Opposites: Comparing the Italian Occupations of Libya and the Dodecanese
The differences in the occupations of the Dodecanese and Libya by the Italians are based in racism, imperialism, and revanchism
Reece Brosco
This investigation aims to compare and contrast the colonial occupation of Libya and the Dodecanese by the Italians, both before and after Fascism, and examine the differing legacies Italian occupation had in each region. The Italian occupation of the Dodecanese differed greatly from their occupation of Libya both in its tone and its violence. Unlike the violence which was exhibited against Libyans, the Dodecanese had the advantage of Philhellenism, deep European sympathy for the Greek people, as well as a shared classical heritage with the Italians which made the Italian occupation of the Eastern Greek Islands far more peaceful and prosperous.
Thus, the Italian occupation of Libya and the Dodecanese are virtual opposites. Libya saw little development but instead concentration camps and genocide whereas the Dodecanese experienced great improvements in quality of life. The only thing that these occupations share is that the scholarly discussion about them helps to shape the neoliberal post-colonial narrative of Italians as “good colonizers”.
First, the beginnings of each occupation should be compared. Interestingly enough, the two occupations began somewhat simultaneously after the Italo-Turkish War. The area that is modern Libya, referenced in the late 1920s primarily by the names of its main regions, “Tripoli and Cyrenaica, bordering on the Mediterranean Sea, were conquered in 1911, after a war with Turkey.”¹ Likewise, “the island of Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands were occupied at the same time and still are under the Italian flag.”² Both the above excerpts were written in 1927 on the subject of Italian colonialism, with the luxury of time and scholarship, however, it is clear that “For some time before 1911, the idea of the occupation of Libya had been developing and maturing in the Italian public mind.”³ This meant that the “eventual acquisition of Libya became a cardinal assumption of Italian foreign policy.”⁴
This assumption was finally lived out on October 16, 1912, after the Treaty of Ouchy which put Libya in the possession of Italy on the condition that “Italy was to pay Turkey an undisclosed sum of money as a token compensation for her loss of Libya.”⁵ Such a payment was necessary because Italy stood to benefit dramatically as a result of their new claim to Libya. The “profit from the occupation of Libya, since Libya in Italian hands would conserve Italy’s surplus population, supply the industrial machine of Italy with new sources of raw materials, provide employment for the Italian proletariat, and open additional markets for the country’s growing export business.”⁶ Thus it is clear that economic considerations were foremost in the minds of Italians concerned with occupying Libya.
By contrast, this was not the case for the Dodecanese. For these Eastern Greek Islands, “neither ethnic nor economic considerations had prompted Italy to establish a permanent foothold in the Dodecanese.”⁷ Instead, the “seizure of the Dodecanese Islands between April 20 and May 21, 1912, a move dictated by military security and possible bargaining rights at the peace table, raised the spirits of those groups which were clamoring for a more energetic prosecution of the war.”⁸ It is clear that the move to seize the Dodecanese was motivated by a rise in Italian nationalist movements who were eager to pursue war and territory to achieve their goal to create a modern Italian state which represented the reach and scope of the Roman Empire of Italy’s past. It is because of this nationalist motivation that historians have articulated that “the real reason for the seizure of the islands was political and imperialistic.”⁹
So, although both occupations were promoted by nationalism and have been understood as imperialistic, they are opposites because the Italians sought economic advantages in colonizing Libya whereas the motivation for the colonization of the Dodecanese was to gain political and imperial clout and help build out the idea of an expansive Italian empire.
The colonial origins of Libyan and Dodecanese occupations are not the only example of how these two cases are opposite of each other. The amount of development each colony received as a result of the Italian occupation was starkly different. The extent of Italian development in Libya could be characterized as little to none. The main developmental goal in Libya for the Italians was the construction of railroads. The Italians “projected three possible lines from the coast.”¹⁰ The most valuable of which would lead to Morocco and Tunisia from Tripoli and “when the Italians seized Libya from the Turks in 1912, they had plans for this [train] line on paper and named it the Trans- Libyan.”¹¹
The construction was slow and without progress. Beyond simply reaching West Africa by train, the rationale behind the trans-Sahara railroads was to re-establish the caravan trade that had thrived in ancient times between the Mediterranean and Chad and the Sudan.”¹² This projected trade, “whose importance colonial writers always exaggerated”,¹³ was the keen interest of Italian colonial developers hoping to build railroads in Libya. The colonial authorities, however, had not anticipated the uprising of tribesmen and “as the Italians pressed for control over the interior, sabotage by the native groups increased.”¹⁴
This postponed and further slowed not only construction but also desire to construct, until the need for railways was dire under the fascist rule in the face of fighting in North Africa during the Second World War. Upon Rommel’s arrival and the beginning of the fighting in Egypt, it soon became clear that the strategic concerns and the need to effectively and quickly advance and retreat outweighed the value of a static train line for the Axis powers in North Africa. Thus “in retrospect, there was a mirage-like quality to Italy’s attempt to establish a railroad system in the parched Sahara — ambitious but enormously costly and ultimately as empty as the desert itself.”¹⁵
By contrast, it is said of the Dodecanese that “no Italian colonial territory was renovated so extensively”.¹⁶ Development on the islands included “road construction, the establishment of Italian agricultural colonies, reforestation programs, and urban development that included the introduction of modern housing, electricity, and modern sewage disposal systems.”¹⁷ This difference in development is clearly stark and likely the result of a number of factors. Since the Greeks of the Dodecanese were ethnically more similar to the Italians in race played a role in the calculation to develop on the Dodecanese.
