Analysis | What to watch at the G7 leaders’ summit
Members of the Transatlantic Writers’ Group analyze the issues to watch at the forthcoming leaders’ meeting of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in Hiroshima, Japan, from May 19–21, 2023.
G7 heads of government will gather in Hiroshima under the Japanese presidency later this week for the annual leaders’ summit of the informal group of advanced democratic economies. Ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine continues to define the bloc’s agenda on security, economic, and environmental issues. Participants in the summit — which include the seven member governments, the European Union, and eight additional invited governments — are also navigating increasing U.S.-led competition and tensions with China.These are critical given the meeting’s location and the priorities of the Japanese presidency. These inescabale geopolitical forces compoundalready ample pressure on democratic governments to deliver energy and economic security to their people — while leading the way on climate action. As Chinese and Russian pressure continues to strain the U.S.-led multilateral system at the core of the bloc’s identity, the summit presents a chance to renew existing commitments, build on communiques from preceding G7 ministerial meetings, and bolster unity among longtime allies.
Japanese priorities | Danny Vazquez Tarrau, Independent Researcher
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishada has adopted a surprisingly assertive stance on Russian aggression since the escalation of its war against Ukraine in February 2022. Tokyo has been in lockstep with the United States and the broader coalition, including the G7 and European Union, which have aligned in support of Ukraine through sanctions. The Japanese government’s rhetoric and positioning have also been uncharacteristically powerful. For example, while Chinese leader Xi Jinping was meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Kishida took a previously undisclosed trip to Kyiv, where he condemned Russian actions in unequivocal terms. This coalescence of interests, including the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo and a dedicated Japanese Mission to NATO in Brussels, bolsters Japan’s ability to coordinate a reaffirmation of G7 support for Ukraine at the summit.
The Japanese presidency also falls against the backdrop of a shift in its broader foreign and security policy. For the first time, the government committed in its National Security Strategy to spend 2% of GDP on defense and to acquire certain strike capabilities that would allow it to hit mainland China.
China, Taiwan, and European unity | Ben Baxendale-Smith, Ph.D. student in defense studies, King’s College London
The underlying commitment of G7 members to a U.S.-led global order makes the broad existential challenges posed by Xi Jinping’s China particularly acute. Japan’s geographical proximity only heightens these challenges, and adds to the summit’s symbolism.
In Taiwan, the intensification of cross-strait tensions has also emerged as a leading issue. While an attack is not inevitable, the People’s Liberation Army’s recent United Sharp Sword exercises, along with frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, have sent a clear signal to both Taipei and its potential military allies.
Due to Xi’s offer to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the war also shapes G7 relations with China. Despite repeated Chinese abstentions in U.N. votes condemning Russian aggression, Xi’s April 26 phone call with Zelenskyy highlighted the former’s desire to end the war swiftly through diplomacy. This may sow discord among allies pursuing Ukraine’s ultimate goal of restoring pre-2014 borders.
China featured prominently in the April 18 G7 foreign ministers’ communiqué. G7 members specifically highlight freedom of access and navigation, rebuking Beijing’s belief that China alone lays claim to the South China Sea’s sovereignty. Despite China’s protest against the communiqué, we can expect that the upcoming leaders’ summit will echo these concerns. Analysts should also watch Beijing’s immediate reaction to the leaders’ summit and its broader intensification of military exercises.
The Hiroshima summit, therefore, poses an ideal opportunity for creating a cohesive Taiwan strategy amid longstanding strategic ambiguity from the United States and its allies. Whether through lethal aid akin to Ukraine’s defense or direct intervention, as President Joe Biden has hinted, a countenanced support strategy would act as a potent deterrent.
France and the European Union: Will a united European China policy emerge? | Jason C. Moyer, Program Associate, Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent statements on China and U.S. leadership have been decried as a sign of wavering European support for Taiwan’s defense and as a capitulation towards China. Although he tried to downplay his remarks and reiterate his country’s continued support for Taiwan, he is heading into the G7 after weeks of back-tracking. This controversy is made starker as Japanese Prime Minister Kishida pushes for a united G7 statement condemning China’s recent military exercises around Taiwan’s territorial waters. An early meeting with G7 diplomats in Japan drew a strong condemnation of France’s ambiguous comments towards Taiwan, potentially previewing Macron’s reception in Hiroshima.
Besides Macron, both European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Council President Charles Michel will be in Hiroshima. Von der Leyen accompanied Macron to China in April. Before the trip, she attempted to clarify the European Union’s policy towards China in a speech, where she stressed the EU’s relationship with China would focus on de-risking but not decoupling altogether. Her approach to China has been labeled as hawkish and stands in stark opposition to Macron’s controversial statements. The G7 allows for an opportunity to reconcile these disparate approaches from France and the EU and display greater European unity on a single policy towards China.
Macron’s comments on China and Taiwan were blunt attempts to unite and consolidate various European views towards China. It is unclear whether Macron will stand united with other G7 leaders in opposition to China or if he will obfuscate the message. Amidst Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggressive positioning towards Taiwan, the G7 must be united in their condemnation of unilateral aggression and violation of territory.
