Major Losses in Kashmir Bring Discussions on Operations and a New Narrative to the Fore
It has been a bloody one month for the security forces in Kashmir. In early April, the Indian Army lost an entire five-men special forces squad (of 4 Para SF). In early May, a battalion from the army’s frontline counter-insurgency force (21 Rashtriya Rifles) suffered a major leadership loss as it lost its commanding officer and a company commander. In the same operation, a sub inspector of the Jammu and Kashmir Police’s Special Operations Group was also lost, which is the state police force’s counter-insurgency wing.
A few things are noteworthy. Both the early-April gunfight involving the Para SF personnel and the early-May encounter involving 21 Rashtriya Rifles and JKP SOG were in North Kashmir’s Kupwara district, the former in Jumgund area and the latter in Handwara. Observers have seen it as a shift in the insurgency’s focus from South to North Kashmir. Both of these attacks were claimed by a relatively newer group called The Resistance Front that has been called a Lashkar-e-Taiba proxy but has gained traction lately.
The losses have brought the operational practices, the nature of the new group, and the security forces’ approach in discussions.
Why was CO at the helm of the operation?
Experts have been curious about the presence of the battalion’s commanding officer at the helm of the operation in Handwara. Arzan Tarapore, a fellow at the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research, highlighted that senior officers in India often carry out roles that would be carried out by non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or junior officers in Western militaries.
He said, “This is a matter of military culture. There is evidently more operational authority bestowed upon more junior members of Western militaries then there is in India.”
Tarapore said, while the reasons for this are grounded in a complex history, there is a clearly observed pattern.
“Without second-guessing the tactical commander in any given instance, you see evidence of this in the number of officers killed and awarded medals in wars too. The Indian Army often seems reluctant to let soldiers do the soldiering,” he told The Dispatch.
Anit Mukherjee, an assistant professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, believes it’s true to a point but cautions overreading into the argument.
He commented on Twitter, “NCOs and JCOs play a greater role in conventional operations like tactical operations in Kargil where a lot of them performed admirably. In COIN [counter-insurgency operations], one has to be extra careful — handling civilians — and hence officers prefer to lead missions. I would not over read too.”
While Colonel (Retd.) Vivek Chadha acknowledged that officers are indeed at the forefront and often take casualties, he said it is not a norm for a colonel to lead a sub-unit level operation, unless exceptional circumstances and the criticality of a situation that develops demands it. Col. Chadha, a research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, highlighted that it is mostly younger officers who lead in the field.
He said, “90% of the officer cadre’s casualties are of company-level officers, lieutenants and captains. COs do not lead every operation.
“The CO coordinates an operation. If the operation’s magnitude is beyond a certain point, say that two companies are involved, only then the CO or the 2-IC (second-in-command) will get involved. A task like house-clearing will not involve the CO.”
Col. Chaddha said the force deployment is spread throughout the area of operation and a particular party at times comes under a surprise attack.
“There are multiple parties in the attacking force and these parties are spread across the area of operation. The distance between these parties may at times be up to 500 to 1000 metres. One of these parties may be subject to an ambush or a surprise burst of fire. The situation drastically changes in such a case,” he said. “In such a case, despite there being sufficient numbers pitched against terrorists, there will be casualties.”
This party may or may not be on the front. It may or may not comprise of officers. But if it does comprise officers, it will be a significant loss and it will be due to a surprise burst of fire that anyone could have been subjected to.
It is something that can always happen, Col. Chadha said.
It was a hostage situation. Why did RR go ahead with the operation and not the special forces?
When asked why it was a Rashtriya Rifles unit and not a Para SF unit that carried out the operation in Handwara when it was known right from the beginning that there was a hostage situation, and a hostage situation is more of the special forces’ domain than Rashtriya Rifle’s, Col. Chadha said every situation does not need special forces to be pressed in.
He said, “A Para SF unit was pressed into a hostage situation at the Entrepreneurial Development Institute in Pampore [in 2016] and yet there were three casualties, including two captains. Pressing Para SF therefore is not a guarantee that there will not be any casualty. There is always a scope of casualties in such situations.”
Col. Chadda highlighted that Col. Ashutosh Sharma, 21 RR’s CO at Handwara, was a two-time Sena Medal (Gallantry) awardee and a veteran of counter-insurgency operations.
It is not therefore wise to second-guess his decision when we are not fully aware of circumstances on the ground, he told The Dispatch.
He also cautioned against over-employing Para SF.
“I am personally against always calling Para SF into an infantry battalion’s area of responsibility (AoR) which is like their own campus and calling someone from outside reflects very poorly on the battalion,” he said.
After Col. Sharma-led party went down, 9 Para SF was pressed into action and they neutralised the terrorists. It has been reported that Col. Sharma’s party comprising him, Major Anuj Sood, two other ranks, and a JKP SOG sub inspector was the first to reach and enter the residential premises that was the site of gunfight. All of them fell to terrorists’ gunfire who were hiding in the cowshed in the premises.
It is not the first time that such casualties have been reported. Col. MN Rai (in 2015) and DSP Aman Thakur (2019) were shot dead by militants in a similar manner when they were fired upon from militants hiding in a cowshed.
“The Resistance Front is not a bunch of ragtag gunmen”
About The Resistance Front (TRF), Col. Chadha said it has been correctly reported that it is a Pakistani attempt to rebrand terror and project the insurgency as an indigenous movement rather than a Pakistan-fuelled movement.
“They are not ragtag gunmen. They killed five of our special forces personnel and it shows that they were inducted into India after proper training,” Col. Chadha said.
