Consequentialism and the Ethics of Jizzing on Babies

A Refutation of Consequentialist Ethics.

Do your duty as you see it, and damn the consequences ― George S. Patton Jr.

For those of my readers who do not know what normative ethics is, what will first be detailed is a distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is usually the topic of choice around this here blog. The purpose of meta-ethics is about discovering what the nature (or meanings) of what moral propositions are meant to convey; for example, what does it mean to say “it is wrong to kill purely for fun”? Is it a self-evident statement like mathematics? Is it identical to a natural property like causing pain or pleasure? Is it purely an emotional utterance with no truth value? Are they the commands of God? For more on that, and various positions therein, check out the article on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Normative ethics comes after the establishment of a meta-ethic. Once the meaning of ethical statements has been established, we can then build on which actions we ought to accept, and model our lives after. There are deontological based ethics, which revolve around following rules which we are obliged to keep. There are virtue based ethics, which revolve around building proper human character. The main focus of this article will be on consequentialist ethics. These are ethics based on the outcome or result of a particular action. There are many subsets on this form of ethical thought (including, but not limited to utilitarianism, egoism and state welfarism).

The topic of this post will center on how consequentialism — which I write about because consequentialism is the first normative framework atheists use to justify their ethics — has difficulty in taking into its account actions which are at best culturally weird, and at worst intuitively counter to our moral senses. The main example will be jizzing on babies. These can be classified as low impact actions. That is, they are actions which would score low based on the negative consequence they produce, and yet we would still wish to ban or morally suppress them nonetheless. Consider the following,

Axiom 1 — For any action A to be morally blameworthy, A must entail some negative consequence C.

This would be an axiom that the consequentialist would want to hold, in order to determine what a negative consequence is. However, problems begin to arise when we plug in low impact actions. Take into account the following syllogism.

Premise 1 — If jizzing on babies is to be held as morally blameworthy, it must entail some negative consequence C [Given Axiom 1].

Premise 2 — jizzing on babies is to be held as morally blameworthy

Conclusion — it entails some negative consequence C [Given Axiom 1].

The first route is to accept that jizzing on babies is to be held as morally blameworthy, based on some potentially negative consequences. Yet, we may ask, what harm jizzing on babies accomplishes? Surely it can’t be anything physical since the discharge takes place on the outside, on the skin; it can be quickly cleaned off the body, and the child could easily forget the action ever took place. The second route would just to allow the jizzing on babies, but that’s a bullet I wouldn’t bite.

The consequentialist might retort that such an act would psychologically harm the father as such actions would lead to the sexualisation of the child. However, the psychology could be hypothetically harmless in certain situations. The parent could be asexual, but get a cheap thrill and see such things as a practical joke. Furthermore, what if you control any urges you have that could lead you to overtly negative scenario (when utilizing constant supervision for example).

A further problem comes in when you consider why such psychological dispositions are morally blameworthy. These psychological states are either blameworthy to the extent it leads to bad consequences, or in itself. If it is the former, then as long as the consequences are mitigated, you could get away from it. If the latter, then one would have to bring in either deontological or virtue based ethic to account for it, rendering consequential ethics less sufficient in itself.

If it is the former, it could not be less consequential to actions we would consider as morally acceptable. Consider actions like smoking, drinking and potentially driving. All these activities have the potential to more negative consequence then jizzing on infants, and yet we would not consider the drinker, smoker or driver more immoral then those who jizz on infants. This presents a rather troublesome situation for the consequentialist.

Take for example those who wish to maximize pleasure, while minimizing pain, as a gauge for what is morally acceptable. By showing that a morally dubious act (e.g. jizzing on babies) was more morally permissible than a more morally neutral act (e.g. driving), this will leave the consequentialist in a quadrilemma.

1. accept the dubious action as permissible

2. decline the morally neutral act

3. reject consequentialism

4. amend the consequentialism with another normative ethic to avoid the problem

Any of these options does a good job of devastating the opposing side, at least in the strongest form.