The Mathematics of Dictatorship

Published in

The Jewish Examiner

11 min readApr 28, 2018

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, The President of Turkey

In recent years, the Republic of Turkey has experienced the deepest social crisis of its nearly century-long existence. Turkish citizens unfamiliar with strong, authoritarian rule are now learning how such a regime emerges, rises, and, through legal means, enables a single individual to take control of state and society.

The soft tone that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan once used to criticize his opponents has grown hard. Where once opponents of the government were intimidated by pro-government media and supporters, and later by physical violence, they are now being removed from public employment and thrown in jail.

When Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, there were 59,187 people in prison [1]; now this figure has risen to 229,790 [2]. Were we to include those given conditional release since August 2016 due to lack of space, that number would rise by 38,000 [3][4][5].

Since August 2015, Turkish security forces have been conducting extensive operations in the cities and countryside of Turkey’s southeast, where the Kurdish population is concentrated. According to the security forces and the Ministry of the Interior, during a period of ten months 5,745 people lost their lives [6]. In total, some 1.6 million were affected and, of those, 350,000 were forced to leave their homes [7][8][9].

The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which is supported by Turkey’s Kurdish voters and has been vociferous in opposing Erdogan, has twelve of its parliamentary representatives in prison at this moment as well as its co-presidents Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag [10][11]. Of the HDP’s fifty-nine parliamentarians, fifty-five are facing investigations; of its 103 elected mayors, ninety-three have been removed by Erdogan’s Minister of the Interior and replaced with government-appointed administrators [12][13][14].

Following the failed coup of July 15, 2016, Erdogan accused Fethullah Gulen, a cleric living in “self-exile” in Pennsylvania of being behind the attempt. Based on accusations connection with Gulen, 150,000 people have been dismissed from government jobs [15], 49,697 have been arrested [16][17], and 37,282 have been prevented from leaving the country [18] [19] [20][21]. Among those arrested are 2,302 judges and prosecutors, 7,444 soldiers, and 8,628 police officers [22][23][24].

Nor are Erdogan’s moderate opponents spared. Enis Berberoglu, a former journalist and vice-president of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), whose 25% in the most recent elections make it the country’s second-largest party, was arrested on June 14, 2017 and given a twenty-five year sentence [25][26][27]. The charges are seen by many as being more political than legal. Just three months later, on September 15, 2017, Celal Celik, the lawyer for CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu was also arrested [28].

The repression goes beyond clear political factions. For the simple crime of “criticizing Erdogan via a social media account” 3,658 people have been charged — and, of these, 25% have been arrested [29]. Among those receiving jail sentences for criticizing Erdogan on social media is a thirteen-year-old child [30].

As the scope of Erdogan’s coercive and authoritarian policies widens, touching all but his closest supporters, the intensity of repression grows stronger. Speaking behind closed doors, even AKP representatives complain and say that no one is happy with these tactics. In particular, the anger of those affected by these measures — and of their families — is rising every day.

So how is it that intense oppression directed at the majority of a population and widespread arrests can continue? How can a small group tied to the head of state oppress 70% of the population? How can a head of state viewed as autocratic — and even dictatorial — secure more than 50% and emerge victorious in free elections? [31][32]

The Answer Is Basic Mathematics

From the beginning, Erdogan was attentive to the fractures already present in Turkish society. Seeing that he could benefit politically from these divisions, he set about widening and deepening the rifts with the aid of the fragments themselves.

To achieve his aim, he did not hesitate to use a language and tone that accentuated divisions. During his fifteen years in power, he raised issues that would increase social fragmentation.

