Dualism and Materialism
Things exist, and you have thoughts about them.
The New Mindscape #6–1
Our mindscape is populated by all sorts of objects of consciousness. How are all of these objects of consciousness linked together and activated? I use the metaphor of an “operating system” to describe how our mindscape is organized (see The New Mindscape #1–1). Culture can be likened to an operating system, which not only organizes and activates our objects of consciousness, but also generates objects of consciousness and implants them into our minds. We all have at least one mental operating system, and often more than one.
Ideologies, religions, and specialized systems of knowledge are all mental operating systems. Worldviews and value systems are all mental operating systems. Our mind can’t function without an operating system. Our shared operating system with members of our society allows us to perceive the same things, to build a common understanding, and to coordinate our actions.
Of course, there are limits to the notion of an operating system as an analogy. We don’t simply “download” a ready-made operating system into a blank mind. While we do, through education, absorb fully functional “operating systems”, we also actively participate in interpreting them, modifying them and transmitting them to others. But it’s interesting to think about culture and religion in terms of an operating system.
Cultural or religious operating systems categorise our objects of consciousness into different categories, and induce us to perceive and to respond to different classes of objects differently. This basic categorisation is called an ontology.[1]
“Ontology” sounds like an abstruse philosophical concept, but it basically refers to the question, “what are the basic components of reality, and how are they connected together?” At the core of any Operating System is a specific ontology.
We can find many different types of ontologies in different cultures and religions; and philosophers have explored the nuances and implications of ontologies in much detail. Without getting into hair-splitting metaphysical discussions, there are a few different ways in which we can classify different ontologies.
One important distinction is between dualistic ontologies on the one hand, and holistic and monistic ontologies on the other. In a dualistic ontology, reality is composed of two radically different and irreconcilable elements: for example, mind vs. matter; or Good vs. Evil.
In a monistic ontology, on the other hand, reality ultimately consists of a single, indivisible substance or principle. And in a holistic ontology, reality consists of interrelated parts that can’t be separated from each other.[2]
To illustrate the difference between these ontologies, let’s look back at some of the examples we have considered in the past few weeks.
Modern society is dominated by a dualistic ontology that the anthropologist Philippe Descola calls “naturalism” [3], in which the world is divided into two categories of beings:
(1) the world of material nature, which operates according to universal, objective, impersonal laws that operate independently of humans and that are objectively knowable to humans; and
(2) the world of human consciousness and subjectivity, which is unique to each individual, and which cannot be objectively known.
Overlaying this distinction is the mind-body dualism:
(1) since we have material bodies like non-human beings, we are part of the material world of nature, and our bodies follow the laws of nature; but
(2) we also have interiority and subjectivity — we have minds — and so we are radically different, not only from the world of nature but from each other, since each person has a different subjectivity.[4]
According to the naturalist ontology as defined by Descola, the world is divided into two:
(1) the world of objective matter, which is common to all beings, and
(2) the world of subjective consciousness, which exists only in humans.
In other words, the universe is also divided into two types of beings, namely:
(1) nonhumans, who follow the laws of material nature, and
(2) humans, who are divided into material nature (body) and subjective mind.
If you meet a nonhuman, it has its external appearances — shape, colour, structure — but it has no mind or subjectivity. It doesn’t have any consciousness, and it only exists as an external thing. That is the world of nature in the dualist ontology — nature doesn’t think, or have consciousness or the ability to communicate. If we think non-humans have emotions or consciousness, or if we feel a deep connection to non-human worlds, that is nothing more than a subjective belief, since there is no way to prove it.
In The New Mindscape #3–3, when I discussed how Sartre and Camus tried to remove meanings from things, I touched the core of naturalist dualism — that any meanings in the world actually come from us. Only humans create meanings and significances, because only the human has consciousness, subjectivity, and interiority.
Materialism is a monistic ontology that considers that matter is the only substance of reality. In this ontology, interiority, subjectivity and the mind are mere reflections or expressions of the material world. Often, then, the highest value is given to material existence, survival and wealth.[5]
We may think that nature, plants, and animals are beautiful, but that’s just our own opinion, our subjective judgment. We may want to protect animals or make our gardens beautiful, but these notions also come from us, not from them. They themselves don’t know if they are beautiful or ugly, nor do they even care: beauty and ugliness are only human judgments. Animals, plants or the universe have nothing to say about it. They just have pure existence, and humans have subjective feelings about them. That’s it. This is the basis of the materialist operating system.
[1] Eduardo Kohn (2015). ‘Anthropology of ontologies’. Annual Review of Anthropology 44: 311–27.
Woolgar, Steve and Javier Lezaun. 2013. ‘The wrong bin bag: a turn to ontology in science and technology studies?’ Social Studies of Science 43 (3): 321–40.
[2] Crane, T. Dualism, monism, physicalism. Mind & Society 1, 73–85 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02512314
[3] Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture. University of Chicago Press, 2013.
[4] Forstmann, M., Burgmer, P. (2017). Antecedents, Manifestations, and Consequences of Belief in Mind–Body Dualism. In: Zedelius, C., Müller, B., Schooler, J. (eds) The Science of Lay Theories. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57306-9_8
[5] Dewey, John. “The metaphysical assumptions of materialism.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1882): 208–213.
Fox, N. J., & Alldred, P. (2018). Social structures, power and resistance in monist sociology: (New) materialist insights. Journal of Sociology, 54(3), 315–330. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783317730615
See the next essay, on Your body’s purpose: to prop up your brain?
See the previous essay, on The imaginary I. Can phones and brains understand the ideas they convey?
Save this URL for the whole New Mindscape series, in the proper sequence.
Join the conversation and receive updates on the latest posts in this series, by signing up for the New Mindscape newsletter.
This essay and the New Mindscape Medium series are brought to you by the University of Hong Kong’s Common Core Curriculum Course CCHU9014 Spirituality, Religion and Social Change, with the support of the Asian Religious Connections research cluster of the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
