Peace Agreements in the Horn of Africa: An Appraisal of the Literature

Given the multiplicity of peace processes and the prospect of emerging ones(definitely many will be coming) due to the developing crisis in the subregion it might be expedient to revisit the piece I wrote to IAG in June 2010.

Executive Summary

This paper is concerned with an assessment of the literature on Peace Agreements in the Horn of Africa. There are several notable difficulties with the way Peace Agreements/PAs/ in the Horn of Africa have traditionally been approached by researchers and academics. Partly, this is an extension of the problems of research on PAs at the global level. In sum, there has been little comparative analysis in the way that PAs have been defined or conceptualized in individual peace processes, many of them have rarely been comprehensive or holistic, and often there appears be little meaningful relationship in the literature between any particular peace agreement and actual implementation. This reflects the reality that until recently there was lack of focus within the academic community. Unlike most of the academics who maintain that the actors of the various conflicts as well as policy makers in the region are responsible for the grim reality of peace processes, it will be contended here that partly to blame is the failure to base the peace processes on a sound theoretical grounds.

The key hypotheses of this review then are first, that the profile of PAs has varied very much from agreement to agreement; second, this has been dominated by a handful of Western observers which have injected their own experiences and narrow perceptions into the study; and third, the evidence suggests that peace processes and agreements in the Horn have never been treated as a major focus of study by their own. They were relegated into, at best, one section in a whole chapter, and at worst, a mere mention in a detailed study of conflicts in the sub-region. Fourth, in almost all the attempts at dealing with PAs as a subject neither the external dimensions , nor the security arrangement of PAs per se, have received enough scholarly attention, and there has been even less effort to link the emerging literature on peace agreements and negotiations with a case-study work on individual processes. Fifth, there has been little scholarly follow up on the implementation of peace processes and lack of a holistic approach on lessons learned.

Introduction

Peace making and mediation is a major subject of its own which requires specialized studies, expertise and resources. Over the past decade, peace processes have emerged as a vital concern for national and international policy in conflict-affected societies. The end of the Cold War allowed a renewed interest on conflict resolution and the ways in which conflict terminates. Peace processes are influenced by the broader human security agenda. A key stimulant for this was the realization that conflicts constitute a major impediment to the development aspirations of the African continent. In the wake of the multi-layered violent conflicts in the 1990s the international community, civil society and regional organizations became concerned about ending conflicts and peace making everywhere in Africa, with a particular emphasis on the Horn of Africa that have constituted a particular sense of urgency.

Meanwhile, the increasing focus of development agencies on peace, human security and governance issues created the space within which a strategic emphasis on PAs began to emerge. In this sense there has been greater readiness from regional organisations and international actors to actively engage in peace agreements throughout the world, particularly Africa. Peace Agreements (PAs) have been an important vehicle for ending civil wars, furthering the agenda of peace-building and democratization. As a result, PAs have been, to a varied degree, an integral part of research and analysis in conflict studies. However, the profile of PAs in conflict research has varied very much from agreement to agreement; overall, the evidence suggests that PAs has not been a priority in most academic journals and policy processes.

This paper in the first instance is based on years of personal engagement in analysing conflicts and peace processes in the Horn of African Sub-region. A close examination of the disparate writings on peace processes in Africa and beyond is also a major component of this review. As a result, while referring to the limited relevant literature, this study is largely based on discussions with a range of people, mostly activists, mediation experts and policy makers, carried out over the years. A thorough examination of IGAD’s regional based peace process cannot be considered in this paper, and instead the intent here is to restrict the focus to the most recent and major peace agreements in the sub-region: the peace agreements in Sudan (CPA, DPA, and EPA), the post-2001 Ethiopia-Eritrea peace agreement and the Somali peace processes.

The Literature on Peace Agreements

With the emergence of a renewed focus on peace agreements in the late 1990’s at the global level, research on PAs by close observers of the peace and security situation in the Horn began to gather real momentum. This coincided with the making of peace agreements in the sub-region. Several attempts in Sudan failed to bring about peace and security, until some hope was restored in 2005 by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/. No less than twenty three national-level peace initiatives for Somalia have already taken place since 1991.[2]

The International Level: What to make of it?

