Analysis | Sino-American summer: Supporting rhetoric with policy
To protect U.S. and allied interests in the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration needs to supplement diplomatic talks with tangible action.
Alison O’Neil
Summer 2023 has seen a flurry of activity in U.S.-China diplomacy. Despite the polite rhetoric that characterized both visits, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s and Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen’s trips in June and July, respectively, reveal tensions that diplomacy alone cannot address. It would seem that U.S.-China talks continue merely for their own sake, while uncompromising tensions remain. U.S. policymakers ought to supplement diplomatic communication with concrete action, recognizing that China — like the United States — operates with its own economic and political interests in mind. They must take care to remember that allies look to American diplomacy with expectations of follow-through, including ongoing support to critical partners, as well as engagement in key regions that China has courted yet the United States has neglected.
A tale of two visits
On June 19, Secretary Blinken visited Beijing to discuss the state of U.S.-China relations with President Xi Jinping. Topics ranged from the U.S. stance on Taiwan to China’s role in the U.S. fentanyl crisis. As Blinken stated in a press release, the United States will maintain its stance on the “One China Policy.” Blinken stressed that the United States expects a “peaceful resolution” — that is, neither Taiwanese independence nor a violent push for reunification by Beijing. Meanwhile, he added, Washington will look into “setting up a working group or joint effort” to push Beijing to crack down on the “flow of precursor chemicals” that make up fentanyl.
The following month, Secretary Yellen’s visit to Beijing intended to address a range of issues plaguing the U.S.-China relationship: export controls, climate change, and intimidation of American companies. Yellen took a tactful approach, stating that the United States hopes to obtain “diverse” supply chains — a notable change from the language of “de-coupling” or “de-risking” that has characterized American and European attitudes toward trade with China. She also stated, “We do not see our relationship in terms of great power conflict.” While the administration may be doing its best to avoid “conflict” in the form of open warfare, this statement is in tension with the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on “strategic competition.”
Rhetoric versus reality
It would seem that both sets of talks have set the stage for ongoing U.S.-China dialogue. As a Chinese press release pointed out, “Secretary Blinken invited State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin to visit the United States, and Qin expressed his readiness to make the visit at a mutually convenient time.” While Qin no longer holds the office he did at the time of this agreement, the statement suggests a commitment to ongoing visits by Qin’s counterparts. Meanwhile, Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry’s recent visit to Beijing — primarily centered on climate change discussions — illustrates an ongoing commitment to U.S.-China diplomacy in areas of mutual interest.
Nonetheless, suspicion continues to cloud aspects of this high-level communication. As AP News points out, “[Blinken’s] two-day visit to the Chinese capital helped restore top-level ties, but China rebuffed a U.S. request to resume military-to-military contacts. Neither government appears convinced of the other’s honesty.” Chinese reporting reflects a similar trend. As one Global Times article puts it, “It is believed that Yellen’s visit will hardly alter the trajectory of the economic relationship. … People are more inclined to believe that Washington’s policy direction toward China is still focused on containment and suppression, and there has been no change in the securitization of economic and trade issues by the U.S.”
Unfortunately, history seems to support this pessimistic view: Certain U.S.-China issues, while easy to address rhetorically, will prove politically challenging to overcome. Past U.S.-China collaboration on matters related to the fentanyl trade required high-level diplomatic engagement yet provoked PRC criticism, indicating that joint counternarcotics efforts may face similar challenges going forward. Brookings finds that although three successive U.S. presidents have “devoted diplomatic focus to induce and impel China to tighten its regulations vis-à-vis fentanyl-class drugs” the PRC has shown reluctance to cooperate with U.S. efforts, in fact “suspend[ing] all counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation with the United States” in August 2022. The Congressional Research Service reports that while “[direct] flows of fentanyl from China are largely stemmed,” U.S. counternarcotics policy now aims to prevent “Chinese-sourced fentanyl precursors from entering the U.S.-bound fentanyl supply chain via third countries.” With this in mind, Blinken’s allusion to working groups and joint counternarcotics would seem misguided and even naïve.
Meanwhile, clear political and economic sticking points remain. The issue of Taiwanese independence continues to loom large in spite of Blinken’s efforts. Diplomatic talks are unlikely to change either side’s stance on the matter. China considers cross-strait relations a matter of national sovereignty, and the United States remains beholden to the Taiwan Relations Act. As for Taiwan itself, U.S. relations with the island remain strong despite Taipei’s lack of international recognition. Taiwan has no official embassy within the United States but maintains de facto diplomatic contact through the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. U.S. arms sales to Taipei received a major boost this spring, and Beijing’s military drills around the island have continued to raise the alarm, indicating that even high-level talks will fail to smooth tensions. Even after diplomatic negotiations, China’s outlook remains the same, with Beijing recently accusing Washington of turning Taiwan into a “powder keg.” On the U.S. side, economic roadblocks — tariffs and restrictions on investment — are similarly likely to remain in place.
Right now, the U.S. strategy toward China represents — in the author’s words — “constrained competition,” couched in the rhetoric of cooperation. Despite the utility of diplomatic talks in preventing further escalation, Blinken’s and Yellen’s visits illustrate important limitations. These visits — much like Biden’s in November 2022 — risk representing diplomacy without action, “biding time” without arriving at concrete solutions. China has made clear that American and Chinese goals remain at a fundamental impasse. It would seem that the Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts will do little to achieve the foreign policy objectives outlined in the 2022 National Security Strategy.
Strategic competition is very much alive, enshrined not only in official policy but in the minds of both Chinese and American citizens. Now is the time for the United States to cultivate other ties in the Indo-Pacific. The upcoming ASEAN Summit in September 2023 offers the opportunity to secure cooperation on topics ranging from trade to security. In the absence of Chinese reassurances on such critical issues as Taiwan and the fentanyl trade, the Biden administration can cultivate partnerships with ASEAN nations. To support these efforts, the United States must strengthen its soft power, influence, and diplomatic involvement across South and Southeast Asia. Diplomacy with China — ostensibly designed to ease tensions in the face of undeniable competition — remains meaningless without further U.S. reassurance of its allies and partners in the region.
Moreover, the post-pandemic era allows the United States to embrace actionable diplomacy in previously overlooked regions. If the Biden administration is serious about strategic competition, it must turn to regions that the West has overlooked and China has embraced — most notably Africa. While the administration has made diplomacy in Africa a priority for the time being, it should continue its outreach in the form of infrastructure investment, military diplomacy — e.g., port visits, joint training, and other forms of engagement — high-level visits, and other ties that China has long cultivated. Such involvement will promote a positive view of the United States as a leader, offering regional partners a diplomatic, economic, and security alternative to China. These regions look to both major powers as leaders and potential partners. As the United States walks the tightrope between cooperation and competition with China, it must match these diplomatic efforts with equally strong involvement in strategically critical states.
Alison O’Neil is a graduate student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. She studied history and political science at the University of Notre Dame. Her writing focuses primarily on Indo-Pacific security, and has appeared in Realist Review and International Policy Digest.
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