A lack of institutional memory and an associated failure to learn from the experience of previous Prime Ministers are factors that must be weighed in assessing a leaders’ ability to make the most of the political capital available to them during the early stages of their tenure.

Observers of contemporary Australian politics have long been critical of what they see as policy paralysis and a lack of proper consultative process in decision-making. These two issues have now been joined by a third: the revolving door of political leadership in a nation that prides itself on stability.

Five prime ministerial changes in five years have shown that Australian politics is undergoing a tumultuous period. Opinion polls have shown continued dissatisfaction with both major party leaders — despite slight poll bounces in honeymoon periods.

The inability of leaders to shift from campaigning to governing is manifest in further issues while in government — expressly, an incapacity to control the political and media agenda, or to coordinate policy across cabinet prompts many to ask — What are the problems in our governance structure that are contributing to a new volatility in the nation’s politics?

Challenges

There are many factors underpinning the deposing of former prime ministers Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard and, most recently, Tony Abbott. The pace and complexity of contemporary leadership, the resource dependence of network governance, pressure to cope and survive in the face of uncertainty, and the controlling personalities within a tightly managed Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), are just some of the factors inherent to current leadership decay.

But, according to extensive research undertaken by Professors Anne Tiernan and R.A.W Rhodes, these complications are a product of an overarching problem — the loss of institutional memory.

Put simply, institutional memory refers to “how things were done before”. It is gained by organisations translating historical data into useful knowledge and wisdom.

In an address to the Sydney Institute, Professor Tiernan outlined how the decisions of Australian prime ministers to shift their main source of advice and support from Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet to the Prime Ministers Office (PMO) and to staff the PMO with personal loyalists, often from outside the public service have had marked effects on the centre’s institutional memory. This is because partisan organisations like the PMO are temporary — they exist to serve a particular Prime Minister.

In contrast, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is a public service instrument that is, by nature, an enduring institution underpinning and, ideally, strengthening the government through integrity, accountability and good policy advice.

But the hollowing out of the government — first identified by Rod Rhodes in 1994 — is a phenomenon whereby the state loses its traditional functions to supranational or subnational bodies, or even to the private sector. This results in collective wisdom and knowledge built up over decades by professional public servants being lost in an age of increasing politicisation.

At the change of any government, each new PMO starts afresh, perhaps unaware that ‘institutional amnesia’ is built into their design. Furthermore, politicised elements in the PMO, after a change in government following an election, may know they are sacrificing institutional memory, but want a clear break with the past for ideological reasons.

A failure to learn

Tiernan notes that the problems of Prime Ministers don’t always stem from a lack of institutional memory, but also from an unwillingness to learn. It appears that while Tony Abbott had access to the institutional memory of the Howard years — arguably a well-functioning and productive period in Australia’s political history — he chose to ignore those lessons in favour of a personal style characterised by frequent ‘captain’s picks’ and over-reliance on his Chief of Staff, Peta Credlin.

Abbott’s failure to learn from the lessons of the Howard era, relying on politically-aligned staff — eschewing public service expertise — also contributed. Had Abbott had possessed ideological flexibility, a sharper political antenna and a desire to be consultative on major reform — such as the 2014–15 budget — he may have been more sensitive to the need to call on a collective institutional memory.

Abbott’s failure to learn was evident earlier this year during a meeting at Kirribilli House in the lead up to February’s attempted leadership spill, where Howard expressed concerns over Credlin’s tendency to overstep the boundaries of her unelected role. Howard added that he would never have allowed a staff member to become the issue. Despite Howard’s advice, Abbott failed to rein in his Chief of Staff, causing deeper division within his party.

The appointment of Howard’s long serving Chief of Staff Arthur Sinodinos to a junior role and not to the finance portfolio– rumoured to be at Credlin’s behest — was another sore point between the two leaders. It is also indicative of a cultural malaise in which the institutional wisdom of long-serving party members was routinely dismissed. Sinodinos is the longest serving Chief of Staff, having served nine years in the role, and is widely credited as a major reason for Howard’s success as Prime Minister. Organised, consultative, and in touch with ‘middle Australia’, commentators have noted that Sinodinos’ political skill and experience could have been well utilised by Abbott.

