Featured
The In-Famous Romanovs: The Bolsheviks’ Riddle (Part 2)
The Hidden Narrative
Unlike in ‘whodunnit’ classic stories, the hidden narrative of the mystery of the disappearance of the Romanovs has two parts.
The first part concerns ‘the underlying substance or material of the narrative’ such as deflections, false fronts, and deliberately planted clues and ‘reconstructions’ via official post factum documentations and recordings of the ‘crime’. Similar to the open narrative of the Romanovs puzzle, this part of the hidden narrative does not deal with what really happened. It is the second part — the hidden part of the hidden narrative which does.
Both the open narrative and the open narrative part of the hidden narrative are the stories that run in parallel and also intertwine and reinforce each other. Whilst the hidden part of the hidden narrative is a story that stands apart. Although it can be detected from the two previous ones via hints, unspoken but present clues and impressions this story line stays hidden and is not perpetuated. Yet it is there to be discovered.
The Hidden Part of The Hidden Narrative
In the Romanovs mystery the golden nuggets of truth are not that easily spotted. For the evidence that points at them is mainly of unspoken nature, diminished in its importance or deflected attention from. Therefore, to find them one has to look at what was not magnified, not presented, and not drawn attention to. In other words, have an inverted look at it.
The Bolsheviks-Germans Equation
So, lets invert and shift focus from the perpetuated Bolsheviks-Whites confrontation to the out of focus Bolsheviks-Germany relations.
On 3rd March 1918, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers: Germany, Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Under the terms of the Treaty, Soviet Russia lost control of Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and its Caucasus provinces of Karas and Batum.
An Article 21 of the Russian-German supplementary agreement of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk said:
‘Nationals of each of the contracting parties who themselves or whose ancestors originate from the territory of the opposing party shall be granted, by agreement with the authorities of that party, the right to return to the homeland from which they or their ancestors originated, within ten years after the ratification of the Treaty. Persons entitled to re-emigration shall, on their application, be released from belonging to the state of which they have hitherto been citizens.
No obstacles or difficulties shall be placed in their written or oral communications with the diplomatic or consular representatives of the country from which they or their ancestors originate. The German Commissions provided for in paragraph 4 of paragraph 1 of Article 17 shall also undertake the care of German re-emigrants.’
On 12th of June 1918, one of such German Commissions arrived to Yekaterinburg and settled literally opposite the Ipatiev House:
‘Recently, German Commission №8 dealing with the evacuation of German prisoners of war, conscripts, and refugees in Russia arrived in Yekaterinburg. The commission temporarily settled on Voznesensky Prospekt in the former Pinovsky house. This commission is one of 17 similar commissions scattered throughout various cities in Russia. The main commission, which unites the work of these commissions, is located in Moscow.’ — an excerpt from the announcement in the newspaper ‘Ural Life’, 12 June 1918
This directly concerned the Romanovs. In particular, the wife of Nicholas II, Alexandra Fedorovna or Alix of Hesse who was the daughter of Louis IV of Hesse (1837–1892), and the first cousin on her mother’s side of Wilhelm II, the last Germany Emperor and King of Prussia (1859–1941).
With these background elements being the setting for the scene, let’s now revisit the subject of the Presidium of the Regional Council of Workers, Peasants and Red Army Deputies of the Urals who took the blame for the ‘crime’ they really did not commit.
The Presidium of the Regional Council of The Urals
The Presidium of the Regional Council of the Urals was not as homogenous as it was presented in the communications of the open narrative of the Romanovs mystery. Among its members there were some extremely left and left ones, and also the ones who supported the Lenin’s line of thinking and the ones who opposed it, and the various combinations of the two. To add to this, there was also a division on the subject of Nicholas II and his fate:
‘The Ural Executive Committee consisted of the Bolsheviks and several left SRs who stood for the murder of Nikolai, some of our comrades were also in favour of finishing off Nikolai as soon as possible. The ones who were then in favour of the immediate execution were SRs: Khotymsky, Polyakov, of our own comrades: Safarov, Tuntul, Voikov, Didkovsky; and for the directives of the Center such comrades as Beloborodov, Chutskayev, Goloshchekin, Syromolotov, Andronnikov.’ — an excerpt from Y.M. Yurovsky memoirs, April-May 1922
‘For the directives of the Center’ in the context of the excerpt means against ‘finishing off Nikolai’.
