The Intellectual Foundations of America: Supporting James Madison’s Federal Negative?
On June 8th, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, James Madison of Virginia suggested that the new constitution should include a “federal negative,” which would give Congress the authority to veto any law passed by a state legislature. He viewed this as a critical safeguard against unchecked power at the state level.
The following essay addresses the questions of including Madison’s federal negative from the perspective of a congressional delegate. I believe this type of historical analysis is very important in weighing multi-perspectived arguments — it helps us rid of our 21st-century presentism and allows us to transport through the time of history, helping sharpen our critical thinking and analysis skills:
If I had been a delegate to the 1787 convention, I would have supported the inclusion of James Madison’s “federal negative” to limit excessive state independence that threatened both minorities and national unity; moreover, I would have supported an absolute negative over a partial negative to avoid destructive tension. For one, being a delegate at the 1787 convention implies recent knowledge of the catastrophic events and outcomes of the “critical period” — namely, the appalling weak financial position as a result of Congress’s limited capabilities under the Articles of Confederation. Not only did states violate the Articles through recent treaty violations, they also “… enacted laws that discriminated against out-of-state merchants,” creating interstate competition that undermined national unity. However, states like Rhode Island and Massachusetts, though flooded with post-war debt, vastly exacerbated the nation’s economic situation. While Rhode Island allowed debtors to repay their debts in inflated currency, giving creditors only a fraction of what they initially gave and causing massive inflation, Massachusetts’ more fiscally conservative legislation of raising taxes led to massive loss of property (specifically for farmers) in court-ordered foreclosures. Put together, these state legislations that engendered massive economic downturn as a result of unchecked state legislation epitomized all that was wrong with the confederation. Therefore, had I been a delegate at the convention, I would choose a “federal negative,” which would give Congress the power to hold a veto over state laws, in order to limit states’ exploitation of the minority (such as creditors or farmers) and to increase national unity that states previously undermined. As Madison stated in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, “the effects [of the federal negative] would be not only to guard the national rights and interests against invasion, but also to restrain the States from thwarting and molesting each other.” In this sense, the federal negative would both bolster U.S security and also reinforce national unity (which was previously threatened by international trade agreements with Britain) by decreasing interstate competition (7). Moreover, Madison warned that without the inclusion of a negative, “every positive power that can be given on paper will be evaded and defeated.” Madison’s earnest tone emphasized his broad distrust of state powers, perhaps even implying that they are inherently antagonistic. Given the state legislatures’ recent actions (both constitutional and unconstitutional), I would likely have the same sentiment, resulting in support of an absolute negative, And while proponents of the partial negative argued that the negative would enable proportionately larger states to impose their will on smaller ones, the absolute negative (which granted the veto “in all cases whatsoever”) in order to largely avoid destructive tension. For instance, a limited negative was liable to become “a fresh source of contention” between states and the federal government regarding constitutionality. These disagreements might have led to federal coercion that could bid defiance to the national authority and therefore cause violence. However, an absolute negative would “render the use of force unnecessary” because “the states could of themselves pass no operative act.” Overall, had I been a delegate the 1787 convention, I would have supported an absolute “federal negative” to protect national unity and minorities and to avoid destructive tension associated with a partial negative.
Bibliography
Madison, James. “James Madison, the ‘Federal Negative’ and the Making of the U.S. Constitution (1787).” HBS №716–053. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2010.