Instead, what emerged was a combative leadership style which alienated not only Sinodinos — a key player in February’s leadership spill — but also other cabinet members, the backbench and the public. As David Marr writes:

Abbott does not have the profoundly professional imagination of John Howard, whose mind focused instinctively on the task of getting where he wanted to go. He found he had little to carry him forward when he came to power except his instinct for brawling. There was no strategy. Persuasion was at a minimum. He picked fights everywhere. Like the worst of world war one’s generals, he led his government straight at the machine guns.

Abbott would have done well to follow Howard’s lead. Howard is often credited as being one of Australia’s most successful prime ministers, second only to Robert Menzies. Howard displayed an astute political antenna and took risks through controversial yet well-considered policies like GST and gun reform. Indeed, Howard’s policy-heavy government, in part, defined his legacy.

Throughout its term, the Abbott government was crippled by a lack of unifying theme and characterised by ‘three word slogans’. The greatest achievements of Abbott’s tenure, by his own analysis, were the repeal of the carbon and mining taxes and ‘stopping the boats’.

Abbott’s attempt at economic reform through the initiation of white papers on federation and tax reform never quite eventuated. Indeed, many commentators noted that GST and superannuation reform would have been essential to a proper restructuring of Australia’s tax system, but these changes were routinely ruled out by the PM. Inquiries were commissioned but recommendations were shelved as too tough. Only now, for example, are radical tax and superannuation reforms being considered by the federal Coalition, under Malcolm Turnbull.

A disastrous 2014 austerity budget — done without consultation and by alienating too many pressure groups at once — was criticised for its attacks on the nation’s poorest, and was out of step with public opinion. Unlike Howard, Abbott in office never seemed to accurately gauge the public mood.

Further, Howard believed in proper Cabinet process and ran a consultative ministerial team. Conversely, the Abbott government was frequently undermined with destabilising leaks, sometimes rumoured to have come from the Prime Ministers Office itself. While Howard was an astute judge of political talent, Abbott’s loyalty to party members, like Bronwyn Bishop throughout the entitlements scandal, caused many to wonder why he would sacrifice political capital for the sake of personal loyalty. The Bishop “Choppergate” affair perhaps best exemplifies this lack of judgment.

Abbott’s personal judgement, ideological blind spots and his inability to behave pragmatically contributed to a lack of leadership capacity, which itself is tied to a failure to learn past lessons. In trying to lead public opinion where it couldn’t be led, Abbott was unwilling to concede on issues that conflicted with his personal religious beliefs — he vehemently opposed progressive views on abortion and same-sex marriage. Unlike Howard, he failed to understand that social progress can rarely be undone.

Tony Abbott’s short tenure in the top job demonstrates the importance of institutional memory. Had he been willing to accept the advice of the former Liberal leader, appoint the long serving Arthur Sinodinos to a more senior role and widen his advisory circle beyond Peta Credlin, he may have been able to return public opinion to his favour.

The move by the current Australian Prime Minster Malcolm Turnbull to head the Communications Department with the highly experienced public servant Drew Clarke is a positive step in restoring trust and relationships with the Australian Public Service.

The changing role of the PMO could be a key factor in the inability of any Prime Minister since Howard to balance support and policy agenda, with one former departmental secretary saying the appointment was “hugely significant” and suggested we could see a return to the way the PMO was run under Bob Hawke, Paul Keating and John Howard.

Perhaps Turnbull’s consultative leadership style, commitment to Cabinet process and an ability to learn the lessons from former Prime Ministers will finally end Australia’s revolving door leadership, and restore the principles of integrity and accountability.

Listen to Anne Tiernan on “Lessons from Prime Ministers’ Chiefs of Staff” at The Sydney Institute.