Likewise, the island of Rhodes, which received the most development as a result of the Italian occupation, had great shared historical significance to both Italians and Greeks. Finally, another aspect of the calculation was to show the people of the Dodecanese that the Italian occupation would be far better for their quality of life than the previous Ottoman occupation had been.
It is important to stop here and understand the significance of Mussolini’s rise to power and the resulting fascist state that was created in 1922. In both contexts, it is appropriate to know the difference between the original Italian occupation and the period of fascist occupation. The Fascist occupation of Libya was cruel, wrought with genocide and cultural suppression. World War I “brought Italy to the brink of collapse, leading to a series of messy truces with the tribesmen,” the same ones who had been attacking train lines before the war.¹⁸
However, “once Mussolini came to power in 1922, he rejected further appeasement and sent in troops to rout the natives and destroy their supply bases.”¹⁹ Mussolini’s grand vision, once he came into power, was “to settle between ten and fifteen million Italians in Eritrea, Somalia, and Libya to populate what he heralded as ‘the Second Roman Empire.’”²⁰ The new fascist policies “meant forced subjugation of Libyans. Rights accepted before 1922 by the previous government were dismissed.”²¹
Policies included “forceful deportation of the rural population of Cyrenaica (Eastern coast of Libya) and their confinement in concentration camps between 1929 and 1934.”²² This genocide has been covered up by the Italian government’s efforts; including the “official refusal to open the Italian National Archives to scholars, especially the files on its colony’s concentration camps”²³ and “rejection of war crimes trials for individuals who carried out government policies as colonial officers.”²⁴
Again, directly opposite of the genocide experienced in Libya the fascist occupation of the Dodecanese was mild. For the islanders “The fascists distinguished themselves from the “good” Italians by their willingness to humiliate the colonized and their eagerness to project their mastery, and their pretentious displays of power.”²⁵ The Dodecanese dealt with the shift between the original Italian occupation and the fascist occupation by articulating the fascists as “un-Italian” Italians. The difference is genocide and concentration camps on the one hand and rudeness on the other.
These differences make it imperative to deconstruct and analyze the narrative of Italians as “good colonizers”. Although the occupations were opposite in their motivations, in regards to the development they brought about in both regions, and concerning the fascist occupation, they both have helped to build a narrative of Italians as “good colonizers”. For the Dodecanese, the Italians were “good” not only because they provided great development and quality of life improvements on the islands but also because, in the eyes of the islanders the Italians “were least disposed among the imperialists to sustain that role in social contexts, and the least inhibited about fraternizing socially with the colonized.”²⁶
This is because of the shared ancient cultural history of Greece and Italy (Rome), the idea of “una faccia una razza” (one face one race) which was meant to articulate the closeness of the Greek and Italian people. On the other hand “the genocide (1929–33) of Libyan nationals at the hands of Italian fascists remains virtually unknown to all but the Libyan people.”²⁷ It is this silence on the part of the Italian government and most scholars of comparative fascism that has created the “persisting notion that Italian fascism was somehow moderate or ‘benign.’”²⁸ This is simply not the case and it is exceedingly dangerous to promote that understanding in concert with a “good colonizer” narrative because such actions help to erase and muddy the history of violence and genocide in Libya and elsewhere.
Works Cited
[1] The Reference Service, American Library in Paris. “The Italian Demand for Colonies.” Advocate of Peace through Justice, vol. 89, no. 4, 1927, pp. 226. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20661563.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Cunsolo, Ronald S. “Libya, Italian Nationalism, and the Revolt against Giolitti.” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 37, no. 2, 1965, pp. 186. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1878309.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Cunsolo, pp. 189.
[7] Mavris, N. G. “Certain Misconceptions in Relation to the Eastern Mediterranean and Greece.” Social Science, vol. 21, no. 1, 1946, pp. 26. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41883706.
[8] Cunsolo, pp. 189.
[9] Mavris, pp. 26.
[10] Maggi, Stefano, and Rutger Gras. “Sahara’s Lost Railroads.” Railroad History, no. 183, 2000, pp. 83. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43504797.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Doumanis, N. (2005). Italians as “Good” Colonizers: Speaking Subalterns and the Politics of Memory in the Dodecanese. Italian Colonialism, 223. doi:10.1007/978–1–4039–8158–5_20
[17] Ibid.
[18] Maggi, pp. 87
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ahimda, A. A. (n.d.). Forgotten Voices: Power and Agency in Colonial and Post Colonial Libya. Routledge. 41.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ahimda, 41.
[23] Ahimda, 43.
[24] Ahimda, 37.
[25] Ahimda, 37.
[26] Doumanis, N. (2005). Italians as “Good” Colonizers: Speaking Subalterns and the Politics of Memory in the Dodecanese. Italian Colonialism, 227. doi:10.1007/978–1–4039–8158–5_20
[27] Ahimda, 35–36.
[28] Ibid.