At the moment, we can divide public opinion among the following political groups:

Justice and Development Party (AKP): The party’s leaders and decision-makers form a close-knit group around Erdogan; the wider bloc comes from extremely religious voters, rural voters who have benefited from the party’s economic welfare policies, and nationalists.
People’s Republican Party (CHP): Established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, the CHP draws its votes from the urban and coastal electorate. These voters identify themselves as secular and “Kemalist.”
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP): Supported by the Kurdish population in the east and southeast of Turkey, the party defends ethnic rights for Kurds. Ideologically, it positions itself on the left.
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP): In recent years it has given open support to Erdogan’s nationalist policies. Those within the party opposed to giving support to Erdogan separated from the party and formed a new party in October 2017.
Supporters of Fethullah Gulen (Gulenists): Until 2013, they supported Erdogan. Though, as a political force, they comprise only 1–2% of the electorate, their organization and control of key points in the state made them one of the country’s most effective groups. Following the failed coup of 2016, they have been removed from government employment and 50,000 are currently imprisoned — a large number have fled abroad [33]. In recent years the government has referred to this group as FETO (the “Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organization”).

These blocs have deep dislike for one another and their overlapping and interlinking antipathies have reached historic levels of intensity.

Divided in such a way, each becomes a target for Erdogan — with the exception of his own AKP (and the MHP which has strongly supported it).

Who Hates Who, and Why

The hatred of each of these groups towards one another has reached such a point that each sees Erdogan remaining in power as preferable to any of the others replacing him.

Now, when Erdogan brings pressure on any one group, consider the reactions of the other groups:

The reaction of the groups to oppressions.

A large portion of people living in Turkey are uncomfortable with the oppressive atmosphere and arrests the country is experiencing, however, as can be seen by looking at cases one-by-one, in every instance of oppression between 72% and 98% of the population think Erdogan is acting correctly.

Last month, a face-to-face survey of 2,580 people showed support of 74% for the actions the government is taking against supporters of Gulen and Kurdish nationalism [34]. Consequently, the regime of repression can continue to increase without resulting in widespread social unrest.

Three recent polls have shown that, were elections held today Erdogan would take 43–48% of the vote (after distributing the undecided voters). In a divided field, such a large vote-share would allow him to emerge in first place [35][36][37].

Even Victims Support Repression of Those Other Than Themselves

Let us consider a few examples of persecuted groups supporting the repression of other groups:

The Turkish parliament opened the door to prosecutions of HDP legislators with a vote on May 20, 2016; with the support of the CHP, their parliamentary immunity was removed [38][39][40]. Thus, with the support of the main opposition party, the government has been able to prosecute fifty-five of the fifty-nine HDP legislators and imprison twelve of them [41][42]. (Some CHP members, opposing the party’s official stance, voted “No.” [43])
The newspaper Sozcu, which has fiercely opposed Erdogan over the years, has also repeatedly called for him to remove parliamentary immunity from HDP representatives and prosecute them. It has supported the arrest and imprisonment of the HDP’s leader [44][45]. At the moment, several of the paper’s upper management are in jail and its owner has fled abroad [46][47]. Although the paper itself is a victim of Erdogan, it continues to find his repression of Kurds insufficient and call for more intense measures.
As state pressure increased on Sozcu in September 2016, the paper ran the headline, “If You Silence Sozcu, You Are Buttering the Bread of FETO; If Sozcu is Silenced, Anti-Gulenist Operations Will Be Weakened.” [48] In the defense statement that he sent to court on November 6, 2017, Sozcu owner Burak Albay (who is wanted for arrest and remains abroad) spent much of his time emphasizing the degree to which he opposed Gulenists and enumerating the past actions he had taken against them [49].
Of the public employees accused of connection with Gulen and removed from office without either a court decision or investigation following the failed coup, 50,000 have been arrested. The CHP and HDP have supported this policy. High-ranking members of these parties have repeatedly emphasized that the operations against Gulen have been insufficient. (Though, following the arrest of Berberoglu in May 2017, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu became more cautious on this point.)
Answering questions from his cell on September 8, 2017, HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas explained to reporters, “Erdogan and the Gulenists did horrible things to this country together; therefore they should be prosecuted together.” [50]
In June, the Turkish Ministry of the Interior published a list of 132 names of people, including Fethullah Gulen, living abroad and unlikely to return to Turkey who would have their citizenship stripped. The list included both Gulenists and HDP supporters. In response, HDP representative Faysal Sariyildiz declared, “It is unacceptable that our friends be placed on the same list as someone like Fethullah Gulen who is neck-deep in crime” and added that such legal move would make prosecuting Gulen more difficult [51].
Following the arrest of his assistant Enis Berberoglu, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu began a protest march from Ankara to Istanbul on June 17, 2017 [52]. Dubbed the “Justice March,” his 425km walk was planned to end at Maltepe Prison where Berberoglu was being held [53]. Kilicdaroglu paid no heed to calls that he also visit a second prison holding HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas and other representatives. At the end of the march, Kilicdaroglu criticized Erdogan’s repressive tactics, but also emphasized that one of the march’s goals was also to “show opposition to Fethullah Gulen’s group” and “call for the prosecution of Gulen’s allies within political parties.” [54][55][56]
Kadri Gursel, a writer at the left-leaning paper Cumhuriyet, was released on October 11, 2017 after being jailed for eleven months on unjust accusations [57]. In a column written following his release, Gursel chastised those journalists who, by giving support to jailed journalists in general, gave support to journalists who supported Fethullah Gulen [58]. In the piece, Gursel praised himself and his fellow Cumhuriyet reporters, but called the remainder “members of networks and tools of a criminal operation.” A victim of Erdogan, Gursel advised the Erdogan administration (which has imprisoned more than 150 journalists) to “be careful not associate me with FETO, it will damage your fight against them.” In essence, Gursel, rejects those who have defended him and prefers to give tactical advice to the government in its battle against Gulenists.
Between the failed coup of July 2016 and today, 3,400 judges and prosecutors have been accused of links to Gulen and removed from office. Of these, 2,200 are in prison at the moment — which is to say that one in five judges and prosecutors in Turkey is currently behind bars [59]. Among these are judges and prosecutors who were involved in some of the most problematic and emblematic cases of the Erdogan administration. For example, several of the judges involved with the prosecution of Demirtas and other HDP representatives are now also in jail [60] [61]. The most striking example may be the prosecutor who opened a case against HDP representative Idris Baluken now be held in the same prison [62].

Yet these examples could be multiplied . . .

Rather than contesting all instances of oppression and defending the rights of both themselves and other groups, the victims of Erdogan attempt to convince him how beneficial it is — or would be — to halt his oppression of them and direct it towards another bloc.

It is important to consider how groups experiencing repression hold other groups responsible for the iron-fisted manner in which Erdogan is ruling the country, partially absolving him of responsibility.

Looking at the table, it is easy to understand why Erdogan’s career continues to rise as his repression grows more intense.

The moderate, pro-Kurdish Erdogan of past years can also see this table. To him, this table does not call for reestablishing democracy and human rights in Turkey; to the contrary, it whispers that an increase in repression will increase his support.

[1] https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkiye%27deki_cezaevleri

[2] http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/turkey

[3] http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/585680/Bakan_Bozdag_rakami_degistirdi__iste_tahliye_olacak_mahkum_sayisi.html

[4] http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/son-dakika-haberi-38-bin-mahkum-tahliye-olacak-1354866/

[5] http://basin.adalet.gov.tr/Etkinlik/denetimli-serbestlikte-yeni-duzenleme

[6] http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22957&lang=en

[7] https://www.ihd.org.tr/ihd-istanbul-subesi-ohalde-turkiye-raporu/

[8] http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22957&lang=en

[9] https://rm.coe.int/168070cff9

[10] http://www.dw.com/tr/hdpnin-var-olma-sava%C5%9F%C4%B1/a-41007804

[11] https://www.yahoo.com/news/arrests-turkey-pro-kurd-party-weakened-defiant-031842466.html

[12] http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/bdp-103-belediye-kazandi