Is God Good?
If you have come to believe that God exists or considered the hypothetical that God exists, you would likely asked yourself “Is God good?” In this post, I will attempt to dissect this question and answer it accordingly.
I. Realistic Presuppositions
This is a rather perplexing question because it has loads of philosophical baggage tied into it. For starters, it assumes that moral objectivity is real. — That there really are moral values, duties, and obligations that are binding upon all moral agents. This is a loaded assertion since it is a presupposition that mixes realism and at least one universal that morally binds humanity.
Next, the question also assumes that it is a possibility that God could exist, like I mentioned earlier. Lastly, the question in its formulation is very ambiguous about the characterization of this God. Is God a finite or an infinite being? Is God a being at all or is God merely a property (usually, sophisticated Pantheists suppose this)? Is this God personal or impersonal? These questions may be endless, and it may be obnoxious to ask them since it avoids answering the main question in this issue. — However, I too want to answer this question as best as I possibly can, because the truth matters.
II. What We Mean By “Good God”
To answer the related questions so we can think through on how to answer the main one, we need to turn to the perspective of those who usually ask this question today. If you notice any serious and educated individual who asks this question, you will surely see a trending consensus about what people mean by “God.” Usually people will ask this question in mind of an Anselmian God. A deity that is maximally great; a perfect transcendent being.
If you have ever heard of Anselm, you will likely hear of his contemplative and logical argument for God’s existence: the Ontological Argument. Due to his contribution and articulation of God in this argument, you will likely hear his ideas of God as the encapsulation of the “God of the Philosophers.” That is to say, most philosophers of religion in history had harmonizing thoughts about what God would be like if God in fact existed.
My take on this is if we can conceive a God who can be maximally great, then if God were to exist, he must be maximally good too. To understand my contention, please follow my line of argument:
i. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
ii. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then it exists with maximal attributes that are great.
iii. Goodness is an attribute of greatness.
iv. It is possible that a maximally great being exists with maximal goodness.
However, with this first formulation of my argument, it is flawed in two respects:
- “Great” and “greatness” may be a philosophically subjective qualifier in the argument which may give us a valid argument with unsound suppositions.
- “Goodness” may be switched out with other attributes like “evilness”; it does not specify what a certain maximally great attribute is.
Instead of simply answering questions to clarify and justify the language I use my syllogism, I am going to modify it to instead bring clear thinking on goodness and God:
i. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
ii. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then it exists with maximally great attributes.
iii. Benevolence is a qualified attribute for a maximally great being.
iv. Malevolence is not a qualified attribute for a maximally great being.
v. It is possible that a maximally great being is maximally benevolent.
Justifications: Alike the Modal Ontological Argument, if you accept premise (i), (ii) through (v) logically follow. Now, some people may be quite skeptical when first reading (iii) and (iv). If you think this, you may be thinking “well what qualifies an attribute to be maximally great?” and I will answer your question with a quick thought.
“Greatness” implies positive attributes. These attributes may entail benefit or advantage. A possible maximally great being would no longer be conceivably great if it had any attributes that are detrimental or disadvantageous. By this, what we mean by negative attributes (like malevolence, ignorance, or frailty) would be the antithesis of a maximally great being for maximally greatness would be absent in such a being.
With such a logical argument, it would occam’s razor archaic objections like Euthyphro’s Dilemma instead of merely labeling I call my modified argument the “Ontological Argument for God’s Goodness.”
III. Possible Objections
I can think of two objections (there may be another, but I cannot think of it right now) to my modified argument for God’s goodness. One is something akin to supposing that there are no objective moral values and duties. The other objection is that supposing a maximally great being should not be presupposed. I will consider both of these counterarguments individually.
I. “We cannot know that there are objective moral values and duties when thinking about God being good; you are using circular reasoning about whether God is good or not when inferring objective morality”
I would simply have to start out explaining that this possible objection is a self-defeater and not a sufficient explanatory conclusion to the original question I might add. Here we are presupposing in the first place the existence of objective good or bad. We argue that the maxim of objective good is advantageous for a great being to be maximally great. This argument only works if you consider the first premise as true. If you are thinking about God and if he can be good, along the lines of the syllogism, the conclusion is unavoidable. To be skeptical of the validity of this argument is to be skeptical of the validity of framing this presuppositions that there is a God with omni-attributes and that there is objective good. Therefore in the end, if you make this objection, I politely inquire you “why are you considering this question if you think the presuppositions in it are incontrovertibly false?”
This is the subject at hand, and in order to answer it as best we can and see if the subject has any coherency, we must assume that objectivity exists since the question already presupposes that.
II. “God cannot be good if it were finite or had malevolence; the questioner may be considering a different conception of God that would be feasible for such a being to not be good or great.”
This primarily correlates with what I earlier addressed about presuppositions. In this case, yes, the God the questioner thinks of may be evil. However, the God that I have thought through (and other philosophers of religion) can only exist if such a being at all existed is completely different from physical existence, this would entail that such a being would not be subjected to our inconsistencies and flaws (like making bad choices, wishing harm upon others, lacking knowledge, lacking power, etc.).
If you think metaphysical transcendence for a god is impossible (which is the case for malevolent theories of God or non-Anselmian theories), then why characterize such a being as a god in our language? Indeed, how can you make such a counterargument for the falsification of a being that you presuppose is not the being of our subject? If you in fact do think that your counterargument and original inquiry addresses a finite conception of God, then by all means you are correct.
However, it does not harm the coherency of classical theism since you are addressing a theism that most philosophers have observed to be faulty. If you think about the possibility of the truth of classical theism, then you automatically must concede the conclusion that a classical/Anselmian theory of God being good or great is coherent.
