The third scramble for Africa: twenty-first century competition in a multipolar world
In the face of declining United States global hegemony and China’s continued drive to promote its preferred system of international governance, the importance of peripheral theatres of competition between rival global powers is growing. Africa has traditionally been a battleground for competition between global powers and in the twenty-first century, as a continent with geographical, economic and security importance for multiple international actors, it is emerging as the principal peripheral theatre in which competition between global powers is being played out.
Africa’s recent history has been heavily influenced by the competing interests of external actors on the continent. Significantly, the ‘scramble for Africa’ of the late nineteenth century, which saw European powers carve up the continent between one another to serve national interests, continues to impact its inter and intra-continental relations today. While various international actors have competed for influence since Europeans colonised the continent, the nature of competition has maintained a number of common themes, of which exploitation of Africa’s vast reserves of natural resources has traditionally been one. For example, China’s rapid economic growth in recent decades has been supported by its exploitation of Africa’s natural resources. In fact, it could be argued that China has become dependent on Africa for its continued growth, thereby precipitating increasing and broadening Chinese activity on the continent, as China looks to secure and protect its access and influence. Gaining the support of Africa’s many members of the United Nations General Assembly has also been a running theme. Decolonisation in Africa coincided in large part with the Cold War, thereby driving competition between the United States and Soviet Union to gain support for their ideologies from the many new African Member States in the United Nations General Assembly, as the second scramble for Africa got underway. In the twenty-first century, Africa’s 54 Member States make up a significant proportion of the whole figure, which stands at 193. In an increasingly multipolar world, securing the support of African Member States in multinational organisations remains an important driver of international competition in Africa. In addition to extraction of resources and gaining support at the United Nations, access to Africa as a rapidly growing market is a further driver of competition, as is the promotion of international actors’ own models of government. Furthermore, Africa’s geographic position is an influential factor which shapes external activity on the continent. Driven by these factors, numerous international actors are engaged in a competition for influence in Africa; evidence [1] supports the assertion that competition between global powers is underway on the continent and will likely intensify over the coming years. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed scrambles for Africa between international actors. As we embark upon the third decade of the twenty-first century, a third scramble for Africa is underway.
Great power competition has become a central factor in the international relations of global powers. The United States is trying to preserve its preferred model of the international system, which was constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War and has gone largely unchallenged since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, China and Russia are trying to bring about change to the United States-led world order, to establish a system that better suits their vision of an effective international system. Great power competition has been a running theme in US policy that stretches back to President Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The National Security Strategy (4) asserted that “…China’s rise, and Russia’s aggression…significantly impact the future of major power relations” and the National Military Strategy (2) went a step further by stating that “Some states…are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens our national security interests.” President Trump’s National Security Strategy (27) went further still, specifically referring to great power competition, by emphasising that “…great power competition [has] returned. China and Russia…are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favour.” More recently, President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (19) explicitly addressed the need to “…prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation.” As made clear in US policy documents of the last six years, great power competition has become part of the narrative in Washington, included in the policy of Republican and Democrat administrations alike. Such a presence in policy making circles over an extended period will have built a mindset of competition within the structures of the United States government, including in the State Department and the Department of Defense. Competition between great powers has previously resulted in scrambles for Africa. The third scramble is likely to intensify as the twenty-first century competition deepens.
There are several reasons why Africa will become an increasingly important location for the competition towards which Washington has refocused its foreign policy. First, Africa remains vitally important for natural resources, control over which is likely to become increasingly contested as they become more scarce. Oil, gold and fish are just some examples of the multitude of natural resources traditionally exploited on the continent, while cobalt, an essential mineral used for batteries in electric cars, computers and mobile phones, will become an increasingly valued commodity as international governments look to move away from fossil fuels. Further, as global demand shifts towards a growing need for renewable energy sources, nations may look to Africa’s enormous coastline and open spaces as opportunities for investment and control. Second, is the geographic position of Africa. In military terms, basing in the Horn of Africa offers power projection opportunities for global powers into the Middle East and South Asia; West Africa, in terms of long-range weapons systems, could be considered close to the East Coast of America; and North Africa’s influence on the Mediterranean means it is of vital importance to the countries of Western Europe and their allies. Third, gaining the support of African Member States in the United Nations continues to be a driver for engagement. As competition between global powers intensifies, the value of the support of African nations in multinational fora will increase.
It is in these 3 areas, primarily, where the fight for influence is intensifying. Importantly, however, while competition is likely to increase in Africa in the coming years, the severity of any escalation, in a global sense, is likely to be limited. This could present a greater risk for African nations, as great powers may be more willing to confront one another in an African theatre of operations. Intensifying competition in the South China Sea, or over Taiwan, for example, could quickly escalate to major military confrontation between great powers, with global implications. Equally, similar risks exist in Eastern Europe. It is conceivable, however, that limited military confrontations between international actors could occur in Africa, or along the African coastline, without major risk of escalation. Peripheral theatres of competition are likely to generate increasing activity in the twenty-first century, as great powers look to extend their influence. Indeed, they may even be used as testing grounds for intensifying methods of competition. The third scramble for Africa could see the continent emerge as chief among these peripheral theatres.
Common themes run through the history of international competition in Africa. An area of change in the twenty-first century, however, is that of African agency. Africa is becoming increasingly important in global affairs. The continent’s population growth rate in the coming decades, alone, will enhance its influence on the international stage. As the influence of African nations grows, so too will the intensity of the competition to garner influence on the continent. Nevertheless, it is not in the interests of African nations to choose sides in competition; instead they will seek to protect their national interests through selecting the most productive relationships across their international partners. Indeed, nations which make it clear that their engagement with Africa is centred upon competition with other global actors (as seen with the Trump Administration), are likely to erode their relationships with African partners. The expanding international influence of African nations may result in the continent becoming increasingly influential on the balance of power in the emerging multipolar order.
Africa is vital ground for the multiple international actors which have extensive interests there: its geographic position makes it highly valuable for securing access to the global commons, to support both international trade and security, and the growing influence of African nations in international affairs means they are becoming increasingly valuable allies, as powers of the emerging multipolar world order seek support for their preferred model of the international system. This, alongside the reduced likelihood of major international escalation following any great power confrontation in Africa, is driving an increasingly intense third scramble for Africa, which is likely to have implications on the balance of power in the emerging multipolar order.
[1] Evidence emerged from primary source data gathered by the author in interviews with senior officials in the FCDO, MOD, USAFRICOM and NATO.
Wing Commander Jack Holt is a Royal Air Force Logistics officer with extensive professional experience in sub-Saharan Africa.
This BLOG is an academic study conducted as part of the KCL Master by Research programme on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. The views expressed are those of the author; they do not constitute the opinion of, or a representation by the Royal Air Force or the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
