Analysis | A cautious return: The U.S. role in the South Caucasus
Mikael Pir-Budagyan
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has directly affected Europe and shifted power dynamics in the South Caucasus–namely, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. This dispute has long been regarded as Moscow’s sphere of influence, where Moscow was the not-so-honest broker. Since the Kremlin is focused on Ukraine, a number of alternative actors may play a more active role in managing the dispute. The U.S. government’s long-overdue attention to the conflict and the European Union’s mediation attempts, coupled with Moscow’s reduced influence, may pave the way to a settlement not overlooking Yerevan’s interests in the face of Baku’s military pressure. Yet, one should be cautious about ultimately counting Russia out.
The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is one of the ethno-territorial conflicts buried under decades of Soviet rule. Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh used to be an autonomous district (oblast’) in Azerbaijan. Shortly after Gorbachev introduced political reforms, local Armenians declared independence. This led to a series of violent conflicts between the newly sovereign Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s, 2016, and 2020. As a result of the first war, Armenia gained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. In principle, the positions of each country were mutually exclusive. Azerbaijan sought to regain its territories while Armenia enjoyed the status quo and advocated for Artsakh’s independence (Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh). The 2016 escalation did not lead to any substantial changes on the battlefield, but it signaled Azerbaijan’s resolve to use military means as pressure tools.
In 2020, during the forty-four-day war, Russia’s decision to broker a ceasefire agreement between victorious Azerbaijan and defeated Armenia allowed Moscow to deploy some 2000 peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. The ceasefire deal also allowed for the reopening of transportation routes, border demarcation, and transferring Armenia-held land to Azerbaijan. Despite these efforts, there was little progress. Ceasefire violations have become dangerously common, while the implementation of agreement provisions largely stalled due to the unwillingness of each side to compromise.
In September 2022, the fighting renewed along the internationally recognized border with Azerbaijan’s forces entering Armenian territory. The Armenian government has continuously experienced pressure to sign a peace deal that would relinquish its claims on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status and create a Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhichevan. For Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, such a decision would be politically detrimental, given that the country has not entirely been able to overcome its 2020 defeat. The immediate public unrest after the Prime Minister’s words about “an agreement that would brand him as “a traitor” exemplifies the unstable position of the Armenian government.
What has the European Union achieved?
In May 2022, Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Illham Aliyev met in Brussels for what President of the European Council Charles Michel referred to as “productive talks.” Indeed the European Union’s decision to become more involved in the region is highlighted by Pashinyan’s and Aliyev’s negotiations at the European Council meeting in Prague.
The European Union’s involvement in the negotiation process has had mixed results. On the one hand, Brussels is more capable of acting as an honest broker than Russia. To begin with, the European Union, unlike Russia, does not have a reputation for maintaining frozen conflicts to benefit its regional position. Furthermore, the Azerbaijani leadership has been visibly irritated by Moscow’s decision to halt its advance in 2020 and to establish a military presence on Azerbaijani territory. On the other hand, European diplomatic efforts in August 2022 failed due to Azerbaijan’s assertive position, one backed by its increased readiness to use military means to bypass the negotiation table. Most importantly, the European Union lacks tangible enforcement tools to complement its diplomacy.
How does the United States change the game?
The United States has long disengaged from the region. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have maintained close economic and security ties with Russia, and an active U.S. involvement could be considered risky. It is also fair to say that such a complex dispute with both parties adamantly opposing any idea of compromise was seen as an unnecessary headache. Russia has enjoyed an almost unrestrained capacity to use its leverage over the South Caucasus to manipulate frozen conflicts. The situation has changed with the recent military escalation where Armenia formally invoked the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s mutual defense clause yet received no military assistance from its members. Instead, the organization sent a civilian mission to the conflict area to “assess the situation.” The eventual fallout of expectations from the organization in Yerevan gave Washington enough reasons to assume a fundamental weakening of Russia’s regional influence. At the same time, speaker Pelosi’s visit to Yerevan amid continued clashes, even as a part of a congressional delegation, signaled US interest in supporting Armenia when Russia, its primary security guarantor, is struggling to keep the occupied Ukrainian territories.
Following the September incursion, the United States seemed to abandon its former indecisive stance on the conflict, and de facto acknowledged Azerbaijan as a ceasefire-violating party. This policy change is especially significant in light of the broader strategic significance of the region. With Russia’s retreat, countries like Turkey, China, and Iran can strengthen their presence in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s unconditional backing of Azerbaijan coincides with Moscow’s weakened capacity to safeguard its interests. For this reason, the United States must not abandon its role as a mediator with the ability to counterbalance Ankara’s support for Baku.
U.S. involvement helps maintain the internationalization of the peace talks. International attention to the conflict improves transparency and puts pressure on the more belligerent party, Azerbaijan, to refrain from using violence. It also amplifies the European Union’s capacity to act as an honest broker. Having become more reliant on Azerbaijan’s gas exports, Brussels alone does not possess enough leverage to soften Baku’s position. The United States has significantly more room to side with Armenia, not for the purpose of undermining Azerbaijan but to allow for a more inclusive diplomatic process. In effect, if unconstrained, Azerbaijan’s policy seeks to achieve Yerevan’s capitulation, which will not bring lasting peace to the region. Instead, it will recommit the South Caucasus to ethnic conflict and new cycles of violence.
Is Russia out?
A truly lasting peace settlement in the region must involve Russia, even considering its weakened international position. Although both Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to have engaged in Western-led peace negotiations, Pashinyan and Aliyev regularly communicate with Putin and inform him of their positions.
The West should still count on regional actors instead of trying to replace them. One must acknowledge Moscow’s stakes in the conflict and the fact that it is unlikely to disappear from the map regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Despite the high tensions around the war in Ukraine, the United States and its European allies need to maintain pragmatic approaches to other regions, especially where Moscow’s traditionally strong position may crumble, encouraging desperate actions to reassert it.
Beyond the scope of the conflict, the European Union and the United States have an opportunity to improve their ties with Armenia with fewer risks than when Russia’s role was more pronounced. However, these efforts should not force Yerevan to renounce its relations with Moscow. Armenians have already chosen democratization over revanchism by reelecting Pashinyan with a strong 54% mandate after he lost the 2020 war. Pashinyan’s post-2020 campaign was primarily based on peace-seeking initiatives, however naive and broad they were. Similarly, his opponents from Armenia’s undemocratic past who ran on a more revisionist platform failed to win enough public support to take over the parliament. Azerbaijan’s government, on the other hand, apart from pursuing a belligerent policy of preferring military means to conflict resolution, has significantly tightened control over media and personal freedoms.
The United States and its European allies have continuously emphasized their devotion to democratic values and pluralism. If the Biden administration truly supports democracies in their battle against autocracies, it should not abandon the one in Armenia.
Mikael Pir-Budagyan is a research assistant at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and a graduate student in the Eurasian Russian and East European Studies Program at Georgetown University.