The most important works at the global level that had ,and still continue to have, a great deal of impact on researching PAs in the Horn of Africa are the one’s provided by Accord Peace Agreements Index(2001) such as Conciliation Resources: Accord: an International Review of Peace Initiatives(since 2004)[3], Accord, Peace by Peace. Addressing Sudan’s Conflict (2006), and United States Institute of Peace (2005).[4] Now we have ,interalia, the IDRCs (International Development Research Center’) intensely written and powerfully complied materials, an online resource that gives the impression that it is a result of many years of work. Other recently formed think thanks with global reach such as the International Crisis Group/ICG/-mainly since 2006[5] have begun to provide an assessment of PAs within the framework of policy papers on flash points of conflict. With the publication of several volumes of papers edited by these organizations between 2001 and 2007, the way was prepared for fuller and more objective studies of PAs in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular.

At an individual level, the works of Mats Berdal Reflections on ‘Consolidating Peace in the Aftermath of War’ (2007)[6] ; Stedman, S. J., Rothschild, D. and Cousens, E. M. (eds.) (2002)[7]; Alejandro Bendana (2003)[8], and others sought to dispel the myths surrounding PAs and uncover the secrets behind them. These represent some of the earliest works and depictions of PAs on a global scale and are a valuable contribution to the study of peacemaking processes. Stedman’s riveting account of how PAs go down the drain during the implementation phase, particularly ‘the difficulty score’ serves as strong departure point to analyze the efficacy and sustainability of peace agreements elsewhere, including those related to the Horn of Africa. Equally relevant and to the point are Mats Berdal’s (2007).

However, the most important writer who greatly influenced many in the way (including myself) of critical thought and examination of PAs in the Horn is Alejandero Bendana.In articles that are sometimes combative in tone and judgment,Alejandero writes with quite antipathy of the international system and its models of peacemaking. Nowhere is that sense of defiant critique of the international community more evident than in one of John Young’s memo on the Sudan Peace Processes: No More Diplomacy but Revolution (2006). [9]Rather than encourage national ownership and support a process agreed upon by local actors and help in its implementation, external actors try to dictate the terms of peace. This message has come out most clearly in the Horn of African context where the reports note that most PAs have been dictated by external players. Bendana’s volumes set the standards for reviewing the international approaches at conflict resolution and peacemaking.

Based on a comparative study of international experiences (notably in Latin America) he concluded that the dominant model of peace building applied by multilateral organizations and governments is ‘top down, externally and supply-driven, elitist and interventionist,’[10] and that is an apt description of most of the peace process in the Horn of African sub-region. My take on what this means is that first, the concepts, institutional structures and timeliness that guide peace processes need to be ‘home grown’, and reflect local needs, priorities and circumstances. Second, peace processes should be seen as a global policy issue, inviting greater input and commitment by major powers, particularly during the implementation phase. And external actors seeking to encourage peace can maximize the impact of their assistance during the implementation period.

The Regional Level: What it is?

Unfortunately, there are few detailed works on peace agreements in the Horn of Africa. Most of them are done by academic specialists who carry the burden of incorporating PAs into their research at some level or the other. These include John Young, Alex de Waal, Jeremy Brick hill, Gerard Prunier, Matt Bryden, Ken Menkhaus,Sally Heally and co. and last but not least the ICG. We don’t have a great deal of research on PAs that is set in Africa by Africans.

A great deal of work on Sudan, particularly Darfur belongs to Alex de Waal, though he treats the subject within the context of broader analysis and not as a separate theme, with some exceptions such as ‘As they sign a peace is this face of yet another tragedy?’ (March 8, 2005).[11] In all his writings on Sudan Alex is known for making up anecdotes about peace processes, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA/, but his sympathy and adoration of the international instruments is so great that at times his policy proposals are a negation of his very analysis. There are, broadly speaking, two major areas of weakness. The first belongs to sources; besides his policy recommendations have never been hard-hitting. Sharp and cutting his analysis could be, his conclusions doesn’t bite. He is often correct to note the origins of the problem and the real challenges faced by PAs, but he is unconvincing in his critique of the implementation phase.

