23.4 The Nature of the Holy
Socrates now raises a different and more fundamental question. “Consider the following: is what is holy loved by [all] the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is loved by [all] the gods?” Euthyphro does not grasp the distinction at first. In fact Socrates’ question raises one of the most fundamental questions of theology. Is something good because the deity approves of it, or does the deity approve of it because it is good?
In Christianity champions of the absolute sovereignty of God, notably St. Augustine, some fourteenth century followers, and the Protestant Reformers Martin Luther and John Calvin, tend to say that values are just what God determines them to be. God is so transcendently superior to humans that we are in no position to comprehend, much less determine, the values he endorses. Apart from his decrees there is no good and evil, and good and evil are just what God declares them to be.
On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas and other rationalistic theologians hold that God conforms to eternally valid principles; God recognizes some actions as inherently good and commands us to do them, while he commands us to refrain from other actions that are inherently evil. For the Greeks, with only a dim idea of a unified and transcendent deity, the Augustinian view, theological voluntarism as it is called, would be almost incomprehensible.
“What then shall we say about the holy, Euthyphro,” Socrates continues, “except that it is what is loved by all the gods, according to your definition?”
“Yes.”
“For this very reason, that it is holy, or for some other?”
“No, for this reason.”
“Therefore, precisely because it is holy, it is loved; and not: it is holy because it is loved?”
“So it seems.”
But since the relevant lovers of the holy are the gods, it turns out that “therefore what is loved by the gods is not holy, Euthyphro, nor is the holy what is loved by the gods, as you say, but it is something else than this.” Euthyphro is again puzzled. Socrates’ point is that in seeking a definition for what is holy or pious, they are not looking for some incidental characteristic (pathos) of the pious but for its essence or true nature (ousia).
It may be true that the holy is loved by the gods, but that does not tell what it really is. Socrates wants a definition that will show what it is that makes something holy. If the gods love the holy because it is holy, they must see something special about holy things that make them worthy of their love. What is it that imparts its goodness to holy things? If Socrates and Euthyphro can determine that, they will be in the same position as the gods, able to recognize holy actions and objects for what they are.
