TERRORISM is arguably, the most difficult area for all policy makers due to its highly secretive nature. When governments successfully recognise a potential terrorist threat, it is doubtful that they will receive credit for their intervention. Yet, if the same officials miss a warning sign, the consequences are catastrophic.

Currently NSW is conducting a coronial inquiry into the ‘Sydney Siege’ or Martin Place Siege that occurred in Sydney on 15 December 2014.

Man Haron Monis, held eight employees and ten customers hostage in a 16 hour standoff at the Lindt Café in Martin Place. At the end of the siege Monis shot one victim, and another was killed as a result of a bullet ricochet.

Understandably both the surviving victims and the public are searching for answers — asking if this tragedy could have been prevented.

Last week, the Federal Attorney General, George Brandis (left) testified before Senate Estimates and provided the first public testimony on the events leading up to the ‘Sydney Siege’.

It was revealed Brandis had received a letter from Monis two months before the siege, asking the Attorney General about the legality of contacting via letter, leader of the Islamic State Caliph Ibraham.

Brandis told Estimates that there was nothing unusual about receiving such correspondence, despite senior public servant, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Division Karen Horsfall, warning Monis of the dangers in contacting Ibraham, a month after he initially contacted Brandis.

The preliminary evidence suggests it would be easy to place the blame for not evaluating the potential threat at the Attorney General’s Department and specifically at Brandis. However, assessing potential terrorist threats is one of the toughest tasks that politicians and public servants can undertake.

A ‘wicked policy problem’

Public policy theorists are particularly attuned to the complexities of such a job. In public policy terms terrorism represents a classical ‘wicked policy problem’ for everyone involved in the policy making process. A ‘wicked policy problem’ is a term that was first coined by C. West Churchman in 1967, in an attempt to address a problem with social planning procedures.

Six years later, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, extended this term and developed a theoretical framework around the concept. They argue that a ‘wicked policy problem’ develops because there is no easy solution when formulating policy because of a number of factors. ‘Wicked policy problems’ are extremely difficult to define, and this definition guides how public servants address the problem at hand.

In turn, the construction of the initial definition, depends upon which stakeholders policy makers consult, because each of them are likely to have widely different perspective on how to tackle the problem. A true ‘wicked policy problem’, such as how to prevent terrorist activity presents many possible solutions, but not a definitive strategy. Trying to solve a ‘wicked policy problem’ is a highly subjective process.

Monis’ letter to Brandis does not necessarily represent a warning sign that a terrorist attack was imminent when examined under ‘wicked policy’ terms. Did Monis represent a threat to national security? It is difficult to draw this conclusion, especially if the Minister was not alarmed by Monis’ correspondence.

The public servants who are faced with the task of providing advice to Brandis are working in an environment where every decision is highly scrutinised, and where time and resources are especially finite. The decision of whether to monitor a potential terrorist is a highly expensive exercise that requires an enormous amount of complex infrastructure.

Consequently, if the Australian Federal Police and other law enforcement agencies are to devote resources to monitor a suspicious individual, they would require large amounts of evidence to indicate that a terrorist attack is likely.

The question in Monis’ case is not whether a single letter represented definitive proof that he would commit a terrorist act but whether public servants could gather substantial enough evidence to indicate whether Monis represented a genuine threat.

In hindsight, it is easier to believe that such decisions are easy to determine. However public servants are highly aware of the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct, which defines their main responsibility to be

‘… responsive to the Government in providing frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice…’

That accuracy is crucial in providing the right advice to the Minister to make an informed decision.