The Subtle Doctor and Free Will, Part 1
Duns Scotus on Freedom of the Will
It can be rather interesting to see how great theologians address various issues concerning Libertarian Free Will. This will hopefully be the first in a series of posts on the issue from the perspective of the Medieval Theologian Bl. John Duns Scotus. In this post, I will detail Scotus’ philosophy of action, and how human beings choose among a set of options.
This post -like most others, unless otherwise stated — will not be an original presentation of Scotus’ point of view, but one developed by reading the work of Allan B. Wolter O.F.M. Scotus considers the human will to be a rational potency. A rational potency is one that can bring about contrary possibilities, the will can either will to stand or sit. However, heat is a non-rational potency because it can only heat things [1].
This form of potency is an active rather than passive potency. A passive potency is an ability that resides in the matter or constitution of a thing, to change in some way. An active potency resides in the ability to bring about a changes as a cause. While the sun can dry (in the case of adobe bricks) or melt (in the case of ice), the difference in effect is due to the matter of that which is affected. [2] However, if I can cause water to become gas or ice, it’s because I, as an efficient cause, chose to effect it in one way or another, not because of the constitution of the water [3].
Another possible objection is that it’s possible to construct software capable of randomly generating certain effects. The flaw with such an objection is that these generators are either pseudo-random generators that work by some deterministic processes, or they are true random generators. In that case, the programs use arbitrary physical phenomenon like atmospheric noise to generate effects. In these cases, it is the passive potency of whatever physical means they use (if it is the physical phenomenon which is affected), or the passive potency of the software (if the software is what is affected).
Since the will — unlike a computer — cannot be reduced to anything physical, and can bring about multiple effects on the same substance in the same environment, on Scotus’ view, its power to bring about contraries must be an active potency. One objection that we’ve dealt with before, ‘The Disappearing Agent Argument’, should also be addressed here. The question that arises is ‘why does some agent will A over B’. The question is similar to the question ‘why does heat heat things’, willing between options is just the kind of thing that a will does, just like heating something is just the kind of thing that heat does [4].
The will is, for Scotus, the essential ingredient of our libertarian free will. It proceeds the intellect in making choices. The intellect — contrary to Thomistic thought- cannot be the the source of our freedom because it is a non-rational potency. The intellect, in its most basic and immediate operation, comes to a belief automatically. When I walk into a room and see a table, I immediately believe a table is in front of me. It is ultimately the act of the will that must than be the source of my freedom [5]. That is, the ultimate source other than the power and knowledge of God, whose role in free will I will discuss next week.
End Notes
[1] Allan B. Wolter. The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ‘Duns Scotus on the Will as Rational Potency’. 166
[2] Ibid. 167–168
[3] Ibid. 170–171
[4] Ibid. 174–175
[5] Ibid. 178–179
