The Federalist Papers
A collection of essays written in favor of the new Constitution
Federalist No. 27
The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded.
Alexander HamiltonMar 31
Federalist No. 26
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense ConsideredTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and…Alexander HamiltonMar 31
Federalist No. 25
The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further ConsideredTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the…Alexander HamiltonMar 31
Federalist No. 24
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further ConsideredTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 23
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the UnionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived. ¶ This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 22
The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present ConfederationTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. ¶ The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 21
Other Defects of the Present ConfederationTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 20
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionBy Alexander Hamilton and James Madison ¶ To the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed. ¶ The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities.
The Federalist PapersMar 29
Federalist No. 19
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Unionby Alexander Hamilton and James Madison ¶ To the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body. ¶ In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief.The Federalist PapersMar 29
Federalist No. 18
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionBy Alexander Hamilton and James Madison ¶ To the People of the State of New York: ¶ AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States. ¶ The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council.The Federalist PapersMar 29
Federalist No. 17
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 16
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 15
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the UnionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 14
Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory AnsweredTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed…
James MadisonMar 29
Federalist No. 13
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in GovernmentTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 12
The Utility of the Union In Respect to RevenueTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry. ¶ The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 11
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a NavyTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other. ¶ There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 10
The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and InsurrectionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he…James MadisonMar 29
Federalist No. 9
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and InsurrectionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 8
The Consequences of Hostilities Between the StatesTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that…Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 7
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the StatesTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say — precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 6
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the StatesTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind — those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 5
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and…
John JayMar 29
Federalist No. 4
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and InfluenceTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies.John JayMar 29
Federalist No. 3
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and InfluenceTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested…John JayMar 29
Federalist No. 1
General IntroductionTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.Alexander HamiltonMar 29
Federalist No. 2
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and InfluenceTo the People of the State of New York: ¶ WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident. ¶ Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people…John JayMar 29