Analysis | Great power conflict: The case for the “long game”
Daniel Henderson
In a recently published article examining the path and course of a world mired in great power competition, ISD Senior Fellow Casimir Yost outlines possible scenarios involving Putin’s war in Ukraine and Xi’s potential invasion of Taiwan. He reviews how critical decisions over either conflict may lead us to one of four possible futures.
So far on the Diplomatic Pouch, we have explored three of the four possible futures Casimir Yost envisioned in his recent article for the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, “Great Power Conflict: Four Futures.” The futures are based on the short- to medium-term decisions currently before authoritarian leaders in Beijing and Moscow, and they are designed to help policymakers manage U.S. diplomatic statecraft in a manner that forestalls the worst possible outcomes of these decisions. These possibilities range from an “authoritarian surge” to a “bridge too far” to “dangerous waters,” and all are worthy of careful analysis and contingency planning. The subject of today’s analysis is the final scenario, “the long game.”
The long game
The “long game” might best be described as a reversion to the pre-February 2022 status quo. For this scenario to come to fruition, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping would need to back away from maximalist objectives vis-a-vis Ukraine and Taiwan respectively, and set their nations on a path of competition with the United States and the West that avoids war. Avoiding war, however, does not reduce the dangerously adversarial nature of competition.
In Russia, this possible future is determined either by Putin’s recognition that his invasion of Ukraine was folly or Putin’s removal from power. While a unilateral withdrawal of Russian forces is unlikely for Putin or any realistic successor, Moscow may settle for a frozen conflict. Outside of Russia, this possibility would require Ukrainian forces to be either unable or unwilling to retake more of their sovereign territory — a skeptical possibility given Ukrainian success in recent operations. If this future comes to pass and Russia withdraws from its current course, the West would be faced with several difficult choices concerning how far to go in holding a weakened Russia accountable for its crimes against the people of Ukraine. The divisions that emerge from such a debate may give Putin the fractures in the Western alliance he sought all along.
For Beijing, this future scenario is based on Xi Jinping’s awareness of the immense cost of a war over Taiwan. Through this recognition, China would signal a decision to retreat from any immediate invasion plans, while still maintaining a long-term vision for unification. Multiple factors may contribute to this decision-making and the likelihood of this future; such as China’s desire to maintain access to semiconductors flowing from Taiwan, the possibility of a strategic détente with the United States; or Russia’s growing subservience to China, leading to opportunities for expanded Chinese influence in Central Asia. U.S. actions would be central to shaping this scenario, as the Biden administration would need to rethink its stated positions towards Taiwan and mutually reduce tensions with Beijing. The U.S. government would need to shift its current plans for the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific if it would like to compete with a more placated China in this scenario.
[Read Casimir Yost’s article, “Great Power Conflict: Four Futures.”]
Analysis
Given the escalatory risks in the other possible futures explored, this may be one of the rosier scenarios — which says a lot about the challenges faced by diplomats and national security professionals today. The fact that long-term strategic competition between nuclear-armed adversaries, requiring authoritarian leaders to admit mistakes and scale down maximalist objectives, is a “best-case scenario,” indicates a long and difficult road ahead. As is often the case, the rosier option is also the least likely to occur.
Putin has shown no signs of accepting the realities of his military’s failures. And since the publication of Yost’s article, Putin has actually taken steps to escalate tensions further, most recently by halting Russia’s participation in the “New Start” nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States. Yost argues in the article that this scenario is most likely in a future where Putin is no longer Russia’s leader. This is certainly true, but even without Putin at the helm, those who would follow are unlikely to accept their circumstances and change course. Despite the unlikely decisions that would lead to this possible future, it might actually prove to be one of the more advantageous options for Russia. Domestic U.S. support for the Ukrainian cause is starting to waver, especially among Republicans. Over the long term, it is possible to see how reducing the conflict now and waiting for a strategic opening in the future, is a better gamble than relying on the Russian military to find victory now.
This scenario is more probable for Beijing than Moscow, as their long game requires significantly less “face-saving.” However, recent actions and increased tensions between China and the United States contribute to the falling possibility of this future. From the international incident caused by China’s spy balloon over U.S. territory to China’s consideration to supply lethal arms to Russia, it appears that Xi Jinping is not in a de-escalatory mood. Like Russia, the incentives for China to pursue this future exist, as the material and economic costs of a move against Taiwan would be massive for all involved. Still, recent decisions by the Chinese leader do not indicate this is the most likely outcome.
Conclusion
If policymakers believe a return to the pre-invasion status quo is a preferable position to be in, they have a long way to go in shaping an environment that could get us there. While Republicans have shown a willingness to change the U.S. policy towards Ukraine, a strong line on Taiwan and dedication to competing against China have remained consistent from the Trump administration to the Biden administration. Xi Jinping is more likely to double down than cave to a more aggressive U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The political forces required to move the U.S. position first simply do not exist in Washington today.
If this future seems unlikely for China, it is currently nonexistent for Russia. As the recently concluded Munich security conference showed, Western support for Ukraine remains strong, and with that backing Ukraine has the means and the will to continue the fight. Putin’s recent escalations and his increasing isolation make the chance of an epiphany that drastically reduces the scale and scope of the war improbable. If getting Russia into a “long game” scenario is the desired outcome for U.S. policymakers, they would need to begin pressuring their Ukrainian allies to accept an outcome that cedes their sovereign territory. Again, as Biden’s recent remarks make clear, the political alignment in the United States to undertake such action does not exist.
While the “long game” seems unlikely to emerge as the likeliest future, policymakers would do well to delve into Yost’s analysis to understand how the decisions made in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington lead to this scenario. By doing so, they can further grapple with the questions necessary to shape the strategic environment that allows for the eventual peaceful resolution of these conflicts — because as of yet, that particular future feels the furthest away.
Daniel Henderson is the assistant director of programs and the publication’s editor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, where he manages the Diplomatic Pouch, produces the Diplomatic Immunity podcast, manages ISD’s Case Studies Library, and helps manage ISD’s annual Global Commons Working Groups.
Read about other possible futures from great power conflict here:
