The Louisiana Purchase

July 4, 1803

Matthew R. Kochakian
The Paper: News from the Past
12 min readJun 2, 2019

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You are a farmer living on the Southern border of the United States, in modern day Georgia. The year is 1803, and tensions around the world are high. America has been fully independent for just two decades and it occupies just a fraction of North America. The French Republic controls most of the adjacent land, including the United States’ entire 2000 mi border to the West. There is a constant fear that, despite its aid in the Revolution, the brewing Empire, led by the haughty Napoleon Bonaparte, would invade the United States from the West. At the same time, to the South is Spain, which controls all of modern day Florida and also poses a significant risk of an invasion.

As a farmer you’ve sustained for decades by sending your goods to the Spanish-occupied city of New Orleans, 200 miles away, to be bought and shipped across the sea. But over the last decade, Spain has revoked and reversed their policy of allowing US traders to operate there a number of times, making prospects in the city incredibly unreliable. To make matters worse, last week you got word in the paper that Napoleon has invaded the city with his great army. Now you’re considering moving North because invasion is starting to look inevitable.

Instability would be an understatement, but such was the situation in 1803, the year the United States purchased the Louisiana territory from France. Indeed, at that time Napoleon had just invaded New Orleans and there were very serious concerns that France, Spain, or both would start a war with the United States. Thomas Jefferson, President at the time, had to decide, should the United States itself invade the city of New Orleans? Should we attempt to drive the Spaniards out of Florida? Or should we negotiate a peaceful purchase? For a long time, it wasn’t clear what would happen. Negotiations to purchase the territory were eventually successful, mostly due to Napoleon’s desparation for resources back in Europe– but the option of another war was seriously considered.

One interesting thing to note about this event is that, other than in the American Revolution, this was the first time the US had officially expanded its borders. As you will read, even before considering the economic or tactical arguments around the purchase, it had to be determined whether it Constitutionally legal for Congress to purchase land from other countries. This was uncharted territory (literally and figuratively).

CONGRESS
Debate On The Louisiana Treaty
Monday, November 21, 1803

It is contended that the United States have no right to purchase territory; that they have no right to admit the people of Louisiana to a participation of the rights derived from an admission into the union : and that a peculiar favor is about being granted to the ports of New-Orleans in violation of the Constitution.

In the view of the Constitution the union was composed of two corporate bodies; of states and territories. A recurrence to the Constitution will show that it is predicated on the principle of the United States acquiring territory either by war, treaty, or purchase. There was one part of that instrument within whose capacious grasp all these modes of acquisition were embraced. By the constitution Congress have power to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imports, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.”–To provide for the general welfare.–The impart of these terms is very comprehensive indeed. If this general delegation of authority be not at variance with other particular powers especially granted, nor restricted by them ; if it be not in any degree comprehended in those subsequently delegated, I cannot, said Mr. R, perceive why, within the fair meaning of this general provision is not included the power of increasing our territory, if necessary for the general welfare or common defence. Suppose, for instance, that Great Britain should propose to cede us the island of New-Providence, so long the seat of pirates preying upon our commerce and the hive from which they have swarmed, will any gentleman say that we ought not to embrace the opportunity presented, as a defence against further deprendations? Suppose the Cape of Good Hope, where our East-India men so generally stop, were offered to be ceded to us by the nation to which it belongs; and that nation should say, on our fulfilling it, you shall declare it a free port. Is there any member who hears me that could contend that we were not authorized to receive it, notwithstanding the great advantages it would insure to us?

But another constitutional objection is stated. Though the United States may acquire a valid title to the territory, the hills and the groves, the rivers and the lakes, it is alleged that they have no right to bring the persons inhabiting it, into a state in which they shall enjoy the blessings of free government. My friend from Maryland (Mr. Nicholson) has observed that the article of the treaty relating to this object is most cautiously worded. If ever there was a precision of language calculated to avoid the imputation of an invasion of the constitution it is the language of this article. Its words are:

“The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.”

How are these people to be admitted? According to the principles of the fereal constitution. Is it an open violation of any part of the constitution? No, an express reservation is made by those who formed the treaty, that they must be admitted under the constitution. Now if admitted agreeably to the constitution, it cannot be said to be in violation of it, the fears of gentlemen are groundless.

But as I observed before, does not the constitution refer to territory? Do not the United States possess territories now? Is the possession of territory confined by the constitution to those they now hold? I believe not; for in the constitution it is stated that “Congress shall have the power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” Here is a clear recognition of territory belonging to the United States, and not merely of territory than held, but of territory which might futurely be acquired by treaty or purchase. And if this territory be ceded to the United States, Congress have power, as soon as ceded, to make rules and regulations respecting it.

