War in the Information Age: who fights for whom?
‘If twenty-first-century warfare has any theme, it is information,’ notes Robert Leonhard. He is here describing the implications of the information age for armed conflicts. The speed of light of information distribution across language barriers on the internet since 1990 has fundamentally changed global communications And this process has not stopped with just the peaceful use of communications. As Peter Singer and Emerson Brooking sum it up: ‘Information is weaponized.’ How will this influence military strategy? How can military strategy still continue to fulfil its instrumental purpose for strategic ends in the Information Age? Will military strategy remain a human activity or has the human being reached the end of their capacity and be overburdened? This blog will explore the influence of the information era on military strategy concerning its instrumental purpose for achieving political goals and analyse whether military strategy continues to be determined by humans or does the influence of information technologies mean that the human is no longer in the loop?
What is the information age?
Since the mid-1990s, there has been much discussion about life in the information age. Manuel Castells describes the effects of this new era: ‘We have entered a purely cultural pattern of social interaction and social organization. This is why information is the key ingredient of our social organization and why flows of messages and images between networks constitute the basic thread of our social structure.’ The significant gamechanger has been the result of the combination of the internet and smartphone that has led to the emergence of social media. At the beginning of 2021, more than 90 % of all people in Western Europe and North America were online. Such dramatic changes in society also necessarily entail changes in the international system and therefore also in the area of military strategy. For instance, Russia’s military doctrine illustrates this approach by pointing out that future conflicts are determined by information and that the main battlespace is in the mind.
But is this really new? For Sun Tzu, information was the crucial element of military strategy: ‘Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.’ Carl von Clausewitz emphasised the importance of knowledge and therefore information as ‘a factor more vital than any other.’ This knowledge based on information seems easier to achieve nowadays than ever before. Hence, the development of military strategy should become simpler. But is it?
How can military strategy still serve political ends?
Military strategy has always been instrumental to achieving political goals. Colin Gray emphasised ‘strategy is the only bridge built and held to connect policy purposefully with the military and other instruments of power and influence.’ Military strategy does not pursue an end in itself or serve any of the military’s own goals. This also results in an interaction between the two. Changes in the political environment have an impact on military strategy. In the information age, the factor of the sheer speed of information passage takes on a whole new level of importance in general and also for military aspects. Even a fighter aircraft, a symbol of faster air warfare compared to land warfare, cannot match the speed of electrons in the information age. In order to meet the requirements of the factor ‘speed’ in the information era, different organisational possibilities have emerged for the states to bridge the gap between the military and the political sphere. Whereas in the past a courier on horseback or later a telegram was the standard for the transmission of information at speed, quasi-real-time information is more the rule than the exception today. For instance, while during the Cold War newspaper articles or interviews with prominent figures provided the forums for strategic messaging, today social media allows for direct action and reaction in the information realm. There are various ways of reacting to this form of faster communication and also the faster possible counter-reaction of the adversary in the information area. There is the Russian centrally organized one. The close link between Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and the armed forces has been cited as a guarantee of success in the context of the annexation of Crimea. This close and direct connection enabled Russia to react quickly to developments in the crisis and reactions of other states. Changes in political planning, for example in the adaptation to the behaviour and messaging of NATO countries, could be passed on immediately to the military. This made it possible to deploy Russian resources in a coherent manner, especially in the area of the targeted use of (dis)information.
In contrast the Hamas’s militants act more in a loosely networked way than Russia from an organisational perspective. The decentralised form of organisation of Hamas should enable each individual within it to react immediately to events in the information area. The factor of speed in the information realm is not managed, as it is in Russia, where there are more direct links between politicians and the military, but by having more independence for each individual.
Thus, while military strategy remains instrumental in achieving political ends, both in Russia and in terms of Hamas, the form it takes is different: A stricter link in Russia or a decentralised one that encourages the individual as with Hamas.
Will machines ever take over military strategy and therefore say how the political goals will be achieved?
The advent of the information age with the characteristics described was associated with great expectations in the field of warfare and military strategy. ‘The bridge of strategy is constructed, maintained, and trafficked by people,’ points out Gray, emphasizing the importance of the human factor for military strategy. The significant increase in the availability of information has different effects for the human factor of military strategy: For a military leader there is the danger of information overload, for example. This is because humans are seen as uniquely ill-equipped to handle the mass of information in the 21. Century in general. More and more satellite imagery, GPS tracking of every soldier and vehicle, information off the internet or other open sources strongly increases the amount of information a military leader is confronted with. Perhaps machines that can handle the amount of information better than the human brain and will soon take over the creation of military strategy? However, there are also some human aspects in military strategy that will not be so lightly replaced by machines.
First of all, the military leader is more than the one who uses strategy to achieve political goals. The leader is also a trainer, educator and role model for their subordinates. A task that can hardly be taken over by computers.
Secondly, the availability and accessibility of information in the 21st century can make strategy even more human. Entire societies are participants in the new battlefield, whereby Singer and Emerson state due to the availability and therefore dissemination of information that controlling the information is controlling the people. They pointed out: ‘All it takes is a smartphone to attack an adversary’s centre of gravity.’ Therefore, anyone can use their smartphone to become part of military strategy, both their own state and that of an opponent at any time and any place. Whereas in the past the way to become an active participant in a military conflict was to register or be drafted into the military, train as a soldier, and be equipped by the state with weapons and uniforms, today all you have to do is buy a mobile phone. Now you can actively participate in the conflicts in the social networks, no matter where you are in the world. Humans can therefore become part of the military strategy more easily and quickly than before.
But most important: There is more to military strategy than processing information in the form of 1 and 0. Ethical, legal, cultural and political aspects play a key role over and above the question of optimising decision-making. David Lonsdale does not see the replacement of the human factor by a machine either: “Ultimately, information has to be handled and used by humans.” Humans will therefore remain in a central role in military strategy even in the information age. Or to point it out like Glenn Gray’s, ‘for all its inhumanity, war is a profoundly human institution.’ And this will also apply to the generation of military strategy.
Everything the same or everything new?
On the one hand, military strategy will continue to be used to achieve political goals. However, the form may change. There can be different developments. A closer link between the military and the political sphere or a strengthening of the lowest level are possible reactions to developments in the information age. On the other hand, even as the amount of information continues to increase and seems to overwhelm the human brain, the human factor will continue to be the decisive factor in the formation of military strategy.
So what for military strategy?
Military strategy must adapt to the changes in the information age. In particular the humans — who are at the heart of military strategy — will face new challenges. The question for states will be how do they adapt their military strategy to the new environment? Do they want to have tighter control, for example, or encourage the tactical level to act themselves to counter the time factor in the information era? What role should technology play? Perhaps these are more questions than there are answers at present. But then it is time to start answering them today, because there will never be a better time. Tomorrow is a worse time to deal with the current questions based on the information era than today.
Lt Col (GS) Marc Nolte is a mountain infantry officer from the German Bundeswehr with a range of operational experiences and posts at tactical, operational and strategic level.
This BLOG is an academic study conducted as part of the KCL Master by Research programme on the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. The views expressed are those of the author; they do not constitute the opinion of, or a representation by the Bundeswehr or the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