Although he makes clear his own view that the problem lies with the Government of Sudan/GOS/ he understands that the conclusions will not be warmly received by governments and regional organizations. This approach has spilled over to and fatally wounded the works of the African Union High Panel -The Mbeki Panel- on Sudan. Alex provided Briefing Papers as early as 2004(Justice Africa/InterAfrica Group or IAG Briefings 31) on the run-up to the signing of the CPA all the way up to 2007.[12] This provided an opportunity to follow the peace process in Sudan on a regular basis, and helped a lot in our understanding of the issues surrounding PAs, particularly the issues surrounding the CPA. The notes from Alex now defunct are still the basic guide to the mechanisms and processes that brought about the CPA. His chief sources were a couple of well-connected Sudanese. Given the dearth of work on Sudan and his significant contribution to research on the conflicts in the region, one would have expected a major preoccupation on peace agreements. Contrary to what others might suppose, his works has hardly placed PAs at the center of his writings.

The Sudan Peace Agreements (discussed more fully by John Young and Alex), and the Somali Peace processes (some what covered by Matt Bryden and Ken Menkhaus) received a great deal of attention than the Algiers Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. With in Sudan, most of the focus is on the CPA,and to some extent the Darfur Peace Agreement/DPA/.Unfortunately there are few analytical studies of the conflict in Eastern Sudan and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement/EPA/, apart from that of John Young,[13]an unpublished memo by Sara Pantuliano (See: ‘Comprehensive Peace? Causes and Consequences of Underdevelopment and Instability in Eastern Sudan’, (2005)[14] and a study by the Brussels based International Crisis Group, Sudan: Saving Peace in the East (2006)[15]. The most serious work on the EPA is however, the one by John Young which is largely based on interviews of a range of people, mostly activists, carried out in a number of centres of Eastern Sudan, including Port Sudan, Sinkat, Kassala, New Halfa, Gedarif, and during the course of a two week visit to Asmara in September-October 2006.[16]

John’s works added considerably to our understanding of the disparate PAs in Sudan. A veteran observer of Sudan (alongside Alex and Gerard Prunier) and author of more than a dozen articles, among others, he keeps reminding us that peace processes in Sudan, including the CPA, have totally missed the point. His is the view that foreign diplomats have given the CPA, an agreement that is not comprehensive, sanctions majority power to an Islamist cabal in Khartoum that has little support, divides and weakens the opposition, and is perpetually in a state of crisis. One criticism of his approach is its propensity to conclude that all peace processes in Sudan suffer from similar problems. Rather than refining his simple explanations, he merely extends it from the CPA and EPA to the DPA.

Managing to be both humorous and deadly serious John has repeatedly made a point that the Peace Processes in Sudan are deeply flawed. He further asserts that not only have the foreign diplomats produced a failed peace process in Darfur, a southern peace process in crisis, and a third in the east which does not begin to address the problems of marginalization for which easterners went to war. His analysis has all the indications that the EPA was signed by Eritrea on behalf of the Eastern Front, leaving the problem largely unresolved. I wonder if he is quite as pessimistic now as he was a year or two ago. On the other hand, Alex de Waal, tilts towards putting the blame on the actors of the conflict than on the approaches adopted by the International Community/IC/ or the Sudanese government for that matter. Gerard Prunier, by contrast, in many of his writings that appeared in Open Democracy takes the view that we already know where the problem is and what the solution should be.[17]

In Gerard Prunier’s view the Sudanese government, including the West which has been repeatedly fooled by the NCP, is solely responsible for the complications created on peace processes, turning the country into a mere collection of unviable peace agreements. Gerard himself indulges in exaggeration when he claims the NCP is responsible for everything. His writings have been ‘very popular’-perhaps because it is always tempting to distinguish among the NCP-led government and its opponents and external actors- reveal a problem of his approach. His success is limited chiefly by a problem of sources, one that oddly echoes the works of Alex de Waal. His works suggest a surprising addition to this list of limitations.

