Misjudging the Fight Against ISIS
Despite months of airstrikes by the U.S.-led coalition in Operation Inherent Resolve, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) continues to launch successful military operations on multiple fronts across Syria and Iraq. As the White House optimistically proclaims that the terrorist group’s momentum has been blunted and US Central Command publishes lists of hundreds of ISIS targets destroyed by the air campaign, one major issue remains: someone forgot to tell ISIS it’s losing. By over relying on statistics to show progress in the campaign, officials risk falling into a trap reminiscent of the Vietnam War.
Despite the positive attitude coming from top U.S. officials, in recent days ISIS forces launched concurrent operations in both Syria in Iraq, gaining against the Syrian regime in the west and against Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the east. In Syria, ISIS simultaneously attacked Deir Ezzor City — seizing the Saker Island area — and the city of Palmyra along the Homs-Deir Ezzor supply line, capturing much of the surrounding environs. The group also captured the strategic town of Sukhna along the highway between Deir Ezzor and Palmyra.
In Iraq, within a day of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivering a defiant audio message calling for Muslims to rally to the cause, ISIS fighters launched a massive attack to capture Ramadi, capital of the Anbar province, along with other, smaller attacks against ISF-held towns along the Euphrates River. These attacks illustrate the reality on the ground: ISIS still maintains significant offensive capabilities, even after months of aerial bombardment.
It appears that the Pentagon and the Obama administration have slipped into the convenient describing of success based on casualty counts and statistics, a commonly referred to criticism of General William Westmoreland’s strategy during the Vietnam War. CENTCOM regularly releases lists of ISIS targets bombed by the coalition, including HMMWVs (“Humvees”), command and control nodes, forward fighting positions, etc. This reliance on numerical data to show the air campaign’s effectiveness bears resemblance to the release of North Vietnamese and Vietcong KIA numbers during Vietnam.
Such a strategy proves ultimately ineffective against an enemy willing to sacrifice huge amounts of men and material in order to succeed. Much like the Vietcong, ISIS is willing to lose huge numbers of men, vehicles, and command positions in order to obtain its goals. In addition, ISIS fighters are motivated by an ideology of martyrdom for “the cause” that’s gives the group the potential to overcome devastating personnel losses and continue to fight against a far better equipped enemy. By focusing solely on the tactical effectiveness of airstrikes (likely to outwardly project success to a war-weary public), OIR continues to struggle to make significant long term gains against ISIS.
Ostensibly, the ultimate goal of Operation Inherent Resolve is not purely to rely on airstrikes, but to train regional forces to adequately defeat ISIS on their home turf. This effort, to date, has been tentative at best. A “train-and-equip” program for Syrian Rebels to prepare them to combat ISIS has barely begun to train an initial company-sized group after months of stalling. Even that has been met with skepticism by rebels, angered at the U.S. Insistence that those trained by them only fight ISIS, as opposed to the Assad regime. Efforts to train Iraqi security forces and Sunni tribes in Iraq have met greater success, but has been constrained by an Shiite-led Iraqi government hesitant to build a powerful Sunni force, preceding instead to rely on Iran-backed Shiite militias.
As ISIS advances across the fronts, the current United States policy, attempting to destroy ISIS by attrition, reveals its limitations. While lists of hundreds of vehicles destroyed may look good on paper, the reality is the terrorist group has shown that it is willing to suffer severe casualties and materiel losses in order to achieve a victory. Airstrikes alone will not stop ISIS, and Operation Inherent Resolve would do well to remember bitter lessons learned in the past.