Now, the Presidium of the Regional Council of the Urals consisted of the following main figures: Philip Goloshchekin (1876–1941), Alexander Beloborodov (1891–1938), Georg Safarov (1891–1942) , and Nikolai Tolmachev (1895–1919).
Out of them there are two people in particular who stand out — Alexander Beloborodov and Philip Goloshchekin. Both were left, and both were against ‘finishing off Nikolai’. In addition to this, Philip Goloshchekin was ‘a typical Leninist’:
‘I know Goloshchekin… He is also a typical Leninist. […] I know both Sverdlov and Goloshchekin personally. They are in close relations with each other…’ — an excerpt from the testimony of the historian and publisher, V. L. Burtsev, August 11, 1920
The story goes that if there were any political disputes between the left and the extreme left, Philip Goloshchekin was the one to be sent from Ural to Moscow to sort things out.
‘But in general, when things got really bad, Goloshchekin would be put on a train and sent to Moscow to Sverdlov. It was called: ‘To send the heavy artillery.’ He would arrive a few days later, having settled all the relationships and resolved all the issues.’ — an excerpt from the radio interview of I. I. Rodzinsky, May 1964
This information in regards to Philip Goloshchekin and the internal dynamics of the Presidium of the Regional Council of the Urals are important elements in the Romanovs story, for it was Goloshchekin who had ‘the special trust of the Central Committee’, and had been entrusted with a certain responsibility:
[…] there was another kind of danger, namely the mood for the immediate execution of the former Tsar Nicholas among the Socialist Revolutionaries who were then part of the Regional Executive Committee. But what is worse, such moods were also among individual responsible communists […].
Since this act was an act of extreme political importance, this entire matter was entrusted to comrade Philip Goloshchekin, who enjoyed the special trust of the Central Committee, and who was entrusted with the responsibility for a coordinated solution to this issue […]. And of course, this was fundamentally a matter of political, and not only and not so much of practical resolution of this issue.’ — an excerpt from Y. M. Yurovsky note, 1934
With the above in mind let’s recap the situation that the Soviet government faced in connection to Germany, Romanovs, Ural, and their comrades.
On the one hand, it experienced pressures and obligations in relation to German-Russian supplementary agreement of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which included the Article 21 and 23, applicable to the Romanovs, in a particular to Alexandra Fedorovna and her children. This relationship was coloured by the additional challenge created by the assassination of a German diplomat Wilhelm von Mirbach (2 July 1871–6 July 1918) in Moscow, and the advancements of the whites and the Czechoslovaks in Ural.
And on the other hand, there were political fights and divisions from within topped up by the differences in opinions in regards to the fate of Nicholas II. With extra challenges added by the uprisal of the Verh-Isetsk factory workers and frontline soldiers in Yekaterinburg on 12–14th June 1918, and in Nevnyansk, in the former, by the way, was involved the son of the first cousin of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) — G. A. Ardashev
In this complex situation, a resolution was needed that, on the one hand, would satisfy Germany and respect the articles of the German-Russian supplementary agreement, and, on the other hand, ease the strain of the divisional moods and remove from the political scene the source of one of the disagreements.
Such resolution was found and Nicholas II was an integral part of it, but not in the role that everyone was made to believe.
The Selected Few or The Few in The Know
Considering the complexity and delicate nature of the situation and the pressure of opposing interests and aspirations, it was only wise to keep the information about the resolution within a tight circle of the few and make the communication on the case restricted. In addition, it was important to make it look as if it was a spontaneous unplanned decision of the local Presidium rather than a thought through and timed political action. That is why there is almost no public recorded written communications prior to the resolution itself. For, most communications and agreements on the case were private and verbal, except the ones which were made deliberately public to deflect attention.
The deflection worked on several levels — on the level of the Center in Moscow, on the level of the Presidium of the Regional Council of the Urals, on the level of the Commandant of the Ipatiev House guards included, and on the level of Nicholas II and the Family. This layered deflection in communications ensured security and safety of the core participants and the successful outcome of the operation.
