The Omnipotence Paradox
An Augustinian Solution
Could Jesus microwave a burrito so hot, that he himself could not eat it? ~ Homer J. Simpson (American Philosopher)
This is a question that has vexed philosophers and theologians. This is the omnipotence paradox. It asks something along these lines,
Given that omnipotence O entails that God can do all things X so long as X is logically possible, then either God can do X, in which case he is ~O, or he is ~O because there is at least one X he cannot do.
One response given to this objection is by Saint Augustine of Hippo in his work, The City of God. According to the Doctor of Grace,
But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent.[1]
Going back to the earlier formulation of the paradox, where does it go wrong given what we know? Let’s first fill out the X’s and O’s with concrete examples.
Given that omnipotence O entails that God can do all things X so long as X is logically possible, but making a rock so heavy its creator cannot lift it, entails non-omnipotence, then either God can make a rock so heavy its creator cannot lift it, in which case he is not omnipotent, or he is not omnipotent because there is at least one logically possible thing he cannot do.
The problem is in the way one defines X, if it is just the ability to bring about anything which possibly exists, then we do have a problem. However, we can reformulate the definition.
Def. A being is omnipotent if and only if it can do all things logically possible, so long as those logically possible things do not diminish the power of God in other respects.
If God were to bring into existence a rock he could not lift, it would in some way diminish his power or influence. For example, he would not be the kind of being that can bring about the lifting of a specific rock. If he were, he would be a being who could render himself powerless. Also, consider other traits like acting irrationally, it is logically possible, but it is also a trait that diminishes other capacities.
One problem I could see with this approach is that it would entail God could not do anything, for all things could, as a skeptic might say, entail some kind of diminishing of power. Theists want to say that God is all-good, but isn’t goodness a limiting factor? If I was all good, I could not tell a lie. There are only two ways out of that problem. One is to say that evils are categorically wrong, since irrationality is an impairment which is prior to any notion of the good. Another way is to go the route of volunteerism, where the good is whatever God commands. Both approaches I do not accept, but hey, I remain open.
Another example is if God were to love Isaac and hate Esau, then it follows at the moment he is stuck hating Esau and loving Isaac, because the law of the non-excluded middle prevents God from affirming two contraries at the same time. But, if we are speaking about logical possibility, then God couldn’t break those laws anyway, and if the skeptic demands that a truly omnipotent could, well there isn’t an omnipotence paradox anymore, or any logical paradox really.
My conclusion is that Saint Augustine’s solution is a good, but not definitive, approach worthy of further consideration.