Center stage for climate change and energy | Iren Marinova, Ph.D. candidate in political science, Colorado State University
In addition to traditional security threats, climate action is increasingly central to the G7’s agenda. At the core is the phase-out of coal. The latest IPCC report puts pressure on global leaders to set a deadline for phasing out fossil fuels as the opportunity to keep temperatures from rising at the 1.5-degree Celsius target is closing. Some argue that failing to set a deadline will derail the Paris Agreement target. The Leaders’ Summit is the first test this year for global leaders to move in that direction prior to the other upcoming global leadership fora, such as President Macron’s climate finance summit in June, the UN Sustainable Development Goals Summit in September, and COP 28 in November. Nevertheless, the G7 Ministers’ Meeting last month failed to agree on a concrete deadline for the phase-out, seen by many as a failure in global leadership.
Energy security, given the current geopolitical crisis, will also be a hot topic. G7 foreign ministers supported new Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) investments in an effort to address energy insecurity caused by the crisis. This reflects ongoing pressure to limit dependence on Russia despite the detrimental effects on meeting the 1.5C target. In addition, US domestic tensions over the Biden Administration’s climate plan and the 2024 elections campaign are likely to manifest in Washington’s position on this and other climate-related matters given their growing centrality in U.S. policy debates.
Economic security and resilient global supply chains | Elisabeth Winter, Program Director, Global Markets & Social Justice, Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung
Economic security has been rising in importance for the G7 for several years. Japan has been the frontrunner in economic security, advocating for an economic security agenda since 2022 when the Japanese parliament adopted a new act in favor of implementing economic measures to promote national security. It has also become a priority for the European Union, which just announced a new economic strategy to be presented in late 2023.
Hiroshima is the first G7 summit where economic security is featured highly on the group’s joint agenda. As highlighted in the G7 Foreign Ministers Communiqué, securing the promotion of resilient global supply chains is a central theme for the G7 economic-security agenda. Global supply chains create dependencies that can be weaponized, particularly if asymmetric, as concentrated on a few trading partners.
In some fashion, all G7 nations are dependent on China. For example, the German government just approved that China’s state-owned Cosco purchases parts of a Hamburg port terminal — despite security concerns raised by its own coalition partners. They all share the aim to diversify supply chains to make them more resilient and intend to introduce a joint “platform on economic coercion” to coordinate their deterrence measures and actions.
So far, however, the G7 members have used different concepts to specify this diversification, such as decoupling, friendshoring, or onshoring. Only recently, the UK announced its intention to build up resilient supply chains instead of getting into a subsidy race, just as the EU’s approach to “de-risk” its supply chains without decoupling from China has been echoed by the United States — a concept yet to be defined in concert by transatlantic partners, let alone among the G7.
State of democracy
Global declines in freedom and ongoing fights against authoritarianism are also critical parts of the Japanese G7 agenda. Japan’s new National Security Strategy explicitly identifies the threat of Russia’s “information warfare through the spread of disinformation” and commits the country to bolster its defense accordingly to “protect universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law.” During remarks at the Summit on Democracy in March 2023, Prime Minister Kishida vowed to use the Japanese G7 presidency and a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council to strengthen democracy and reinforce “a free and rules-based international order.” Reiterating this point, the foreign ministers’ communiqué also reflecteda Japan’s recent shift to a more assertive foreign policy posture and G7 leadership in, trying to sustain unified support to Ukraine, noting “increasing threats […] posed by foreign interference activities including disinformation, which aim to disrupt our democratic processes.”
Moreover, since early 2023, Chinese diplomats and state media have significantly increased the frequency of anti-Japanese coverage on Twitter aimed at fomenting anti-Western sentiment and rifts within the G7. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, administered by Canada since 2017, strengthens coordination among members to identify and respond to foreign threats to democracy through information sharing, capacity building, and strengthening the group’s response posture. Developing joint standards and analytics is an important next step to advance the integration of processes across involved agencies. At the same time, to prevail in the ‘battle of narratives,’ Tokyo will have to manage a difficult balancing act to avoid framing the G7 and democracy as such in overly geopolitical terms that may antagonize potential partners.
Russia looms large | Danny Vazquez Tarrau and Jason C. Moyer
Given its global economic power, , the G7 can use its weight to drive home the costs of Russia’s unprompted invasion of Ukraine. From cooperating on sanctions to clamping down against countries that evade them, the G7 is flexing an economic muscle that many had not previously envisioned it to possess:this inccludes the Russia oil price cap, where the G7 along with the European Union capped the price Russian crude oil could be sold on the international market, at $60 a barrel, and now even talks of a near-total ban on exports to Russia.. Last year’s statement from the G7 summit in Germany showed impressive unity against Russia, but attention was split as post-COVID economic recovery continued. While vaccines and pandemic preparedness remain on the table, this year, the G7 has a clear opportunity to articulate a shared vision for an eventual peace in Ukraine, in addition to many other significant and intertwined geopolitical and transnational challenges.
The Transatlantic Writers’ Group is an initiative organized in collaboration with the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program to support and promote the next generation of thinkers on transatlantic relations. It fosters a supportive group of emerging thinkers to: share ideas for policy writing projects focused on transatlantic relations and intended for public audiences (op-eds, analysis, academic research); peer edit drafts of writing projects; develop relationships among emerging writers and leaders; create mutual connections with editors and publication outlets. Members have recently published in such outlets as Business Insider, War on the Rocks, Inkstick, and Responsible Statecraft. Learn more about the group.