According to the ‘official’ version of the open narrative described in the book ‘The Last Days of The Last Tsar’ by P. M. Bukov (1888–1953) the resolution that would be publicised as ‘execution of Nicholas II’ was decided in the beginning of July 1918:
‘The question of executing Nikolai Romanov […] was fundamentally resolved in the first days of July’. — an excerpt from ‘The Last Days of The Last Tsar’ by P. M. Bukov, 1921
In reality, the resolution had been conceived and decided on much earlier. The implementation of it, however, started in June 1918, around the time of the ‘German Commission №8 settled on Voznesensky Prospekt in the former Pinovsky house’ which was 12th June 1918. Ten days later, the first deflection manoeuvre was performed: on 23, 24 and 25 June 1918 fake news in regards to the murder of Nicholas II appeared in some Moscow newspapers:
‘In recent days, reports continue to appear in some Moscow newspapers regarding the fate of Nicholas II and his family, either confirming, based on information from various sources, the initial rumour about the murder of the former emperor, or refuting this rumour.’ — newspaper ‘Freedom of Russia’ (former ‘Russian Vedomosti’) issue №53, 23 June 1918
This occurrence was almost immediately followed by the letters of the White Officer, — four in total, although I. I. Rodzinsky in his recollections stated that he had written only two:
‘Tell us about the note in red ink […]’
‘Ah, the correspondence I had with Nikolai. […] there are apparently two letters written by me in French with the signature… (foreign language). Russian officer. In red ink, as I recall now, we wrote two letters, we wrote them, that’s how it was decided. It was a few days before, well, before all these events, just in case, they decided to start a correspondence of such a nature…’ — an excerpt from the recollections of I. I Rodziansky, May 1964
On 3rd July 1918, Germans released similar to Moscow newspapers fake news about the murder of Nicholas II:
‘In the German newspapers, an announcement of the death of the Emperor was published; 13 days earlier than the supposed news e.g. 3 July (new style 1918). This was told to me by Germans, thinking that it is all a fake.’ — an excerpt from the testimony of S. V. Markov
In parallel with this deflective communication, in the first days of July, a member of the Presidium of the Regional Council of Urals and the one of the few people in the know, Philip Goloshchekin, went to Moscow. Officially to attend the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets that took place on 4–10 July 1918, and unofficially, to fine tune the details of the resolution. This is confirmed by the telegram sent on 4th July 1918 to Yakov Sverdlov for the attention of Philip Goloshchekin:
‘Syromolotov just went to organize the case according to the instructions of the Center, the fears are in vain period Avdeev has been replaced his assistant Moshkin has been arrested instead of Avdeev Yurovsky internal guard has been replaced by others period.’ — A. G. Beloborodov, 4 July 1918
Note the mention of F. F. Syromolotov, the Commissioner of Finance of the Ural Regional Council, who was the follower of the directives of the Center, and also against the execution of Nicholas II.
Some days after 4th July 1918 the date when Y.M. Yurovsky had been installed as a new Commandant of the Ipatiev House, the fourth and the final letter from the Presidium of the Regional Council of Urals (The White Officer character) was sent to Nicholas II. In the body of its text the most important were the words:
‘This moment has come, we must act.’ — an excerpt from the fourth letter of the White Officer, July, 1918
At the same time, on 5–6 July 1918, in Kiev, Ukraine, a former diplomatic official of the German Foreign Office’, Count Alvensleben, warned a politician F. N. Bezak (1865–1940) and Lieutenant General, A. N. Dolgorukov (1872–1948) about the major announcement in connection to the prepared events:
‘In the summer of 1918, a member of the State Council and a Kiev provincial leader, Fyodor Nikolaevich Bezak, lived in Kiev. He and I were both part of the same monarchist group. I remember well, on the 5th or 6th of July, — new style, — Bezak called me on the phone and said that Count Alvensleben had just called him and told him that he would now be at Bezak’s and would give him some important news. This Alvensleben is a former diplomatic official of the German Foreign Office. […] During this conversation, Alvensleben warned us that between July 16 and July 20 (new style) a rumour or news of the assassination of the Emperor (Nicolas II) would spread, and that this rumour or news should not bother us: like the rumour about the murder of the Emperor, which took place in June, it would be false, but that it was necessary for His salvation. […] At the same time, he asked us to keep our conversation with him secret, pretending that we believed the news of the Emperor’s death. — an excerpt from the testimony of A. N. Dolgorukov
This statement beautifully connects the false newspaper announcements made on 23, 24 and 25 June 1918 and the newspaper announcements of 19the July 1918 that were to follow.
