. The findings show widespread support for modernising disciplinary practices with additional reform, but also make it clear that this must be to enhance the punitive powers of a CO’s current disciplinary toolset, not to replace them.
This conclusion derives from four key research findings. Firstly, that there is a clear intent to conduct offender reform at unit level, but this does not reflect practice. Secondly, that the harms of punishment results in a dichotomous situation, in which those needing to change their behaviours risk becoming demotivated to do so. Thirdly, that both the chain of command and soldiers are ready, if not resourced, to adopt a new approach. Fourthly, that the individual impact of punishment and reform must be addressed in the context of a unit’s collective operational effectiveness.
A Balanced Approach?
Just 18% of COs state that the primary purpose of a CO’s disciplinary powers is punishment. They present a widespread belief in the importance of offender reform, summarised by the observation that,
“The underlying principle may be to punish an offender, but if we seek to retain motivated junior soldiers, we should also see it as an opportunity to advise, mentor and counsel.”
In contrast, the number of detainees who believe that punishment is the main purpose of discipline enforcement increases to 62%. This perception is reinforced by phrases like “it’s all about punishment,” “it’s completely punitive” and that “any options are punishments and in no way help out the individual to become better and can lead to further incidents.” Of course, these responses are likely influenced by the detainee’s loss of liberty. However, they are supported by wider findings, indicating a lack of reform opportunity at unit level. For example, only two of the thirteen respondents had ever been placed on a Formal Warning, and only one had received mentoring, suggesting that there remains limited understanding and uptake on how to transform behaviours outside of the formal intervention of MCTC.
Furthermore, data from the COs shows that 39% have never attempted to reform offenders through official measures, like Formal Warning, reinforcing the view that it is under-applied at unit level. The lack of uptake can be explained by inadequate means with only 21% of COs agreeing there is sufficient knowledge and resource to conduct it in unit even though most believe they should. Instead, reform is described as “something that COs ‘pick up’ as they go along” that is reliant on leadership and experience. Whilst essential, leadership attributes by themselves cannot ensure the consistent and effective application of offender reform, resulting in the dominance of punishment without additional intervention for those whose behaviour falls below the threshold of detention.
The Toxicity of Punishment.
This dominance results in a process which places significant harm on individual offenders, with 85% of detainees stating punishment lowered their morale and 62% that it reduced their sense of belonging. Moreover, one Lance Corporal states that Summary Hearing “affected (their) mental health and gave (them) a toxic attitude to the chain of command,” highlighting the psychological entrapment of negative discipline measures. The data suggests this is compounded in a military setting due to Labelling Theory, which contends that offenders internalise the negative expectations that family, friends and authority places on them. For example, one repeat offender describes how they became the “go-to person to blame on camp,” noting the adverse impact this had on their mental health and referring twice to lack of unit support to stop them offending. Their response indicates limited belief and knowledge to change plus an acceptance of their trouble-making role. The reference to camp highlights how the military setting can exacerbate this, since a soldier’s workplace, social community, and authority figures all coincide and risk reinforcing negative labels.
Punishment within an institutional environment also risks heightening an offender’s sense of isolation. This is evidenced in the survey by soldiers who state the discipline process left them feeling like they were “just a number” or had been thrown “under a bus” by their hierarchy. These sentiments demonstrate the disempowering and exclusionary potential of punitive discipline, which undermines the vision in “Future Soldier” of “an inclusive culture where all individuals are valued.” Of course, punishment is detrimental by design to deter offending, denounce unlawful, immoral acts and enable retribution. Whilst these effects may have societal justification, they are not conducive to the transformation of offenders, which highlights the perennial friction that exists between the collective and individual requirements of discipline enforcement. However, Ward’s strengths-based framework means it should not need to choose between these two, providing an inclusive, opportunity for unit personnel to support offenders, post punishment, to the benefit of all.
Reform Ready?
The survey indicates that both COs and offenders are ready for such approach. For example, 62% of detainees stated that they believed advice and mentoring would help stop them from re-offending. Those uncertain were older than 25, suggesting that the younger generation is most receptive to reform. This is reinforced by the belief given by most COs that Generation Z soldiers, comprised of those born from 1997, will potentially respond better to reform than other generations. This age-related data, therefore, indicates the benefit of disciplining future offenders in a more progressive way. As stated by one Generation Z Private,
“soldiers need some type of help to not re-offend.”
COs also appear receptive to reform. 70% deem that formalised offender interventions in unit would be a beneficial addition to their current powers whilst several refer to the need to address the causal factors of offending. One CO, for example, notes that,
“It is rare that an infraction is motivated by an intentional desire to cause harm or do wrong…. there are environmental factors that result in poor decision making, resulting in ill-discipline.”
However, whilst reform is viewed favourably, the study reinforces the traditional view that punishment is the most effective way to sustain unit discipline. 87% of all respondents believe in its potential as an effective collective deterrent whilst its role in reinforcing expected standards is also frequently noted. Furthermore, several COs referred to context being the key determinant of an appropriate balance between punishment and reform. These references to the collective and contextual impact of discipline stress the importance of CO’s retaining command autonomy to deliver discipline according to the wider needs of the unit. As such, this suggests that the enhancement of reform at unit level is most likely to be effective if it supports, not supplants, the current powers of punishment.
A Better Future for All.
Overall, the research demonstrates that punishment remains a necessary way to protect operational effectiveness but risks significant individual harm. Strengths-based reform is an opportunity to mitigate these harms which both offenders and COs appear receptive to. This progressive opportunity to transform offenders must therefore be seized to ensure that military discipline enforcement is fit for the “Future Soldier.”
Statistics provided by Army Personnel Services Group (APSG) are reproduced with permission.
Lt Col Rachel Brunt is a Royal Military Police officer with 16 years’ experience of the service justice system who is currently a student on the Advanced Command and Staff Course.
This BLOG is an academic study conducted as part of the KCL Master by Research programme on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. The views expressed are those of the author; they do not constitute the opinion of, or a representation by the British Army or the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