A slightly different and more useful observation on the Darfur peace process that, infact, represents a slight departure, if not an improvement over most of the expert’ comments on Sudan peace processes is the one by Jeremy Brickhill (2007)[18]. Jeremy’s questioning of the viability of peace agreements that lack detailed and robust security arrangements seem to be largely influenced by his association with the on-going debate on Security Sector Reform/SSR/ and Peace Agreements within the African Security Sector Network/ASSN/. ASSN is exceptional in Africa, even beyond, in providing the most insightful, serious and focused analysis on the nature of peace agreements. It is fair to say that the vast literature of PAs based on a broader policy imperative, though it represents perhaps the most impressive research of recent years, seldom draws from an analysis of SSR.[19]Those articles and policy papers, supplemented by dozens of secondary sources, are certainly the basis for a standalone report on Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements.[20] Edited by Eboe Hutchful, Chair of the ASSN, this superb collection of materials is a profoundly suggestive and illuminating work on PAs and security in Africa to date.

Apart from the literary aspects of SSR and security arrangements, the work by the ASSN (2009) has extensively dealt with some of the key aspects (such as comprehensiveness, inclusivity, and role of external actors, implementation and follow up mechanisms) of PAs in Africa. For this reason alone all researchers and academic specialists on conflict should read the works of the ASSN and use its method as a guide for interpreting contemporary events and texts. This fascinating and ambitious project makes arguments that are important well beyond SSR provisions in Peace Agreements and the groves of the academe. Partly an extension of this exercise is the paper on the War on Terror and Peace Agreements in the Horn of Africa (2008)[21]. A focused paper, one full of fresh insight into the relationship between two or three complex factors: War on Terror, interstate conflicts, and Security Arrangements in PAs in the Horn of Africa, it could be of much interest to all specifically interested on the nature, course and outcome of PAs.[22]

Since 2002 or so several short notes have come out on the Somali peace processes by Matt Bryden and Ken Menkhaus (and to some extent Ronald Marshal). Menkhaus (2003)[23] commented on almost all peace making efforts, focusing on their shortcomings as externally driven. However, no one is more responsible than Matt Bryden (2002), for clearing away the confusion of the Somali Peace Processes. The most notable, in this case, is his exposé’ on The IGAD Peace Process for Somalia: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? In this he asked the pertinent question-why should the Eldoret initiative succeed where others failed? And his sort of ‘simple’ answer is that, it probably won’t. Further explaining his position Matt argued that, like most Somali peace conferences, the Eldoret conference has, among others, been preceded by insufficient consultation with the principal Somali actors, with little meaningful diplomacy to build confidence in the process.

During the past five years there have been several short profiles on Conflict resolution Best Practices in Africa at the Tswalu Dialogue of the Brenthurst Foundation[24](produced by a colloquium of African experts) which is also available in a digital edition. Given the explosion of papers by the International Crisis Group/ICG/, it is also comforting to have one analysis on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Process, Weaknesses of the Algiers Agreement (2008)[25] one that provides a critique of the military and political conflict with an overview of the Algiers Agreement. A major contribution on PAs in the Horn that deserves appreciation is the work of Sally Healy and Co., Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel (2008)[26] which has produced a thoroughly engaging and compelling analysis, original in its treatment of several PAs in one discussion paper. By asking what is the common denominator in all the three major PAs and tracing their connections with a wide range of factors in each respective countries, Sally made a serious attempt to provide a comparative analysis of the major peace processes in the sub-region. This is a rare accomplishment.

Gaps and Limitations

As the preceding section clearly shows, during the past few years we have had several several attempts at researching peace agreements, of which the work by the ASSN is the most recent and the finest; and more studies may be on the way. And yet we cannot seem to get enough out of it. This makes the review on the literature on PAs in the Horn less interesting than it really is. Part of the reason for this pessimism is that most of the research on PAs in the Horn is devoid of comparative analysis, lacks details and is highly fragmented. The problematic nature of current research on peace processes overall reflects the underdeveloped conceptualization of PAs at the time that many of these PAs were negotiated or documented, not least among the countries, organizations/agencies leading the process. The fragmented approach favored in these PAs was enhanced by poor coordination among academic/research institutions, researchers and decision makers, and the policy community at large. The results are less satisfactory.

This brief over view ends with six broad reflections on the current research on PAs that have implications for future research on the subject. The study on peace agreements in the Horn suffers from 1) disjointed approach 2) uneven coverage 3) Unnecessary emphasis on textual provisions 4) lack of follow up in the implementation phase 5) weak dissemination, and 6) narrow view of the security sector.