The sequence and timing of the above mentioned communications as well as the direct involvement of the three members of the local Presidium who were against the execution of Nicholas II — Goloshchekin, Boloborodov, and Syromolotov, — their indirect guidance of Nicholas II, and his inclusion into the loop, and the timed and coordinated actions of the people in the know on the German side indicate not only that the resolution of the situation with Nicholas II did not involve his murder but also was not some sort spontaneous outburst of extreme nature made on the spur of the moment by the local Bolesheviks.
On the contrary, the resolution was a carefully orchestrated, coordinated, and timed plan.
The Cryptic Telegram
There is a saying — the best place to hide something is in plain sight. This applies to one of the most referenced and referred to documents — the telegram which, on 17th July 1918, was sent from Yekaterinburg to Moscow to the attention of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) and Yakov Sverdlov.
The famous telegram contained two messages, one within the other. The very fact that has been intentionally overlooked in the open narrative of the Romanovs puzzle. The core message of the telegram presented below is underlined and highlighted in bold:
‘TELEGRAM TO V. I. LENIN AND Y. M. SVERDLOV:
Received on 17/7 Yekaterinburg at 12 o’clock.
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIES COMRADE LENIN
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE M. Y. SVERDLOV
FROM YEKATERNINBURG
ON LINE PRESIDIUM OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL OF THE WORKERS’ AND PEASANTS’ GOVERNMENT PERIOD
IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY’S APPROACH TO EKATERINBURG AND THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMISSION’S DISCOVERY OF THE GREAT WHITE GUARD CONSPIRACY INTENDED TO KIDNAPP THE FORMER TSAR AND HIS FAMILY PERIOD
DOCUMENTS ARE IN OUR HANDS PERIOD
BY RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL NIKOLAI ROMANOV WAS SHOT ON THE NIGHT OF JULY 16TH PERIOD
HIS FAMILY WAS EVACUATED TO A SAFE PLACE PERIOD
IN REGARDS TO THIS WE ARE ISSUING THE FOLLOWING NOTICE PERIOD
IN VIEW OF THE APPROACH OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GANGS TO THE RED CAPITAL OF THE URALS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CROWNED EXECUTIONER WILL AVOID THE PEOPLE’S COURT
(THE CONSPIRACY OF THE WHITE GUARDS WHO ATTEMPTED TO KIDNAPP HIM AND HIS OWN HAS BEEN DISCOVERED AND COMPROMISING DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN FOUND WILL BE PUBLISHED)
THE PRESIDIUM OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL FULFILLING THE WILL OF THE REVOLUTION HAS DECIDED TO SHOOT THE FORMER TSAR NICHOLAS ROMANOV GUILTY OF COUNTLESS BLOODY VIOLENCES AGAINST THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON THE NIGHT OF 16 JULY 1918 THIS SENTENCE WAS CARRIED OUT
ROMANOV’S FAMILY IS HELD WITH HIM IN CUSTODY IN THE INTERESTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY EVACUATED FROM THE CITY OF EKATERINBURG PERIOD
PRESIDIUM OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL PERIOD
ASKING FOR YOUR SANCTIONS EDITING OF THIS CONSPIRACY DOCUMENTS ARE SENT URGENTLY BY COURIER TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE’S COMMISSARS AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NOTIFICATION AWAITING ON LINE ASKING FOR AN URGENT ANSWER AWAITING ON LINE PERIOD’
As one can see, the core message informs about certain documents as well as about Nicholas II and his family being fine and held together in custody for safety. The rest of the message is simply a wrapping that deflects attention from the main subject.
The text of the telegram also shows a contradiction — the person who is written about as having been shot is alive and the documents of importance are written about as if they are the documents of a conspiracy which in fact was created by the Bolsheviks themselves. But it is this exact contradiction that reveals the truth.
The Documents of Interest
Although the exact nature of the documents of interest mentioned in the telegram of 17th July 1918 cannot be stated with outmost precision, one thing can be guessed with certainty — the documents were of such nature that would deem useful and valuable for the Soviet government.
