Analyzing Media Sentiment Toward Chinese Investments in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
Local political considerations in the Central Asian nations play a large role in determining both how often Chinese investments are written about and how they are portrayed.
By Sharanya Rajiv, Senior Analyst and Manager of Operations
In recent years, it has become impossible to imagine Central Asia’s future without considering China’s role. With Chinese investments in the region totaling 54.95 billion USD by the end of 2019 and regional economies also increasingly relying on China for trade and development assistance, analysts have frequently warned about the country’s growing influence in the region. Have Chinese investments actually translated into public diplomacy outcomes? How have regional sentiments toward Chinese investments evolved since the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan in 2013?
Have Chinese investments actually translated into public diplomacy outcomes?
Using our Altai Sentiment Analysis tool, we analyzed news articles from 11 leading Kazakh, Tajik, and Uzbek news sources between 2012 and 2019 to assess whether sentiment trends towards Chinese investments shifted with the announcement of the BRI in 2013 and how they have evolved since then. These three countries provide a useful snapshot for the entire Central Asian region, with Kazakhstan enjoying greater economic engagement with China than other regional economies, Tajikistan, mainly relying on China for most investment inflows, and Uzbekistan counting China as its largest trading partner. The news sources reviewed in this research include the official government-owned newspaper of Kazakhstan, Kazinform; three privately-owned business newspapers from Kazakhstan, Forbes Kazakhstan, Kapital, and InBusiness; the official government-owned newspaper of Tajikistan, Narodnaya; three privately owned Tajik newspapers, Avesta, Dialog, and Tajik Telegraph Agency; a government-owned portal that focuses on the economy in Uzbekistan, Review.uz; and two privately owned newspapers, Podrobno and UzDaily.
Media Coverage of Chinese Investment Increased after the BRI
Cumulatively across all of these news sources, mentions of Chinese investments were very limited before the announcement of the BRI in 2013 (Figure 1). After this date, however, in both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, there were steep increases in the number of mentions of Chinese investments, which peaked in 2016 and began a small decline. In Uzbekistan by contrast, mentions of Chinese investments only began to increase as President Mirziyoyev undertook reforms and focused on the narrative of opening up the Uzbek economy from 2016 onwards. However, actual flows of Chinese investments into the three countries did not increase after the announcement of the BRI in 2013. In fact, since a lot of these Chinese investments are loans, the Kazakh National Bank began reporting negative investment flows from China between 2015 and 2019, the same period when mentions peaked. In Tajikistan, the seven years prior to this event actually saw 68% more investments than the seven years after this event. Similarly, most Chinese investments in Uzbekistan occurred before the reforms from 2016. These factors suggest that the increases in media coverage of Chinese investments could be related to the political appeal of attracting Chinese investments and, especially, the BRI. After all, Chinese President Xi Jinping first unveiled the initiative during a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013.
Private Media vs Government Media
In all three countries, privately-owned news sources mentioned Chinese investments more often than government-owned sources. This could indicate an elite consensus around the significance of Chinese investments and the BRI. As a result, public conversation on the issue doesn’t need to be driven by the government.
Sentiment Trends
A look at sentiment levels toward Chinese investments (Figure 2) during the same time period provides more clarity. While Uzbek media mentioned Chinese investments the least, it consistently displayed exuberant sentiment toward these investments, even including a slight dip in 2014. This does not follow the pattern of investment flows. Even though the Uzbek government has not publicly released the latest data on foreign direct investment by source country, according to the American Enterprise Institute, Chinese investments actually declined between 2012 and 2013, and never recovered thereafter.
While both Kazakh and Tajik media were less upbeat than Uzbekistan, they nevertheless displayed positive sentiment with only minor variations. In Kazakh media, positive sentiment peaked in 2013, when the BRI was announced, and 2017, when both countries signed deals worth USD 8 billion. In Tajikistan, there was a minor decline in positive from 2013 onwards followed by a sharp rise in 2018, when a Chinese company was granted a license to a gold mine in exchange for the construction of a power plant in Dushanbe.
Implications
Ultimately, positive and negative sentiment reviewed in this research project toward Chinese investments seem to be less dependent on the actual flows of Chinese investments and more dependent on the political implications of these investments for regional governments and elite groups. For instance, in Kazakhstan, both the announcement of the BRI in 2013 and the slew of economic deals four years later are significant political events. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, despite limited investments, the Mirziyoyev administration that took charge in 2016 has emphasized the steps taken to attract investment and open up the Uzbek economy. This helps explain the media’s greater coverage of Chinese investments thereafter. On the other hand, in Tajikistan, the 2018 power plant-for-natural resource swap deal highlights the country’s high debt burden. The increase in positive sentiment on the heels of this agreement suggests that the Tajik government and elite groups leveraged news media as a public diplomacy tool to hedge against negative public sentiments toward the deal.
Ultimately, positive and negative sentiment reviewed in this research project toward Chinese investments seem to be less dependent on the actual flows of Chinese investments and more dependent on the political implications of these investments for regional governments and elite groups.
The research here shows the absence of a straightforward connection between actual flows of Chinese investments into Central Asia and the region’s media discourse on these investments. As a result, local political considerations in the Central Asian nations play a large role in determining both how often Chinese investments are written about and how they are portrayed. For Chinese investors, this suggests that investments in themselves are not the be-all, end-all of a consistent and positive media discourse. Given the importance of political factors in driving the media’s coverage on Chinese investments, a conscientious public diplomacy campaign built around these investments can ensure that they receive frequent coverage and the reportage doesn’t peter out.
If you enjoyed reading this article, click here to sign up for our weekly newsletter to receive our latest analysis directly in your inbox.
About the Author
Sharanya Rajiv is the manager of operations and senior analyst at Hillhouse Consulting Group. Her research focuses on geopolitical competition and energy politics in Eurasia. Previously, she was a senior program coordinator at the New Delhi center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she conducted research on India’s strategic interests in Eurasia. Sharanya is fluent in Hindi and Tamil and speaks intermediate Russian.
About Hillhouse
Hillhouse Consulting Group specializes in data driven analysis in frontier markets, helping organizations understand today’s challenges and opportunities. We bring world-class expertise to regional challenges by combining the best of international academic and research practices with a rigorous and informed local perspective, delivering the best of both words. To learn more about retaining our team for custom analysis and reports, please click here.