1. Thus far, peace agreements in the Horn of Africa have been considered in isolation from each other. Regional analysts, for their part, have traditionally avoided a topic that transcends country case studies and challenges generalisations. The only exception is the work by Sally Heally, Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel (2008) which tried to sketch a comparative analysis of the three major PAs in one study report.

2. The profile of PAs has been uneven; overall coverage, consistency and follow-up have tended to be limited in most of them. By contrast, the CPA followed by the DPA have received considerable attention, and follow up themes on both attract commentaries, often drawing upon extensive field experience and a substantial body of literature, even though many gaps remain. Indeed, there is some question as to the extent to which there is an understanding that a comparative analysis is required. While there is some literature emerging on Peace Agreements, as well as some case-study work on the specific processes, there has been little effort to relate the two.

3. Focus on the textual provisions of a peace agreement, than the issues surrounding them. Too little is known of the situation surrounding the signing of the agreements. The works so far don’t try hard to bring to light nuances and shades of meaning that have forced signatories and eluded mediators.In other words, majority researchers on PAs in the Horn of Africa failed to ask the real question- when is a peace agreement really a peace agreement? Many of them, with a couple of exceptions, made little effort to interrogate the issue- why do some peace processes succeed and others don’t? Specifically, what did the peace agreement say about (and the links between them) addressing the real and underlying causes of the problem; issues of transitional justice; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration/DDR/; what was the nature of the implementation regime, and how did it function in practice?

4. In most of the studies, important issues of implementation have been conceived rather narrowly, with the primary emphasis on the signing. Even so, expositions covering these areas have typically been vague, focused on short-term actions, and lacking detailed analysis on implementation plans or schedules. In even fewer cases have researchers sought ‘sustained’ scholarly engagement on implementation arrangements? What is still not clear (from either this literature or the relevant peace making and peace building efforts) is the linkage between DDR and broader SSR processes. As a consequence, there has been little in terms of addressing the real issues that lead to the formal signing of peace agreements- usually a complex of factors such as-what drove the conflict parties to the negotiating table? Were they negotiating in good faith, or were negotiations mainly a tactical ploy. In this regard, most of the researchers did not attempt to assess the implementation phase of PAs against a checklist of good practices.

5. On the other hand, PAs and associated concepts still lack extensive dissemination in the Horn of Africa, and are uneven in their penetration among the academic community and within the respective countries .More to the point, PA remains rather a weak point in the agenda of some of the regional organizations (such as the AU) which have played such prominent roles in conflict resolution in general and the orchestration of peace agreements in particular. This may well explain the persistence of weak presence in many aspects of the CPA, and even in recent peace agreements in Somalia and Sudan (the Djibouti and Doha processes respectively).

6. Most of the literature on peace agreements have tended to have a correspondingly narrow view of what constitutes the ‘security sector’ , this being usually limited to military and paramilitaries, and (much more rarely). As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, peace agreements have tended to have weak Security Sector Governance/SSG/ provisions. A reading of the political and institutional arrangements in many agreements shows that they have usually prioritized mechanics of power-sharing and reconstruction of operational bodies rather than addressing institutions of security governance.

PAs and their relations with security arrangements is a theme that has received only intermittent attention in the mainstream peace and conflict research. These are highly critical to understanding the course of a peace process. Many (with the exception of Jeremy Brickhill, June 2006) failed to focus on, the seemingly, less important but crucial issues such as-what were the specific security demands of the various negotiating partners, and how did these affect subsequent chances for implementation? Were discussions on security issues and security agreements ‘robust’ or ‘weak’ (or somewhere in between)? What immediate and contextual factors explain the security and justice provisions of the peace agreement? Crucial issues of security arrangements, in which DDR and SSR are critical, have not attracted much political will and policy attention, in spite of the well-founded perception that these impact disproportionately upon the failure of peace processes. Thus, those that most negatively influence the outcome of peace processes are left out of the equation; and these are by far the most determining factors in PAs.

