Analysis | Taiwan: The benefits of engagement
Philip Anstrén
Our new series on Taiwan will feature stories from our guest contributor, Philip Anstrén, who is a visiting researcher at National Chengchi University, Taiwan, and an alumnus of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He will analyze the unofficial ties between Europe, Taiwan, and the United States, and how innovative diplomatic initiatives as well as different kinds of unorthodox diplomacy can help strengthen ties with Taiwan. The literature on this topic is spotty and underdeveloped, especially as it relates to the relations between Taiwan and EU countries. It is important to highlight and seek ways to strengthen ties between Taiwan and the West.
Taiwan matters, but having ties with this island nation is full of complications. This piece previews how creative diplomacy can help mitigate them.
Covid-19 has highlighted the benefits of engaging Taiwan. With less than a thousand confirmed cases and only nine deaths as of February 6, Taiwan has more than proven that it has much to teach other democracies about how to conduct public health policy and combat infectious disease.
Moreover, according to the American Institute in Taiwan, “Taiwan has world-class experts in a wide variety of fields, including … law enforcement, disaster relief, energy cooperation, women’s empowerment, digital economy and cyber security, media literacy, and good governance.” As with public health, Western societies have an interest in engaging with this expertise.
This is also the case when it comes to disinformation and cyber. Taiwan faces more disinformation attacks than any other country in the world. The main culprit is China, which wants to convince the Taiwanese population to unite with the mainland. Beijing also uses Taiwan as target practice for its cyber capabilities. Because of this, Taiwan has developed expertise in how to counter China — expertise that could be of use to the United States and the European Union.
Taiwan’s example to the world is also worth highlighting. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy with an impressive 93/100 score on the Freedom in the World Index. According to the Heritage Foundation, it is the 11th freest economy in the world. Taiwan also has a GDP per capita of $30,000, three times that of China. In a world where authoritarian, state capitalist ideologies are flourishing, Taiwan is a showcase for the benefits of liberal democracy.
Geopolitical interests are at play, too. This year, for the first time, the Council on Foreign Relations put the risk of an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the first tier of its Preventive Priorities Survey, which tracks the most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints around the world. Such a war would have grave implications for global security and, given that the United States reserves the right to defend Taiwan, for U.S. defense guarantees in Asia and Europe. The West has an interest in avoiding those outcomes — and in working together to ensure continued stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Finally, Western democratic nations have moral obligations vis-à-vis Taiwan. The island nation is under threat. China is pelting it with disinformation. Chinese aircraft now encroach into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone on a regular basis. Taiwan is a democracy, and Western democracies have a duty to ensure that it not only survives but also thrives.
In short, Western countries have good reasons to seek ties with and to support Taiwan. But in doing so, they face a lot of obstacles. First, there is the lack of diplomatic recognition. For a mix of political , economic, and geopolitical reasons, they have — at different times in their histories — all opted to recognize China instead of Taiwan. And Beijing, which lays claim to the island nation, has been adamant that, doing so, they curtail their ties with Taipei. This means that their ties with Taiwan have to be unofficial.
“Unofficiality” is often no more than a façade. The United States, for example, has institutionalized a dense network of unofficial but substantive
dialogues with Taiwan about a range of issues, including security and defense. But to show their commitment to unofficiality, many countries also feel pressured to restrict their contacts with Taiwan. U.S. officials long
operated under self-imposed constraints of this kind — until they were recently lifted by former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Less powerful countries still have to be wary. In many cases they have informal but real restrictions. Sweden, for example, doesn’t send
cabinet-level officials to trade consultations in Taipei — even though the same consultations attract Swedish ministers when they are hosted in Sweden. This constrains the extent to which relations with Taiwan can be deepened.
Unofficiality also entails constraints on the breadth of the policies that other countries can conduct toward Taiwan. Economics may fit under the rubric of unofficiality, but not political or diplomatic issues. Many European countries focus almost exclusively on economics in their relations with Taiwan. Pressing geopolitical and moral issues are kept off the agenda.
There are two reasons for that. Fear is one of them. China is out to punish any move that could bring countries closer to official ties with Taiwan. And there is no step too small for Beijing. In 2020, for instance, Dutch authorities renamed the Netherlands Trade and Investment Office in Taiwan to the “Netherlands Office Taipei.” China responded by seeking clarification from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and threatening to withhold deliveries of personal protective equipment.
The second reason is unenlightened self-interest. Many European countries are content to reap the rewards of economic ties with Taiwan, while being able to kick the geopolitical and moral responsibilities to the United States. That tendency is made all the worse by the economic gains that several of them hope to win from China by toeing the line on Taiwan. All this is dangerously short-sighted given the stakes at play in the Taiwan Strait.
Creative unofficial diplomacy can help remedy these problems. Take citizen diplomacy, for example, which can have several advantages in this context. A decentralized approach makes it more difficult for hostile actors to counteract. At the same time, it can help build personal linkages that allow for the exchange of knowledge and create grassroots pressure that makes it harder for official actors to dodge the Taiwan question.
This series will consider this and many other ways that non-state actors can contribute to strengthening ties with Taiwan. It will also consider diplomatic initiatives and projects that push the boundaries of unofficial diplomacy. These include the U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Global Training and Cooperation Framework, the EU Business and Regulatory Cooperation, Track 1.5–2 diplomatic initiatives and Taiwanese health diplomacy.
Taiwan matters, and the ties with the island nation do, too.
Philip Anstrén is an alumnus of Georgetown’s Master of Science of Foreign Service program and is on a Taiwan Fellowship, financed by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taipei.
