Analysis | American Sanctions Eased, Venezuelan Migration Increased
Once upon a time, there was a belief that allowing Venezuela to export more oil and gas would curtail Venezuela’s outmigration. There was also the theory that resuming deportation flights would deter some from attempting the journey. But clearly, these theories have proven to be just that — theories.
Rafael L. González
There has been a prevalent and enduring belief that lifting the ban on Venezuelan oil would help address the Venezuelan migration crisis. In response, the Biden administration lifted the ban–for only ten months. Since the United States lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s oil exports in October 2023, border authorities have encountered a staggering 154,344 Venezuelan nationals in the five months up to March 2024. This represents a 114% spike compared to the same period a year earlier when 72,037 Venezuelans were apprehended. Rewind another year to the five months up to March 2022, when full sanctions were in force, and encounter numbers were relatively stable at 75,787. So did an ephemeral “sanctionless” Venezuela halt the migration crisis? Preliminary data shows it did not.
The Chevron Effect?
The sanctions relief allowed a near-total restart of Venezuelan crude exports to the United States. In the five months leading up to October 2023, imports averaged 158,000 barrels per day (b/d), peaking at 194,000 b/d that September, based on data from PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil company) reviewed by S&P. Post-sanctions lifting, the November 2023 to March 2024 period saw an uptick to 170,000 b/d on average, projected to reach 241,000 b/d in April 2024. According to the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, this led to a 770% annual rise in overall Venezuelan exports, mainly oil, to the United States in 2023.
The key player in this growth trend has been American-based Chevron. In November 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury authorized Chevron to restart exporting crude oil from its joint venture operations in Venezuela to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. This operation began in January 2023 and is set to continue until 2041. Chevron’s production, which had been null since 2019, increased to 135,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2023. The U.S. government projects that Chevron’s output in Venezuela will reach 200,000 b/d by the end of 2024. In their annual report, Chevron highlighted that “Crude oil liftings in Venezuela […] have positively impacted the company’s 2023 results,” leading to a record high in their oil and gas output.
Then, on April 1st, 2024, Chevron stunned observers by announcing the launch of a new joint Chevron-PDVSA drilling campaign, despite an earlier deadline for winding down previously permitted transactions. The irony is that all but one were winding down: Chevron transactions. The 2022 tailored “General License 41” will allow Chevron’s Venezuela joint ventures to continue operations.
While more time is needed to ascertain the long-term impacts of continued Chevron activities and shifting sanctions, neither has curbed Venezuelan emigration. Despite Maduro’s regime forecasting a 27% revenue boost for 2024 from greater PDVSA oil exports worth up to $10 billion — a tenth of GDP — migrants are still fleeing en masse, driven by factors far beyond just economic hardship. Not even Venezuela’s inflation cooling to 1.2% in March 2023, the smallest monthly increase since early 2012, is keeping Venezuelans at home. Chevron’s pumping of more dollars into the economy since January 2023 may not have been enough.
Venezuelan-based sources, consulted by this author, argue that the relief period has been too brief to significantly impact the Venezuelan people, which is why no notable results have been observed. It remains to be seen if a more extended implementation of the sanction relief would have indeed curbed migration numbers.
Deporting, With What Purpose?
The other major policy move regarding Venezuela was restarting deportation flights that “would discourage” the journey northward. Yet in fiscal 2022–23, just 1,800 out of 524,434 Venezuelan border encounters — a minuscule 0.34% — were ultimately deported, whereabouts unknown. Ironically, the same agency facilitating these flights had expanded Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelans one month prior, citing “conditions [in Venezuela] that prevented a safe return” because of the country’s political, economic, and rights crises impacting food, healthcare, utilities, and fueling destitution. One DHS insider branded the deportations “absolutely useless,” asserting that perhaps the controversial family separations under Trump were a more effective deterrent.
In the field of migration studies, migration drivers are mostly confirmed by qualitative empirical studies. However, it can still be inferred after conducting a preliminary quantitative analysis that when sanctions were lifted, migration did not decrease, but somehow increased instead. While causation cannot be determined without more time and inquiry, the initial observations of this unprecedented sanctions relief offer insights intended to provoke further research.
What is certain is that the current piecemeal policy responses have had zero impact on keeping Venezuelans in their motherland. The “sanctionless Venezuela” has continued to experience the mass emigration that started in 2015, years before the United States imposed sanctions on the Maduro government. Bolder, more innovative strategies will be required. To avoid the crisis spiraling further out of control, fresh long-term thinking must urgently prevail. Assessment of previous actions should too. Las caravanas will continue heading north.
Rafael Luis Gonzalez Graciani is a U.S. Department of State Rangel Fellow and graduate student in the M.S. in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University, concentrating on global politics and security, with certificates in Latin American Studies and Diplomatic Studies. Most recently, he was Congressman Shri Thanedar’s senior aide at the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee.
This article solely represents the opinions and research of its author. It does not represent in any way the views of the Charles B. Rangel Fellowship or the U.S. Department of State.
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