Even though the cryptic telegram did contain a separate line about the documents of interest, it also contained information about the documents related to the exposed non-existent conspiracy which was purposefully used as a deflection from the topic of the documents in question:
‘It must be said that no kidnapping was being prepared, apparently the relevant circles would have been very happy if these people had been among them. But apparently, they were busy with something else, not so much with the search of the Royal family, but the organization of counter-revolution…’ — an excerpt from the radio interview with I. I. Rodzinsky, May 1964
Similar deflection was also used in the newspaper announcements that appeared on 19th June 1918 in ‘Pravda’ (N149) and ‘Izvestia’ (N151):
‘At the same time, a new conspiracy of counter-revolutionaries was uncovered, the aim of which was to snatch the crowned executioner from the hands of Soviet power. […] Documents about the exposed conspiracy were sent to Moscow by a special courier.’ — an excerpt from the newspaper announcement in ‘Pravda’, 19 July 1918
Obviously, the documents of non-existent conspiracy and of no interest to no one could not have been sent by courier to Moscow on 17th July 1918. The mention of this is a deliberate deflection. Instead, they were sent two days later as can be seen from the telegraph communication of 20th July 1918 that took place between Yakov Sverdlov and Philip Goloshchekin:
‘In it, to Yakov Sverdlov’s question: ‘What’s up on your side?’ an unidentified person [Philip Goloshchekin ] answers: ‘The situation at the front is somewhat better than it seemed yesterday. […] Yesterday, a courier left for you with the documents you are interested in.’ — an excerpt from ‘The Murder of the Imperial Family’ by N. A. Sokolov
The documents of importance and interest might have been connected to personal correspondence and diaries of Nicholas II and his family as it was hinted to under the section MATERIALS in the newspaper announcement of the ‘execution’ of Nicholas II published on 19th July 1918 in ‘Pravda’ and ‘Izvestia’:
‘Then the Chairman reports that the Central Executive Committee has at its disposal extremely important material and documents of Nikolai Romanov: his own handwritten diaries, which he kept from his youth until recently; the diaries of his wife and children; Romanov’s correspondence, etc. There are, among other things, letters from Grigori Rasputin to Romanov and his family. All these materials will be sorted out and published in the near future.’ — an excerpt from the newspaper announcement about the ‘execution’ of Nicholas II in the newspaper ‘Pravda’, 19 July 1918
And once again the core message is presented in a wrapping as although the above sounds plausible, it did not really correspond with reality. Firstly, Rasputin never wrote any letters to Nicholas II and his family, as he was mostly illiterate and only scribbled very short notes. And secondly, the Presidium of the Regional Council of the Urals knew about the personal correspondence and the diaries long before 19th July 1918 as the Romanovs shared this information with them in their response to the second letter of the ‘White Officer’:
‘The only things we have still packed are in boxes in the barn (in the courtyard). We are especially worried about an ‘A.F. N 9’ small black box and a large black box ‘N. 13 N.A’ with old letters and diaries. […] All the keys, especially of ‘N. 9’, are with the commander, who behaves well towards us.’ — an excerpt from the letter of the Romanovs to the ‘White Officer’, June 1918.
Since the original mention of the documents of interest in the telegram occurred in connection to Nicholas II, it can be very well that these documents were related to something that could be found among the letters of Nicholas II, and, most likely, was connected to Germany for this issue was still current as the telegraph communication of 20th July 1918 between Yakov Sverdlov and Philip Goloshchekin illustrates:
‘In the meantime, I will report the following: […] 4) I will report on the Germans. After the murder of Mirbach, the Germans demanded that a battalion be brought into Moscow. We categorically refused, and were on the verge of war. The Germans have now removed this demand. Apparently, there will be no war now, there is nothing more to report for now.’ — an excerpt from the telegraph communication between Yakov Sverdlov and Philip Goloshchekin, 20 July 1918
The proof of this connection is found in the Preface of the ‘Correspondence of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II’ published in 1923 in Moscow where it is mentioned that the correspondence between Nicholas II and Wilhelm II is being kept ‘in a special envelope with a handwritten inscription by N. Romanov himself: ‘Letters from Emperor Wilhelm.’
A Public String of Bursts
The 19th of July 1918 was truly an eventful day in the life of the Romanovs, especially in the life of Nicholas II. There were three major announcements, each having their own meaning and in conjunction could be compared to a publicly exploded ‘bomb’ or a string of ‘the machine gun bursts’.
The Newspaper ‘Pravda’ (N149), 19 July 1918
The first ‘burst’: A ‘public’ execution of the former Tsar, Nicholas II that was published in a form of the overly emotional and exalted article about Nicholas II and his death, which appeared on the front page of the newspaper, paired with the announcement the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee on the second page which informed about the ‘execution’ of Nicholas II.
