Analysis | “Aftershocks from Gaza”: Regional Power Dynamics
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
As negotiations over the Israel-Hamas ceasefire plan have unraveled, the future remains uncertain. There are several proposals and a variety of actors in the mix, all vying to determine Gaza’s long-term future. In February, President Trump announced his plan to take ownership of Gaza, resettle Palestinians in Egypt and Jordan, and redevelop Gaza into “the Riviera of the Middle East.” Both Egypt and Jordan have strongly rejected these calls to take in Palestinians, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shown strong support. In March, the Arab League Summit met in Cairo and endorsed a counterproposal to reconstruct Gaza without resettling its residents. The plan details three stages that would take place over the next four to five years, beginning with clearing the rubble from roads and building temporary housing. Nearly 18 months since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict, both the immediate region and the international community have faced aftershocks that are creating shifts in long-standing policies and norms. October 7 was a seismic event that has accelerated long-existing fault lines, resulting in a new regional order — with Israel and Palestine at its epicenter.
To better understand these cascading changes and impacts, the Institute of the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) is convening its annual working group series to analyze the impact October 7 had locally, regionally, and globally. Experts from inside and outside of government will discuss the conflict’s ongoing fallout and provide recommendations on how the United States should approach the region — and the world — in light of the war’s aftershocks. ISD has developed a framework of three “concentric circles” to unpack the impacts in geographic relation to the epicenter of Gaza: 1) the immediate conflict zone and neighboring states; 2) the broader Middle East region; and 3) the world at large.
This is the second article in a Diplomatic Pouch series unpacking the spectrum of aftershocks, focusing on the second concentric circle — the broader Middle East region.
For an in-depth overview of each concentric circle and analysis of circle one, check out the first article in this series.
Gulf States’ Positions
The October 7 attacks and subsequent escalation have altered key Gulf states’ approaches to Israel and regional stability, particularly as Arab states have rallied together in conceiving a post-conflict plan for Gaza. These states are no longer reactive (and have not been for some time) but are recognized proactive shapers of regional dynamics. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been cautious in its public responses to the conflict. Still maintaining formal relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, the UAE has been careful to walk the line between voicing its criticisms of Israeli actions and protecting the economic and strategic benefits that its relationships with Israel and the United States bring. Saudi Arabia has taken a stronger approach against Israel. Immediately following the conflict, it froze normalization discussions with Israel and stated that some form of Palestinian statehood would be necessary for continued talks. It also accused Israel of committing “collective genocide” in Gaza and pushed for a two-state solution, a non-starter for the Netanyahu government — and presumably the United States. Meanwhile, Qatar continues to be the key regional mediator, leveraging its connections with Israel, Hamas, and the United States to facilitate humanitarian aid and ceasefire negotiations. Notably, Qatar played a critical role in the talks that in January 2025 resulted in a ceasefire and arrangement for hostage releases from both Hamas and Israel.
Regional Power Diplomacy
Other regional middle powers, like Iran and Türkiye, have actively participated in the conflict. In April 2024, Iran launched an unprecedented missile attack which Israel was able to almost completely blunt with the assistance of U.S. and Arab allies. Israel and Iran both declared victory after a second round of tit-for-tat, ending the direct back-and-forth for the time being. Hezbollah joined the conflict immediately following October 7, with tensions culminating in an intense Israeli air campaign against the southern part of Lebanon — where there was a significant Hezbollah presence. Overall, Israel’s actions have reportedly weakened Iran’s air defense capabilities, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the broader “Axis of Resistance.” In November 2024, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a temporary ceasefire that required both Israeli and Hezbollah forces to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The terms of the ceasefire and the end of the Assad regime in Syria have further eroded this “axis.”
Under President Erdoğan, Türkiye has used the crisis to reassert its regional role and advance Erdoğan’s Ottomanist ambitions. It has been vocal in its support for Palestinians — with Erdoğan refusing to recognize Hamas as a terror organization but rather as a liberation group — and has offered to assist as a mediator in the negotiations. Erdoğan’s support for the Syria-based Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its victorious coalition speaks to the increasingly important role he intends to play as a new Syrian governance structure emerges. If Türkiye can consolidate its position in Syria, Erdoğan will have secured a major piece of the former Ottoman empire in the Middle East.
Regional Security Architecture
The fall of the Assad regime has significantly shifted military cooperation and security alignments in the region, with Iran and Russia losing a key ally and regional access point. Syria was the first Arab nation to recognize the Islamic Republic and served as a vital link to Lebanon and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Israel has taken advantage of the power vacuum, seizing large portions of southern Syria, reaching the southern outskirts of Damascus, and exploring the possibility of a Druze buffer state, contributing to the fragmentation of the emerging Syrian state.
Otherwise, much remains the same. While tensions remain between Arab Gulf states and Israel, these states have kept their defense ties with the United States despite significant U.S. involvement with Israel. Meanwhile, Iran relies on collaboration with Russia and other non-Western powers. Maritime security remains a pressing concern after the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza, particularly around the Bab el Mandeb, where missile attacks from the Houthis disrupted vital trade routes earlier in the war. In March, President Trump launched a series of major strikes on the Houthis, targeting senior leaders and command and control centers — presumably an attempt to deter Houthi action now that Israel has resumed major operations in Gaza.
The Abraham Accords also remain vitally important to U.S. regional policy. Prior to October 7, Saudi Arabia — under intense pressure from the United States — appeared to indulge in steps toward normalization with Israel, but Israeli actions in Gaza and the re-emergence of the future of the Palestinians as a core issue for Arab public opinion has since derailed those efforts. Above all else, this cements the Palestinian question as the central point of tension in efforts to move toward regional stability — a problem that Israel and the United States can no longer ignore.
A close examination of this second circle of aftershocks reveals the complex interactions between actors within the region and with actors in the immediate area of the conflict. The initial conflict between Israel and Hamas has quickly spread to engulf the region, and the regional order is now undeniably in motion. Facets of this include the increased agency of regional middle powers, Israel’s domestic political landscape, Palestinian leadership and governance challenges, Iran’s shifting strategic position and influence, Syria’s future, and the erosion of long-assumed international rules and norms, especially in the context of Palestine as a symbol of this erosion.
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