Analysis | How the United States and China can restore stability after Vienna
Efforts to cultivate personal relationships between U.S. and Chinese diplomats can maintain lines of communication between the two governments.
Daniel Schoolenberg
On May 10 and 11, in Vienna, Austria, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with China’s Director of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, for a strategic dialogue on bilateral relations. According to the Washington Post, both sides reached a level of understanding that has so far proven elusive for the Biden administration, a level some analysts say may indicate a “stabilization” in U.S.-China relations.
For more than a year, the Biden administration has sought to establish “guardrails” to ensure that U.S.-China competition does not “veer into conflict.” This has been rebuffed by Chinese officials, who have repeatedly stated that the current tensions in bilateral relations stem directly from the behavior of the United States. But now, China has for the first time stated that both sides have agreed to “responsibly manage competition,” and since then, even President Biden has expressed optimism that relations with China are set to improve.
While it remains an open question whether this meeting constitutes a breakthrough in U.S.-China relations, it nevertheless indicates that both sides understand and have the incentive to cooperate and communicate in ways that avoid conflict. On that basis, the Biden administration can continue to use this channel of communication to navigate ongoing points of tension, ranging from Taiwan to technology to economic relations, while taking action on these issues that would support this tentative rapprochement.
For insight into how this can be done, I spoke to Georgetown University’s Dennis Wilder, a former CIA China analyst during the Bush administration and now an assistant professor of Asian Studies. In April, when few would have expected that the United States and China could have reached even this modest level of agreement, Wilder published an article in Georgetown’s Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues. He argued that both sides could stabilize bilateral relations, primarily by relying on a high-level channel like the one established in Vienna.
In the article, Wilder diagnoses the ongoing deterioration in U.S.-China relations as a result of a breakdown in communication, low mutual trust, and growing suspicions on both sides. Although competition is inevitable, it is crucial to find ways to mitigate their strategic suspicion of each other and prevent competition from overshadowing cooperation on global challenges. By looking back on diplomatic history, the lessons become clear: close, candid, and face-to-face engagement and dialogue at high levels have been effective in bridging divides and resetting the strategic framework.
To negotiate principles, both sides have to put forward a representative that has a direct connection to their respective leader. For the United States, this has almost always fallen on the National Security Advisor, going back to Henry Kissinger and Zhou En-lai. Other examples include Tony Lake’s negotiations with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu during the Taiwan crisis, and Brent Scowcroft’s secret meeting with Deng Xiaoping after the Tiananmen crackdown.
I spoke with Wilder on May 9, a day before the meetings in Vienna took place. At the time, his recommendation for a high-level dialogue between Jake Sullivan and the Chinese representative seemed feasible, but far off. When I asked Wilder who he thought Sullivan should make contact with, he correctly guessed it would be Wang Yi. While Sullivan had previously met with then-Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission Yang Jiechi, Yang had since been replaced — and maybe for the best. “Yang Jiechi never had the ear of Xi Jinping,” Wilder said, referring to Yang as a “Jiang Zemin man,” in reference to China’s former president. In contrast, he said, “Wang Yi clearly has the ear of President Xi.”
I also asked Wilder whether he thought the Chinese would be receptive to setting up a high-level channel — after all, with the next U.S. presidential election getting underway, wouldn’t Beijing prefer to wait and see?
“Well, that is kind of the line that the Chinese are feeding us right now,” Wilder said.
For example, during a visit in late March, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai stated that any improvement in relations would have to wait until after the election. But that could just as easily be China playing a “game of leverage,” Wilder said. If Trump were to return to the White House, the Chinese would still prefer to have some agreement on principles set between themselves and the Biden administration.
In our conversation, Wilder and I discussed a range of issues that likely figured into the recent convergence toward dialogue, and the inherent challenges and opportunities they present for the United States and China.
Taiwan
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 demonstrates that the island’s political status remains the greatest potential source of crisis in U.S-China relations. Yet, given this danger, as well as the presidential elections in Taiwan scheduled for January 2024, China’s leaders have a strong incentive to find common ground with the United States sooner rather than later. As Wilder pointed out, if William Lai, the candidate for the pro-Taiwanese independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ends up winning the presidential election in January 2024, various crisis scenarios could unfold. China could stage military operations meant to influence Taiwanese voters before or during the election, similar to what occurred in 1996. If that happens, Wilder said, “The U.S. side is going to say, ‘Oh, calm down, Beijing. You know he’s really not going to do this.’ But if he starts doing the Chen Shui-bian referendums, and all the rest of it? You just don’t know. And Beijing doesn’t know.”
While cross-strait dynamics and domestic politics are beyond the president’s control, the Biden administration can take a number of steps to reassure Beijing of the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, even as the United States signals its resolve to defend Taiwan in order to deter a potential Chinese attack. The easiest way to do this would be to avoid the kind of symbolic gestures that give U.S.-Taiwan interactions an air of officiality. For example, Wilder says the United States could promise Beijing that no cabinet-level officials will go to Taipei. This stance bears many complexities, especially when considering recent reporting that an agreement on a U.S.-China trade pact could be imminent. This pact would require a high-profile signing event between President Tsai and U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai.
