Analysis | From European sovereignty to European strategic unity — Part one
Petr Tůma
This article is part one of a two-part series exploring the strategic challenges faced by European leaders and the Czech Republic’s EU Presidency. Part one explores the broad strategic framework. The second part will focus on the Czech Presidency and its implications for the future of the Union and European security.
The latest Russian aggression against Ukraine, launched in February 2022, profoundly transformed Europe. The continent began to think more strategically and is learning to speak the language of power, with considerable increases in defense spending where leading Poland should reach 4 percent of GDP in 2023. In some areas, such as sanctions targeting Russia, the EU was ahead of the United States. One would be tempted to refer to a geopolitical awakening. Europe stood up and unified in an unprecedented way, incomparable to what we saw during previous spasms, be it financial and refugee crises, the Trump presidency, or the Covid pandemic that prepared the scene.
Europawende
It may sound counter-intuitive, but those who suffered the biggest policy shocks were not the EU members bordering Ukraine but rather traditional power centers of Western Europe, unhinged by the sudden collapse of their long-term Russia approach based on a belief in engaging rather than deterring Moscow and the inconceivableness of full-fledged conventional war in Europe. Berlin and Paris had to engage in a broader strategic shift that did not affect only security or defense and became known by the German name “Zeitenwende,” which is now part of the English dictionary and could apply to varying degrees across Europe.
Until Western Europe’s Zeitenwende is at least partially achieved, its power centers’ relevance will continue to be challenged. And rightly so, as they remain relatively disoriented and struggle with providing an adequate answer to the major threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. Part of this required transformation is to recognize the relevance of voices coming from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and give up the paternalism that could have been partially justifiable in the 1990s or when new members were joining the EU but became gradually obsolete and counter-productive. Lack of recognition may even have played a limited role in decisions to challenge the Western liberal democratic model taken by Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán and his ilk.
CEE countries clearly showed the lead in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, starting with weapons deliveries and other aid from the very first days of the war. Czech, Polish, and Slovenian prime ministers were the first EU leaders to visit embattled Kyiv in March 2022, while Paris and Berlin sent mixed messages on engaging Russia and the need to provide the aggressor with security guarantees.
On the other hand, Central Europe should acknowledge the ongoing efforts of Berlin or Paris to transform their approach toward Russia and related issues. A lot has already been done, and not everything is displayed publicly for tactical reasons or due to the military or political culture of given countries. Recent signals coming from Paris through closed diplomatic channels appear promising, and Germany is working hard to move forward. Incentives are certainly still needed; not bashing that does not help. We all can do better and more for Ukraine.
A strained relationship between Poland and Germany is a salient example of what should be avoided, especially when the current Polish critical approach towards Berlin seems to be partly motivated by domestic political purposes. The Berlin-Warsaw axis has the potential to become Europe’s engine, particularly when the Franco-German couple is not in its best shape. Hence the crucial Polish parliamentary elections to be held this fall. The outcome could also impact Franco-Polish relations, another potential East-West axis joining the two mightiest EU armies. However, here it’s not only on Poland but also, to a large extent, on France to execute its long overdue pivot towards Central and Eastern Europe. Without this reorientation, where Warsaw is slated to play an instrumental role, French European policy will continue to falter.
To summarize, there are two imperatives to get the new power balance in Europe right: the West has to recognize CEE’s growing strategic relevance, while the so-called new EU members should come to terms with traditional European powers’ return behind a better-shared steering wheel. Once the dust settles, the European power center will certainly not remain solely in the East. But there will be more balance between the East and West, which is vital for Europe and its strategic posture.
From strategic sovereignty to strategic unity
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe talked a lot about its strategic sovereignty derived from strategic autonomy, a concept coined by French President Macron in 2017 in the context of a missing EU geopolitical posture and Washington’s shift towards the Indo-Pacific, which was accelerated during Trump’s presidency.
When wrapping up his recent visit to China, President Macron stated that the ideological battle for European strategic autonomy — which he uses interchangeably with strategic sovereignty — was won, and most of what he talked about in 2017 at Sorbonne was achieved.
However, it appears that something different than what Macron outlined at the beginning of his mandate is happening, even if Europe appears stronger. The Russian war against Ukraine confirmed that Europe was not ready to defend itself without the support of the United States. Also, major European powerhouses — Paris and Berlin — proved unable to lead here, with Macron and Scholz sticking to their diplomacy with Putin, who promised just a few days ahead of February 24 that there wouldn’t be any aggression. Finland and Sweden reconsidered their long-term neutrality and decided to join NATO.
Russian aggression against Ukraine did not erase the issue of European strategic sovereignty but rather redefined the discussion. Rather than talk about strategic sovereignty, one can now hear the buzz in Europe about the unprecedented unity that appeared in opposing Russian threats to the continent’s security. Even if this exceptional unity may gradually erode under the weight of our naturally diverging interests, Europe should seize the opportunity and build something more perennial and strategic on this momentum. Let’s call it strategic unity.
If unity was previously a mere prerequisite for building strategic autonomy, we propose to refocus on unity that could provide more directly — as proved by current developments — what godfathers of strategic autonomy or sovereignty righty sought: a stronger Europe.
Strategic unity transcends Europe, and even if being mainly about the old continent, it has an important transatlantic dimension. It is the U.S. decision to support Ukraine that aided the current European unity. Without Washington moving ahead, it will be more difficult for CEE countries to push Germany and other hesitant states to policy shifts and keep up with developments on the ground. The transatlantic dimension of European strategic unity will also make it a better sell for CEE countries, compared to strategic sovereignty, sometimes perceived as a French tool to limit U.S. influence in Europe.
On top of that, strategic unity could be considered beyond its original European and transatlantic realm when reaching global dimensions with like-minded countries such as those in the Indo-Pacific.
It goes without saying that the unity we talk about will always remain a unity in the diversity of voices, as this diversity remains one of Europe’s biggest assets. It’s about putting a variety of perspectives in synergy so that broader unity can appear. Strategic unity does not mean we will agree on everything. It means that there is more than a basic understanding of principles, a shared strategic drive not limited to the Russian war on Ukraine but includes a wide range of areas.
This unity should be maintained and manifested through two key principles or vectors. One oriented outward, the other inward.
First, the EU should be able to do strategic power projection abroad when needed. The EU should use existing instruments and create new ones to project its power — including the development of its own military industry capacities — amid the rise of authoritarian regimes such as (but not only) Putin’s Russia. Cooperation with transatlantic and global partners is crucial here. And it is not just about hard power. Projecting soft power, such as through EU enlargement that includes Ukraine and the Balkans, is equally important.
Second, Europe’s adversaries and rivals are doing their best to make it vulnerable and break the unity. Thus, the EU needs to strengthen its strategic resilience within. It should develop resilience in its energy systems, economy, information flow, or democratic institutions.
A twist of strategic sovereignty’s terminology and narrative, with a focus on unity — with its important transatlantic dimension — could provide Europe with an important conceptual glue. The first thing it demands is to continue with the ongoing rapprochement between Western Europe and CEE through both the accomplishment of the Zeitenwende in the West and a more responsible approach by the Central and Eastern Europeans.
Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations. Petr previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, D.C. He was earlier posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah/Jerusalem.