Policy makers and development partners have not been much of help either. Indeed, a critical weakness in the research on PAs in the Horn of Africa and, indeed, much of Africa is its profound disconnect with the policy community and decision makers. Research and advocacy programmes on PAs in Africa appear to have largely bypassed the needs of the decision makers at both national and regional level. Another problem is evident too: narrow focus on stakeholders in PAs. Most researchers (perhaps with the exception of Alex de Waal and Matt Bryden) lend little attention to the role of other (popular) sectors in the status and lifetime of PAs. Alex de Waal’s New Multilateralism thesis (2007)[27] is probably the closest one can get to focusing on other stakeholders, such as civil society and NGOs in PAs in the Horn of Africa. Largely missing are also a comparative analysis of the contrasting roles of Civil Society in other regions and countries such as Guatemala, South Africa, and East Timor.

Key Issues

Many have tried hard to provide analysis, resources and a data base on peace agreements in the Horn of Africa. But they have been less successful. This is partly attributed to the complexity and diversity of the subject, including a great deal of technicality and some aspects of vagueness attached to it. Still, closer look at the literature on PAs suggests some diversity to Peace Agreements — not unexpectedly, given that PAs, in spite of certain generic features, are unique in terms of their origin and context, the issues they seek to address, the negotiations that led up to them, the parties (internal and external) driving the processes, and the outcomes and lessons learned.

The case-studies so far have failed to blend analysis of historical with current Peace Agreements across a wide diversity of political and cultural contexts, actors, processes, etc, in part to determine the extent to which lessons learned from past experiences are being applied to contemporary cases (e.g.: Somalia, Sudan), identifying in particular changes in the approach to PAs, to implementation and monitoring, in the roles of local, regional and international actors, and finally, the persistent gaps and how these might be overcome. In a nutshell, what is really missing (and therefore required from) the research on PAs in the Horn is the following:

· A critical investigation of the development processes of the peace agreements and their implementation within the regional environment and the international context.

· A review and analysis of security arrangements(and the inclusion of SSR provisions in peace agreements) and the monitoring of their implementation; and

· A comprehensive and comparative analysis of the lessons learned from previous agreements and the monitoring of their implementation’.

Conclusion

The Horn of African sub-region has come to occupy a central place in the making of Peace Agreements/PAs/. Despite this, there has been little effort to encourage research and policy analysis into this important subject matter. Over the years, analysts have built a “wall” separating study on PAs from the study of all other aspects of regional conflicts. Indeed, the theme of PAs has been relegated into a sideshow and anecdotal references in conflict studies. There is reason to believe, however, this tide may be turning, albeit far too slowly. So much so that, the problem at present is that the monographs have become so numerous, so fragmented, unrefined and so specialized(or narrowly focused) that most academic specialists on peace and security have tended to struggle and throw up their hands at the possibility of synthesizing all this studies, of bringing them together in comprehensive narratives.

While the study of Peace Agreements and their implementation has recently received considerable scholarly attention, there is a ‘multiple deficit’, ranging from the holistic and comparative analysis, the role of external actors, the status and health of an implementation regime, including the study of the security dimensions, and the analysis to the political economy of PAs as such. Neither is well-researched or clearly understood. On the one hand researchers found it difficult to integrate security arrangements in to the study and policy recommendation on PAs. On the other, there is a gap between research on PAs and the policy community. Research on peace agreements in the Horn is ‘half dead, half alive’. Further, while there is some literature emerging on Peace Agreements, as well as some case-study work on the specific processes, there has been little effort to relate the two.

June 2010

[1] Medhane Tadesse is academic specialist on peace and security issues in Africa. A Visiting Professor at Kings College London he, among others, serves as a Senior Security Sector Reform/SSR/ Advisor to the African Union. He is also the editor of the currentanalyst.com.

[2] Matt Bryden. ‘The IGAD Peace Process for Somalia: One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward, October 2002. Both Matt Bryden and Ken Menkhaus (2006) have enumerated 19 national level initiatives between 1991 and early 2006. When the Sodere (1996), Cairo (1997) and Arta (2000) initiatives are taken into consideration, the total is around 23.

[3] For Instance, the work complied by Markbradbury and Sally Healy. ACCORD, Issue 21.An International Review of Peace Initiatives. Whose Peace is it anyway? Connecting Somalia and International Peacemaking. Accord Peace Agreements Index. Conciliation Resources. Mark Simmons and Peter Dixon. Peace by Peace: Addressing Conflicts in Sudan. Issue 18, 2006.

[4] C. Crocker, F. Hampson, P. all (eds) Turbulent Peace: The challenges of managing International Conflict.