But then the Biden administration also could quietly remove its military advisors from Taiwan, which are ostensibly on the island to train Taiwanese forces. However, Wilder said there is no reason for this, explaining how the U.S. government could bring those forces to American bases elsewhere to complete that training. At the same time, the training Taiwanese troops receive in America may be more profound and valuable than they would receive in Taiwan, similar to how Ukrainian troops are training in 26 countries, including the United States.
“De-risking” economic relations
In his article, Wilder notes how the Biden administration could revive the 2006 Strategic Economic Dialogue, created by then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. This direct, high-level engagement between Paulson and Wang Qishan led to a relationship that proved critical during the 2008 Financial Crisis. “I was serving in the White House at the time,” Wilder writes. “And I saw firsthand how when Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008, the relationship developed over time between Paulson and Wang helped contain the financial crisis.” A similar setup could bring in current Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.
The main difficulty with these initiatives has more to do with U.S. domestic politics than with China’s leaders. President Biden’s political base, as he points out, includes strong support from the unions, whose leaders have become stridently opposed in recent years to further liberalizing trade, especially with China. But whatever influence unions may have, the administration as a whole has not allowed itself much flexibility on trade. For example, in his speech on May 2, Jake Sullivan said the so-called gains of trade deals in the past had “failed to reach a lot of working people.”
But on China, Sullivan stated: “We are for de-risking and diversifying, not decoupling.” To use the term “de-risk,” first used by EU President Ursula von der Leyen in January 2023, the Biden administration seems to be aligning itself, at least rhetorically, with the European approach toward China, which aims for a balance between cooperation and competition. To Wilder, that may reflect an internal debate in the White House, where some officials advocate a moderate approach, out of concern that U.S. policy may be getting ahead of our allies. This restraint, coupled with an improvement in high-level dialogue, may be key in staving off maximal policies that Beijing would see as an attempt to destabilize bilateral relations.
Technology and export controls
Another indication that key players in the Biden administration may not be fully aligned on China policy is the delay in a long-awaited Executive Order instituting export controls targeting China’s tech development. While the government already screens investments for national security risks related to investments coming into the United States through the Treasury Department’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), this would create an outbound investment regime — empowering the government to screen investments by American firms in foreign countries as well.
But in response, Congress has sought to take the lead. On May 2, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer announced his intention to lead a bipartisan group of legislators in crafting a “China Competition Bill 2.0.” This new legislation would build on last year’s “CHIPS and Science Act,” which provided federal subsidies to U.S. semiconductor manufacturers while restricting their expansion into China — an attempt, as Wilder sees it, to hold the Biden administration’s feet to the fire: “They are basically saying, ‘If you don’t come up with an outbound investment regime, we’re going to impose one on you.’”
It’s a part of a long-standing game between Congress and the White House, particularly when it comes to U.S.-China relations. Following the crackdown on protesters in 1989, for example, a reluctant Bush administration responded by freezing ties and protecting Chinese students in the United States only after Congress moved to place stronger and more comprehensive measures on China.
But while Bush could have cared less about Congress, Wilder said, this administration is different: President Biden, Antony Blinken, and Jake Sullivan have spent most of their careers in the Senate, and therefore they are much more attuned to congressional politics. “I think as we get closer to the election,” according to Wilder, “it gets tougher for this group, because they do not want to let Congress get to the right of them on China policy.”
U.S.-China relations going forward
So what does Wilder think about the meeting in Vienna? Surprisingly, he was less than impressed — calling it “fairly sterile.”
For one, it was less than ideal that the meeting between Wang and Sullivan included a large retinue on both sides. There were probably few opportunities for both men to build a personal relationship in such a formal setting. Although both sides described the dialogue as “candid,” Wilder called that just “diplospeak” for talking tough on subjects like human rights. For these meetings to work, they “should involve actually getting to know each other and building personal bonds of trust, not reading talking points.”
In short, it is hardly the type of “breakthrough” moment in U.S.-China relations seen in the past. In 1996, for example, the meeting between Liu Huaqiu and Tony Lake took place on an estate belonging to the late Averell Harriman. Over a meal of chicken and Caesar salad, the two men talked tough — exchanging proverbs from China and New England — but eventually hammered out a new strategic framework and set the stage for Jiang Zemin to visit the United States the following year.
Similarly, barring any major disruptions, the Vienna meeting may be just enough to enable certain tactical adjustments on both sides, and to set the stage for Xi Jinping to visit San Francisco in November for APEC. But the greatest potential for this communication channel can only be realized by making it focus on the relationship between the two individuals. By avoiding formality, spurning large retinues, getting away from talking points, and allowing them to build personal bonds of trust, both countries stand a better chance of being able to weather crises, reset the relationship, and ultimately re-orient itself toward cooperating on fundamental issues facing the United States, China, and the world.
Daniel Schoolenberg is a Washington, D.C.-based researcher focused on U.S.-China relations and Indo-Pacific affairs. He earned his Master’s in Asian Studies and a Graduate Certificate in Diplomatic Studies from Georgetown University, and has spent over five years living, working, and studying in China.
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