The MLB playoffs have shown that 2016 is the Year of the Manager
Shockingly, managerial decisions matter.
1968 was the Year of the Pitcher. 1998 was the Year of the McGwire-Sosa home run chase. But based on how the playoffs have transpired so far this year, 2016 has the chance to be remembered as the Year of the Manager. The allure of sabermetrics has slowly seeped into the baseball mainstream for a while now, and in 2016 we are seeing the apex of these gains. The ways of WAR, wOBA and xFIP have permeated throughout front offices for a while now, but never before have we seen such rigorous commitment to new-age strategies by managers. But because of how such game plans have been implemented, and with a World Series title at stake, the managerial decisions may end up changing the game forever.
Let’s start with the American League champion Cleveland Indians and their manager, Terry Francona. As an instrumental part in bringing a championship to Boston for the first time in 86 years, Francona is no stranger to World Series droughts, after winning the Commissioner’s Trophy with the Red Sox in 2004. Cleveland hired him to win its first championship since 1948, and now it seems their bet could pay off. While Francona managed Boston, he and the front office capitalized on the revolutionary Moneyball strategies used by Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletes two years prior to end the Curse of the Bambino. This time around, Francona is revolutionizing something else—the way teams use their bullpens.
Right out of the gate, it was clear that Francona had no interest in managing his bullpen by the books. In Game 1 of the Division Series against his former Red Sox, he called upon relief pitcher Andrew Miller, Cleveland’s prized midseason acquisition, in the fifth inning. To many casual and old-timey baseball fans, Francona bringing in his “set-up man” in the fifth seemed like a crazy idea. But even though Miller is known for his shutdown prowess toward the ends of games, he is no stranger to the early innings. Ben Lindbergh at The Ringer wrote about Miller’s unique usage in September, detailing how he would be deployed from anywhere between one and six outs as early as the sixth. Miller ended up tossing two scoreless innings in some of the highest-leverage situations of the game, setting the tone for the rest of the series.
As Cleveland went on to sweep Boston, it became clear that Francona’s willingness to expend one of his best relievers in the fifth paid massive dividends. With ace Corey Kluber slated to start Game 2, Francona gambled he wouldn’t need to use Miller and closer Cody Allen one day after each recorded season-high pitch counts—a pretty good bet. Kluber pitched seven scoreless innings and, with Cleveland’s offense providing six runs of support, Francona was able to turn to inferior relievers Dan Otero and Bryan Shaw instead of trying to overuse Miller and Allen. And then of course Miller was absolutely lights out in the ALCS, becoming one of a select few to earn a postseason series MVP award.
What makes Francona’s usage of Miller’s so incredible is the stark contrast with how he was utilized by the Yankees before the trade deadline. Joe Girardi and the Yankees were blessed with a three-headed bullpen monster (that they loved telling everyone about) for the first four months of the 2016 season. The trio of Dellin Betances, Miller and Aroldis Chapman at the back end provided so many options for Girardi, yet for most of the year he seemed like a little kid in F.A.O. Schwarz: he didn’t know what to do with all of the toys. Rather than restricting Miller’s usage to the eighth inning like Girardi, Francona called on Miller whenever the situation was most dire. Before his trade to Cleveland, Miller was pitched exactly one inning in 40-of-44 appearances. After the trade, Miller recorded only three outs in just 11-of-26.
Taking a look at the National League, there were two brilliant managers competing for a spot in the World Series. The Chicago Cubs’ Joe Maddon is highly regarded as one of the best skippers in baseball, having rocketed to stardom after leading one of the most astonishing turnarounds in MLB history with the Rays in 2008. Dave Roberts, of the Los Angeles Dodgers, is the closest thing baseball has to a supercomputer solving millions of complex algorithms in fractions of a second and translating that to optimal managerial decisions.
Though Maddon is the better overall manager, Roberts has been superior in playoffs, with one decision standing out above the rest—bringing in Clayton Kershaw for a save. Roberts didn’t have the luxury of having another excellent relief pitcher like his Cleveland counterpart did in Cody Allen, so naturally he went to the only pitcher better than Jansen on his roster. It just happened to be the best pitcher in baseball. Coming off a midseason injury. On one day’s rest.
After the Dodgers nearly coughed up a 4–1 lead in Game 5 of their Division Series against the Washington Nationals, Roberts brought in closer Kenley Jansen during the seventh inning, much earlier than normal. It was a strategy Roberts had utilized earlier in the series to great effect in Game 1—much like Francona called on Miller. Roberts almost didn’t even need to call on Kershaw, as Jansen cruised through the seventh and eighth innings. But after two consecutive walks in the ninth, Kershaw came on for the save, inducing a Daniel Murphy pop up and a Wilmer Difo strikeout. Not only was it Kershaw’s first professional save since 2006 in the minor leagues (when Jansen was his catcher), it was exactly the kind of out-of-the-box thinking that could shake up baseball for years. By comparison, Maddon looked pedestrian in the NLCS compared to Roberts, but the Cubs are just so good Maddon could afford a few to make a few mistakes.
But it is the mistakes of other playoff managers that really proves these new strategies are here to stay. Had Baltimore Orioles manager Buck Showalter—usually very adept at in-game maneuvering—decided he wanted to bring in Cy Young candidate Zach Britton in the late-innings of the tied AL Wild Card game, rather than keep him for a save situation, Francona’s and Roberts’ decisions may not have looked so good in comparison. The idea that Ubaldo Jimenez would fare any better in the 11th inning of a 2–2 game than the relief pitcher with some of the best stats ever is baffling. Nats manager Dusty Baker shot himself in the foot as well.
After Max Scherzer allowed a game-tying solo home run in the seventh inning of Game 5 against the Dodgers, the same Game 5 where Kershaw re-wrote his own narrative, Baker pulled his best pitcher from the game. It was the first run Scherzer had given up all game, he was only at 99 pitches, and, had he finished the inning, likely would not have given up the following three runs Los Angeles eventually scored. However, it is somewhat ironic that Baker, famous for overusing top prospect and wunderkind Mark Prior, knocked himself out by removing Scherzer too early.
Some may say that luck has had more to do with the playoffs this year than sharp managers, and to some extent that’s true. Mets manager Terry Collins, panned by most fans as a terrible in-game strategist, played by all the rules of conventional wisdom in the NL Wild Card game. No one could have expected White Sox castaway Conor Gillaspie, of all people, to hit a ninth-inning, go-ahead home run off closer Jeurys Familia, who had given up just one home run during the regular season.
The same could be said about Bruce Bochy and the Giants, who pushed all the right buttons in San Francisco’s incredible even-year championship run, only to have his bullpen completely fall apart in the second half of the season, and see those failures spill over to the NLDS. But luck is always a part of the playoffs. The MLB Postseason has become a crapshoot more than any other sport, so much so that teams have essentially resorted to finding the most adroit managers in order to counter such randomness.
Finally, we’re seeing baseball teams implement strategies at the on-field level advocated by sabermetricians for years now, and the national exposure will hopefully lead more fans toward this way of thinking. The change had been coming for a while now, and it’s only a matter of time before what Francona and Roberts have done becomes the new normal.
