Plato 9.4.4 Socrates as a Moral Philosopher

Daniel W. Graham, PhD
The First Philosophers
5 min readJul 29, 2024
Socrates. Photo by Anna Lazou from the play Socrates on Trial, by Andew D. Irvine. CC by-SA 4.0.

Plato’s Socrates (as the student portrays his master in his early or Socratic dialogues) is an ambiguous figure. He seeks tirelessly to find definitions of moral virtues, always working with a discussion partner who is willing to answer his questions and to try to advance the investigation. He is able to make progress in identifying plausible answers and in clarifying issues, but he never seems to arrive at the promised land of the right answer. Those who converse with him with confidence in their own understanding of ethical issues often leave confused and disoriented. What is the point of all this inquiry if it gets us nowhere?

We see, however, in the Apology and the Crito hints of a more confident and constructive thinker, one who has a deep commitment to moral behavior, which seems to presuppose, at least, an understanding of fundamental issues and reliable principles. Socrates is a man with a mission in the former dialogue. The god whose oracle is at Delphi has spoken, and singled out Socrates as some sort of exemplar. Socrates’ inquiries have led him, to his own surprise, to realize that he has something to offer to his fellow Athenians. At the very least, he makes them think and worry about their moral standing. He sees himself as calling on Athenians to spend less time and effort on superficial non-moral goods, such as fame, fortune, and power, and more on moral issues: how to live the good life, how to make the world a better place.

In the sequel to the Apology, we see, for once, Socrates confront a moral dilemma. As he waits in prison for his execution, his devoted friend Crito offers him a way out. You have been condemned to death unjustly, Crito says; I have paved the way for you to escape to a distant city where you can live and continue your work. Socrates pauses to consider the situation with a friend who nominally shares his beliefs. Is this the right thing to do? he asks. Of course, Crito argues; what other choice do you have? But Socrates sees this choice not as a prudential decision about self-preservation, but as a moral one about personal responsibility. What is the moral thing to do? Especially since I claim to be a moral person and to have a concern for my native city and its welfare, Socrates insists, I need to ponder first and foremost what is right.

Socrates considers the problem carefully. And he uses the same question-and-answer approach he usually applies to questions of definition. He also seems to find grounds for determining what is right and wrong in some sense on the basis of what the good life is. He arrives at a conclusion, together with Crito, which is diametrically opposed to the one Crito urged upon him. Is this the case of someone facing the end of his life, the loss of his freedom, his fortune (which is modest but not negligible), his family, his associations, and instead renouncing them on purely moral grounds? This is an ideal that many individuals aspire to, but few actually attain.

In the rogues’ gallery of Athenian politicians, we find Themistocles, hero of the Persian War, who later responded to political attacks by defecting to Persia; Alcibiades, the golden boy of Athens who, when faced with a trial, defected to Sparta, then to Persia, then returned to Athens, then fled to became a warlord in Thrace; Nicias, hero of the Peloponnesian War who lost his enormous army because of his superstitious fear of an eclipse; Theramenes, hero of the Peloponnesian War, and later the only voice of moderation in the government of the Thirty, shifted the blame for failures at the Battle of Arginusae onto the generals in charge, to save his own skin. Where could one find a man of integrity and principle?

Socrates behaved courageously in the three battles he fought for Athens; he alone stood up to the six-thousand-man Assembly when they wanted to turn the trial of the generals of Arginusae into a kangaroo court; he stood up to the five hundred jurors at this trial and told them what he thought they needed to hear rather than what they wanted to hear. Was Socrates truly a moral philosopher — in both senses of the ambiguous term: a student of morality who adhered strictly to his avowed moral principles?

The devoted followers of Socrates, “the Socratics” as they came to be known, all seem to have subscribed to the view that Socrates was a moral philosopher, first, last, and always. But he remained something of an enigma to them too. Whatever Socrates was, he did not have an inner circle of adepts to whom he revealed his secrets. He maintained the same stance to his devotees as to strangers whom he accosted on the street. Many of his followers did not share their experiences in writings; of those who did, the writings of only two have come to us complete: those of Plato and Xenophon. But enough remains of the other Socratic writers to let us see that they did not all understand his moral philosophy the same way.

To Antisthenes, Socrates was an almost ascetic practitioner of self-control. Inspired by Socrates “he adopted the stance of a counter-culture puritan or proto-cynic.”[22] Xenophon was influenced by Antisthenes and also portrayed Socrates at times as a preacher of sermons and a preceptor. Phaedo wrote a dialogue in which Socrates discussed philosophy in the humble shop of Simon the shoemaker. He also stressed the personal influence Socrates had on improving his friends. Aeschines wrote a dialogue about Alcibiades in which Socrates’ admonitions bring the young man to tears. Socrates professes to have no art to educate him, but hopes by divine dispensation (theia moira) through his love for Alcibiades, to improve him.[23] Here Socrates appeals to a kind of religious inspiration to reform his prodigal friend. In all of the Socratic dialogues Socrates is portrayed as deeply invested in questions of moral education, but we find a wide range of interpretations of his method and teachings from theoretical analyst to rigid disciplinarian to inspired advisor.

[22].Kahn 1996: 7.

[23].Fr. 11 Dittmar = SSR 6A53.*

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