[5] International Crisis Group. Sudan: Saving Peace in the East. Africa Report №102. (January 5, 2006); and Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, Africa Report no. 141 June 2008 and Why Algiers is failing: Weaknesses of the Algiers Agreement.

[6] Mats Berdal, ‘Consolidating Peace in the Aftermath of War — Reflections on ‘Post-Conflict Peace-Building’ from Bosnia to Iraq’, in John Andreas Olsen, ed., On New Wars (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2007).

[7] Stedman, S. J., Rothchild, D. and Cousens, E. M. (eds.) (2002). Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Lynne Rienner Publishers: London.

[8] Alejandro Bendana, ‘What King of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessments from the South,’ International Development Research Centre, (Ottawa: January 2003).

[9] John Young, The Sudan Peace processes: No More Diplomacy but Revolution, An Unpublished Memo, June 2006.

[10] Alejandro Bendana, Ibid. This is aptly quoted in John Young’s ‘Flawed Peace Process leading to Flawed Peace’ (2006).

[11] (De Waal, Alex. ‘As they sign a peace is this the face of yet another tragedy?’ Parliamentary Brief. (March 8, 2005); Alex de Waal, 28 September 2006 ‘Darfur peace agreement: so near, so far’. Open Democracy.

[12] Briefing Papers Justice Africa/InterAfrica Group-IAG Briefings 31 January 2004-March2006.

[13] Young, John. ‘Eastern Sudan: Caught in a Web of External Interests.Review of African Political Economy. №109. Vol. 33. (September 2006); John Young, 2006. Eastern Sudan: Local Conflict, Marginalisation and the Threat to Regional Security. CPRD/ISS, 2008.

[14] Sara Pantuliano. ‘Comprehensive Peace? Causes and Consequences of Underdevelopment and Instability in Eastern Sudan’, Unpublished NGO Paper, September 2005)

[15] International Crisis Group. Sudan: Saving Peace in the East. January 2006.

[16] Eastern Sudan: Local Conflict, Marginalization and the Threat to Regional Security.CPRD/ISS. 2007.

[17] Opendemocracy.net For instance Gerard Prunier: Sudan between Peace and War November 1, 2007.

[18] His paper on ‘the Challenges of Implementing Effective Security and Stabilisation Strategies in Peace Processes’, African Security Sector Network/ASSN/ presented in Kampala, Uganda in June 2006 was later updated into Brickhill 2007, ‘Protecting Civilians Through Peace Agreements — Challenges and Lessons of the Darfur Peace Agreement’, ISS Paper 138, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

[19] The ASSN emerged as a result of a process of interaction and ensuing initiatives from a group of African scholars and practitioners with an interest in SSR in 2003. Since then, it has been engaged in cutting-edge analysis on the nature of PAs, with a particular focus on SSR and DDR.

[20]Security Sector Reform Provisions in Peace Agreements’ by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform-GFN-SSR. University of Brimingham,2009.

[21] Medhane Tadesse.’War on Terror, Peace Processes and SSR in the Horn of Africa’. GFN-SSR, Maputo, Mozambique January 2008.

[22] Ibid. It also includes various treatises and sections on the Somali Peace processes (2003) and a note on the Doha Accord: Perils of Peace Agreements in Sudan (March 2010) currentanalyst.com; and chapters on ‘Towards a Framework of Conflict Resolution Best Practices in the Horn of Africa’. Towards Conflict Resolution Best Practice-Report of the 2008 Tswalu Dialogue. The Royal United Services Institute May 2008; ‘UN Peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa’. From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations. University of KwaZulu-Natal press.2009.

[23] Ken Menkhaus. “Protracted State Collapse in Somalia: A RediagnosisReview of African Political Economy (2003)

[24] Among which one relating to the Horn of Africa is Medhane Tadesse, “Conflict Resolution Best Practices in Africa”, The Tswalu Dialogue by the Brenthurst Foundation, 2008.

[25] ICG. Beyond the Fragile Peace Between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, Africa Report no. 141 June 2008.

[26] Sally Healy, ‘Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel’ Royal Institute of International Affairs. A Horn of Africa Group Report by Sally Healy. 2008.

[27] ‘In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the Horn of Africa’. In Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa. CPRD/IAG, March 2007.

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