The Para SF operation in North Kupwara has been called into question as well. The personnel’s insertion through helicopters “in close proximity” to terrorists has raised eyebrows. One analyst commented that helicopters can be heard from afar and terrorists can therefore prepare to face the troops being inserted as the element of surprise is lost.
Did the squad walk into an ambush? The discrepancies in the official narratives inspire such questions.
The Para SF operation, different versions, and some questions
General Officer Commanding 15 Corps Lieutenant General BS Raju said, “As this column [of special forces] was approaching the target area, one of the terrorists, who probably was a guide, started to return back towards the LC, and who ran straight into the stops of LC battalion and he was neutralised immediately.”
He added, “In the ensuing firefight that took place over the next five-six hours, the special forces managed to kill the balance of the four militants.”
This contradicts what a special forces soldier said in a video released by the army to the media. The soldier who identified himself as belonging to “squad two” said they were inserted along with “squad one”.
He narrated the fight: “[…] When we saw terrorists, we fired on them with MGL. We then saw them jump into a very deep nala (gorge). It turned into two corners as we went ahead to check it. Our squad was on one (corner’s) side, and Subedar Sanjiv sahab’s squad was on the other. Then, suddenly, there was a slide and two men from Sanjiv sahab’s squad fell (into the nala). Then, to save them, Sanjiv sahab too slid down and a fight ensued. It led to hand to hand combat. Sanjiv sahab held one terrorist firmly and he was screaming. Then his buddy came to save him. They did not know if the terrorists were alive or not. Some of them were hiding and as they went down, they were fired upon. Not caring for their lives, they killed both of the terrorists. When we found him in the morning, Subedar Sanjiv sahab was on top of a terrorist.” (This is translated from Hindi)
The gunfight seems to have not gone on for long as per this narration. Moreover, the narrator-soldier does not indicate that his squad too participated in the fight. Contrary to what GOC 15 Corps said, there is no mention of any terrorist running towards LoC and being shot there.
One wonders why there are such discrepancies in the narrative.
On the operational front, this gorge seems to have taken SF personnel by surprise. Were they not aware of the terrain? While one should not speculate or second-guess about conditions in the field, limitations of aerial surveillance have been well documented in tough terrains (like North Kupwara or even the Maoist-infested Central India) and this is therefore a genuine question. Did these features escape aerial reconnaissance?
The Technology Quotient
A former army officer who has served in counter-terrorism roles in the Valley said technology’s optimum use could reduce the toll.
“Had they been equipped with thermal image intensifiers that could see through walls or handheld drones that could fly in through windows, the outcome might have been much different,” the officer said about the Handwara encounter.
The officer admitted that there are multiple factors shaping an outcome beside technology but said technology is a great force multiplier and it can very much sway the outcome.
“I wonder why they did not have UAVs in the sky in Handwara like in the North Kupwara mission with the Para SF personnel,” the officer wondered. “What stops senior commanders from getting those UAVs in operations? They have been pressed into action before. Why are they not a regular part of operations?”
Pakistan Upping the Ante
It has been an old tactic of Pakistan to activate groups that have been inactive for a while when the going gets tough for other groups. Jaish-e-Mohammad was activated some time back to give breathing space to other groups such as Hizb-ul-Majahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose leader Hafiz Saeed has come under international scrutiny.
Now that both Jaish and LeT are under international scanner, Pakistan is working to change the insurgency’s narrative in Kashmir. Bolstered with its success in Afghanistan and its resultant rapport with the US, Pakistan is upping the ante in Kashmir.
This new narrative is also marked by taking the insurgency where there has been a lull for some time.
“Pakistan is focusing on places where the conflict has been low for a year or two. It is taking advantage of a perceptual and operational gap, redirecting its terrorists and information warfare tactics to such areas,” Col. Chadha told The Dispatch.
Militants claimed by TRF as their own have turned out to be LeT cadres. Former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen HS Panag wrote, “The aim is to give the proxy war an indigenous flavour. This organisation [TRF] is likely to be used to claim responsibility for all terrorist activity while the cadres will continue to be trained and controlled by the parent organisations that will remain incognito.”
Experts have also suggested that Pakistan is also “secularising” the movement. While religion has been a top motivator for recruits and cadres in Kashmir, Pakistan ensures that elements it sponsors keep loyalty to Pakistan above their loyalty to Islam, making it a political endgame rather than religious, and making religion a means to an end.
A rift between the then Hizb-ul-Mujahideen’s operations’ chief in Kashmir, Zakir Musa, and the group’s Pakistan-based leadership emerged when Musa began to give primacy to Islam over pro-Pakistan rhetoric. He first called for the establishment of sharia in Kashmir as the foremost priority and then threatened to behead the Hurriyat leadership and hang their heads in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk. The group refused to back Musa’s statement on Hurriyat. Musa eventually left Hizb for an Al Qaeda affiliate where the primacy was for an Islamic caliphate rather than a Pakistan-based rule in Kashmir.
Now that Hizb chief in Kashmir, Riyaz Naikoo, has been neutralised and Pakistan is under pressure regarding other groups, and Al Qaeda and ISIS imprint in the Valley is low, it is set to push for a movement in Kashmir that does the exactly the same thing that it has been doing for decades but under a new banner of The Resistance Front — the banner of Kashmiri local resistance to the Indian rule, and not Islam or Pakistan.
Madhur Sharma is a post-graduate student of journalism at the Indian Institute of Mass Communication, New Delhi, and a graduate in history from the Delhi University. He tweets at @madhur_mrt.
Views of persons quoted in the story are their own.
