Analysis | Hostages of History: How the 1979 Hostage Crisis Still Shapes American Policy Towards Iran Half a Century Later
With hawkish rhetoric dominating discourse on Iran today, it is essential to question why this stance persists and how we can break free from it.
Anissa Ozbek
Listening to politicians and pundits in Washington, D.C., one would be hard-pressed to find a policy recommendation on Iran that does not begin with a bomb.
It seems quick fixes have found a most illogical home in American foreign policy towards the Middle East. But, in the case of Iran, the situation presents an especially cruel irony: that peace, through a halt to Iran’s nuclear program, can only be achieved with a weapon.
This begs the question: how did we get here?
In 1979, the American public experienced foreign policy like never before: in real-time, through nightly coverage of the Iran hostage crisis. Watching fellow citizens handcuffed and blindfolded overseas while their government helplessly struggled to free them had a profound effect on the American psyche, as programs like America Held Hostage — predecessor to Nightline — amplified public fear and national humiliation. The 444-day detention of the Americans in Tehran had a transformative effect over U.S. media and public sentiment towards Iran.
The hostage situation showed just how profitable invocations of Iran could be for politicians and media companies alike. Elected officials could easily tap into anti-Iran sentiment to appeal to their base, framing toughness on Iran as synonymous with American strength and patriotism; all of which made for great television. With this, the hardline stance became the norm, creating the vicious cycle that media narratives, political rhetoric, and public emotions have kept alive for decades.
This sentiment quickly transcended from the discursive realm to the tangible as compounded feelings of American vulnerability following a failed attempt to rescue the hostages helped break a 40-year legislative deadlock on military reforms. More than centralizing military authority across branches, this progression represented an American shift to militarized approaches towards crises in the region, cementing the perception that military force is the most reliable means of confronting the “mad mullahs.”
Today, despite the average American being born after 1979, charged rhetoric repeats the same story of an irrational Iran whose citizens chant “Death to America,” turning a chapter of the past into living memory. Logic follows that this ground could only be fertile for talk of war, one that considers civilian suffering secondary, making the suggestion of bombing Iran callously commonplace.
Yet, this portrayal of the United States as a perpetual victim disregards its own sins towards the Islamic Republic. While the hostage crisis remains at the heart of American public sentiment on Iran, moments like the U.S. Navy’s 1988 downing of Iran Air Flight 655 killing 290 innocent civilians, are conveniently forgotten.
This history of selective outrage and victimhood has shaped Washington’s flawed approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Beyond the faulty belief that Iran’s long-indigenized nuclear expertise can be erased through the destruction of its physical infrastructure, this painfully short-sighted approach points to a recurring pitfall in Washington’s thinking: the illusion that military action offers an easy solution to proliferation concerns.
Did Israel’s 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor demolish Saddam’s nuclear ambitions? No, it pushed the program underground. Bombing Iranian nuclear facilities would prove an egregious mistake that would, as in the case of 2003, incur a costly price of American blood and dollars, this time through a de facto declaration of war. Furthermore, history has already shown us where this road leads; the Israeli-inflicted blackout at Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility in April 2021 had Iran enriching to 60% within a week (a small step from weapons-grade levels at 90%). Today, current and former government officials warn in a single voice that a military strike would be the last straw in pushing Iran towards weaponization. It is not incumbent on us to repeat the same short-sighted mistakes.
The repercussions of allowing this bombastic rhetoric to spiral into action, through either U.S. intervention or support for an Israeli venture, would be costly and tragic, let alone counterproductive to nonproliferation interests. Though the appeal of an attack is vast in its marketability and feeling of tangible accomplishment, military intervention has not proven itself a more reliable solution to proliferation over diplomacy — the utility of which has been unmatched in American dealings with Iran thus far.
An examination of International Atomic Energy Organization statements from 2016 to February 2018 demonstrates the efficacy of diplomatic engagement in curtailing Tehran’s enrichment, exhibiting Iranian compliance with the Iran Nuclear Deal in the eleven statements preceding President Trump’s exit from the agreement. Considering the previous success of American diplomatic negotiation with a reformist government in Tehran, policymakers should take the enthusiasm of President Pezeshkian and his cabinet of nuclear negotiators at face value. In capitalizing on internal shifts in the civilian government, joined by the Supreme Leader’s approval for engagement, dialogue promises the best course of action towards peace and security.
The alternative sees the U.S. risk war beneath the shadow of the past.
Anissa Ozbek is a graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs specializing in Middle East Studies. Her research focuses on Iran, with key interests in Middle East security, non-proliferation, and U.S.-Iran relations. She has presented her work on the region at international conferences such as the British Society for Middle East Studies.
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