May 2021 Election Violence Risk Briefing

Matt Scott Frank
The die is forecast
3 min readMay 13, 2021

Syria, the only country within our forecast data with an election this month, is at high risk of election-related violence.

The Mango Trees, Martinique by Paul Gauguin

The ELection VIolence (ELVI) dataset can be downloaded from our GitHub repository and monthly updates are released on the first Tuesday of each new month.

Election event data is subject to change as election dates are delayed, clarified and set in place in many countries.

Feel free to reach out (mfrank@oneearthfuture.org) for any questions regarding our ELVIS platform or analyses contained in the updates.

May 2021 ELVI report

Data and algorithm updates:

  • Forecasts made using updated World Bank and IMF indicators for GDP, population and infant mortality rate.
  • Changed Chad’s regime type of military provisional following institution of military transitional council
  • Added Mali’s October 31 constitutional referendum to ELVI forecast list

Risk forecast for May 2021:

After a rather busy election calendar in April, Syria is the only country within our ELVI data that has an election scheduled for this month.

Although the country’s risk of election-related violence may seem somewhat low given the ongoing decade-long civil war, it is important to note that while high levels of political violence raise our estimates, political violence that occurs as a result of civil war is conceptually distinct from election-related violence which “is levied by political actors to purposefully influence the process and outcome of elections.”

Syria’s most recent presidential election in 2014 did experience election-related violence as, for instance, rebel groups launched mortars into areas of Damascus where voting was taking place, although some of the larger rebel groups announced they would abstain from attacks.

These divergent choices by different rebel groups reflects the dilemma insurgents face during election periods. On the one hand they can continue to engage in violence with the hope of driving down turnout which can destabilize the incumbent by making them appear weak. Indeed, elections in autocracies that expose the incumbent as weak can foreshadow coup attempts.

On the other hand, insurgents could abstain from violence in an attempt to present themselves as allied with the public against the incumbent regime. The rebel groups that announced they would refrain from attacks during the 2014 election presented themselves in this fashion, for instance.

For the government’s part, the Assad regime has undertaken some efforts to assuage public discontent with his government such as raising state salaries and offering cheaper public loans. His regime has also released over 400 individuals arrested for expressing dissent on social media.

These efforts to win public approval are likely aimed at boosting turnout and therefore projecting the strength and stability of the regime. One of the central questions regarding the risk of election violence then will be whether insurgent groups attempt to use violence to depress this turnout.

Looking forward to the rest of the year, there are six remaining elections with risks of election-related violence greater than 50%. Chile, which has the highest estimated risk of election violence will hold general elections in November, potentially with a second round of voting for presidential candidates to be held in December.

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