The newspaper ‘Izvestia’ (N151), 19 July 1918
The repeated and additional ‘bursts’: A similar to ‘Pravda’ announcement about the ‘execution’ of Nicholas II paired with two other important publications:
· The Decree on the Confiscation of the Property of the Deposed Emperor and Members of the Imperial Household
· The Constitution of the RSFSR
The Decree on the Confiscation did not just concern the former Tsar but also the whole former Russian Imperial House, as the first point of it read:
‘All property belonging to the Russian Emperor Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov, deposed by the revolution, and to the former empresses Alexandra Fedorovna Romanova and Maria Fedorovna Romanova and to all members of the former Russian Imperial House, of whatsoever it may consist and wheresoever it may be located, not excepting deposits with credit institutions both in Russia and abroad, is hereby declared to be the property of the Russian Socialist Soviet Federal Republic.’ — an excerpt from the Decree on Confiscation, 19 July 1918
It is important to note that the Decree was adopted by the Commission under the Council of People’s Commissars on 4th July 1918 and approved by the Council of People’s Commissars on July 13 1918.
The first date, — 4 July 1918, — coincides with the visit of Philip Goloshchekin to Moscow, and with the change of the Commandant of the Ipatievsky House. The second date — 13 July 1918, — coincides with the last entry in the diary of Nicholas II.
‘The Constitution of the RSFSR’ was approved on 10 July 1918. This happened on the last day of the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets that took place on 4–10 July 1918, which was also quite eventful event coloured by the assassination by the extreme left members of the party, Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Andreev, of the German diplomat, Wilhelm von Mirbach (2 July 1871–6 July 1918). The idea of this act was to provoke Germany to break the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and force the Bolsheviks to abandon the ‘shameful policy of compromise’.
Their attempt failed and resulted in the arrest of all extreme left delegates:
‘At that moment Trotsky or Vladimir Ilyich called, — I don’t remember which one precisely, — and told Latsis to stay in the Cheka, and I, together with others, went to the Bolshoi Theater and arrested the Left SR faction. We went to the theatre… One of us went on stage, announced that the Bolshevik faction was gathering, and that all Bolsheviks should leave the theatre. At the exits, we set up a document check and initially let out only the communists. But, of course, very soon this trick was discovered by the SRs and others, but they did not react to it in any way…’ — an excerpt from the memoirs of a Russian revolutionary of the Latvian background, Yakov Peters (1886–1936)
What it meant for the Romanovs was the elimination of the extreme left moods in regards to the ‘finishing off Nikolai’. Right after this incident, on 10th July 1918, the Bolsheviks approved the Constitution and officially approved the idea of using ‘mass terror’ against opponents of Soviet power who in this case were the extreme left members of the Party. Just to remind that Goloshchekin and Beloborodov of the Presidium in Yekaterinburg were not the extreme left, were against ‘‘finishing off Nikolai’, and were the followers of the directives of the Center.
If the Constitution was more of a on-the-spur-of-the-moment approval, in contrast the ‘Decree on the Confiscation of the Property of the Deposed Emperor and Members of the Imperial Household’ which was adopted and approved days before the announcement of the ‘execution’ of Nicholas II. This makes it a part of the original and well prepared plan and not something which was done out of blue.
The public ‘execution’ of Nicholas II as well as the Family losing of all their properties and some of the finances was a sort of second ‘abdication’ of Nicholas II, only this time he seized to exist for the general public and was removed from the political scene — in Russia and internationally.
In this sense, a comment made by the unknown author of the article ‘Nikolai Romanov’ that appeared on the first page of the newspaper ‘Pravda’ is intriguing:
‘Nicholas II was not only the personification of the barbarian landowner, this ignoramus, blockhead and bloodthirsty savage, he also had the noble blood of English kings and German emperors. He was bound on both sides by the imperialism of the bandit states of Europe. They will cry for him there. The Russian workers and peasants will have only one desire: to drive a good aspen stake into this grave cursed by people.’ — an excerpt from the article ‘Nikolai Romanov’, the newspaper ‘Pravda’ 19 July 1918
The ‘good aspen stake’ was not literal of course, but lateral. Similarly, the perceived ‘murder’ was not physical at all as many were led to believe, but symbolic — in a political, social, and historical sense. It seemed like a perfect solution at the time — being alive, Nicholas II, at the same time, would be ‘dead’, except for the few in the know.
In the circumstances, the price Nicholas II paid was certainly high, but he was also the one who had agreed to it, of which in the future articles.
The End
