Calls for a federal oversight body grow louder
by Todd Winther
MEDIA COMMENTARY on Australian politics has largely focused on a single issue this past week: the alleged misuse of entitlements of Members of Federal Parliament — specifically the Liberal Party’s Speaker in the House of Representatives, Bronwyn Bishop, and the scandal infamously dubbed ‘choppergate.’
Such incidents, however, raise larger questions about whether there is a need for a Federal oversight body act as a watchdog against parliamentary corruption, similar to those set up by most Australian states to combat illegal activity and corruption by elected officials.
The fallout surrounding Bishop, once again brings to the surface an issue that has not been effectively or adequately dealt with for at least two decades.
In 1997, three Howard Government ministers resigned as a result of their misuse of travel expenses. Just two years later, two further MPs, National Party MP Michael Cobb and Liberal Party Senator Robert Woods, were found guilty in the ACT Supreme Court of fraudulent travel claims.
Bishop’s predecessor, Peter Slipper, was found guilty by the ACT Magistrates Court for inappropriately using a Federal Cabcharge account. This conviction was later overturned.
The formalisation of a Federal oversight body would help regulate and prosecute such breeches.
In the aftermath of the ALP’s tight victory in the 2010 Federal Election, Julia Gillard forged a parliamentary agreement with The Australian Greens. One of the conditions of that agreement was that the government would establish a ‘Parliamentary Integrity Commissioner’ within 12 months. This was never implemented.
In 2012, the government claimed this inaction was because … ‘there was no convincing case for the establishment of a single overarching integrity commission’
Despite this, the Government’s Special Minister of State, John Faulkner, contradicted this claim months later in a speech at Melbourne University where he argued:
“Federal Parliamentarians need to get serious about a code of conduct to apply to them… because the public at large is entitled to know that objective standards exist, and that these standards are open to public discussion, and public assessment.”
The coverage of Bronwyn Bishop’s travel expenses suggests that the public is unaware of these standards. The incidents highlighted above indicate that such standards have not been set high enough.
However, there are existing templates that currently exist in the States that would remedy this problem at a Federal level. In Queensland, the Crime and Corruption (formerly Misconduct) Commission (CCC) was introduced, as part of the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry that was charged with investigating police corruption, involving illegal gambling and prostitution. This investigation led to serious political consequences for the State as former Premier Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen was charged with perjury as a result of his evidence to the inquiry and was forced to resign from office.
The CCC has ‘special powers’ that are not available to the court system or to the parliament. Arguably the most important of these is the power to compel witnesses to testify in ‘coercive hearings’. These hearings override parliamentary privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination, which means that all participants must testify if required.
A similar anti-corruption agency exists in New South Wales (NSW), with the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) having a similar jurisdiction to the CCC in Queensland. ICAC too forced the resignation of a Premier when Barry O’Farrell left office last year after he ‘inadvertently’ lied to ICAC in a hearing investigating systemic corruption within the NSW Parliament.
South Australia’s anti corruption watchdog, also referred to as ICAC, has recently cleared former Education Minister Jennifer Rankine of corruption charges. This case, as well as the other two more high profile cases noted above, illustrate how impartial investigations from independent authorities, can restore the public trust in elected officials, while also allowing them the opportunity to defend their actions.
However, such bodies that were created by and modified through legislative means can be subject to criticism. The most common of these is that institutions such as the CCC can be modified, or ignored, to suit the objectives of the government of the day. The key figure in establishing the CCC, Tony Fitzgerald claimed that the Newman Government was doing exactly this when he spoke to ABC News last year:
“Unless there is an effective parliamentary opposition to advocate alternative policies, criticise government errors, denounce excesses of power and reflect, inform and influence public opinion, the checks and balances needed for democracy are entirely missing… (the state government has) flaunted its disdain for democracy and good governance.”
Though there is an unquestionable need for the creation of a parliamentary oversight body at a Federal level, such an organ would only be as strong as the powers that are given to it.
While the anti-corruption watchdogs provide a formidable template in which a Federal counterpart could work, members of parliament will only place clear restrictions on themselves if the public’s appetite for reform is strong enough. The issue of Bishop’s travel entitlements may provide the catalyst.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
TODD WINTHER
Todd Winther is a PhD Candidate in Political Science in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University.
Todd is a frequent contributor toThe Conversation. His thesis studies the relationship between leadership and internal party structure.