The National Intelligencer, Washington D.C. — Read full article

ON THIS QUESTION, WHETHER IT BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR FRANCE TO TAKE POSSESSION OF LOUISIANA
Presented To The French Government By Mr. Livingston, The American Minister At Paris
Monday, July 11, 1803

This question presents itself in two points of view:–First, in the relation of commerce and manufactures:–Secondly, in those of the positive or relative force of France.

Colonies do not excite interest for their own sake, but only as reflects the influence they may have on a nation; and as one man alone is more useful by remaining at home, than two by removing at a distance, a wise nation does not seek to colonize, until she has a superabundance of population, which she cannot usefully employ in any other way.

Though very considerable, the population of France is very far from having reached the term which renders colonies necessary: Her foil, climate, and local situation give her, as a commerical, and especially as a manufacturing nation, great advantages over all the nations of Europe. The spirit of invention, the taste and industry of its inhabitants, place her in the first rank. But those advantages are wonderfully abridged by the want of capitals sufficient to make use of them. A rival nation, greatly inferior in every one of these particulars, has, by the effect alone of an immense capital, obtained the superiority, not only in commerce, but also in manufactures; and these advantages, by increasing the national fortune, furnish it with the means of maintaining that very superiority.

Capitals increase the number of manufactures, by the introduction of machines, by the regular payment of workmen, by the reduction of the interest of money, and especially by the possession of new markets.

A massive expense in that time

None but rich individuals can undertake those slow and expensive speculations, which often give the superiority to a manufacture. A poor merchant cannot undertake long voyages, returns from which are slow: they are reserved for the wealthy, who can give credits long enough to tempt foreign nations to give his articles the preference over those of other nations, which expect a quick return for theirs. The want of capitals in France, is such, that no manufacturer has at his command a quantity of articles to answer the demands; and consequently no foreigner can be sure to obtain from his French correspondent wherewith to make his returns without retarding his vessel in port, or, at least, without being obliged to take a considerable quantity of articles of inferior quality, picked up in a number of different manufactories; so that if he commits any fraud, no one can be charged with it. This renders the character of a manufacture of very little importance in the eyes of a French workman.

The question, therefore, is reduced to this, Has France a superfluity of men and money great enough to justify the settling of a new colony?

Those which France already possesses in the West-Indies and at Cayenne, are more than sufficient for her wants, and even the wants of all Europe, if they were cultivated so as to produce all they are capable of. But how are they to be cultivated? Experience has proved that the inhavitants of hot climates never work from want: Force alone can supply the two great spurs to labour in northern climates, hunger and cold, which nature has placed in those severe climates. Hence slavery alone can fertilize those colonies, and slaves cannot be procured but at great expense.

The National Intelligencer, Washington D.C. — Read full article

THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
Thursday, November 8, 1804

This day at 12 o’clock, the President of the United States, by Mr. Burwell, his Secretary, delivered the following message to both Houses of Congress. To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

TO a people, fellow citizens, who sincerely desire the happiness and prosperity of other nations, to those who justly calculate that their own well being is advanced by that of the nations with which they have intercourse, it will be a satisfaction to observe that the war which was lighted up in Europe a little before our last meeting, has not yet extended its flames to other nations, nor been marked by the calamities which sometimes stain the footsteps of war.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that the objects which had been urged by [Spain] against the validity of our title to the country of Louisiana have been withdrawn: its exact limits however remaining still to be settled between us. And to this is to be added that having prepared and delivered the stock created in execution of the convention of Paris of April 30th, 1803, in consideration of the cession of that country, we have received from the government of France an acknowledgment in due form of that stipulation.

With the nations in Europe in general our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed : and from the governments of the belligerent powers especially, we continue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to an honest neutrality, and to such good offices consistent with that, as we have opportunities of rendering.

In pursuance of the act providing for the temporary government of Louisiana, the necessary officers for the territory of Orleans were appointed in due time to commence the exercise of their functions on the 1st day of October. The distance however of some of them, and indispensable previous arrangements, may have retarded its commencement in some of its parts. The form of government thus provided having been considered but as temporary, and open to such future improvements as further information of the circumstances of our brethren there might suggest, it will of course be subject to your consideration.

With the Indian tribes established within our newly acquired limits, I have deemed it necessary to open conferences for the purpose of establishing a good understanding and neighbourly relations between us. So far as we have yet learned, we have reason to believe that their dispositions are generally favorable and friendly. And with these dispositions on their part, we have in our own hands means which cannot fail us, for preserving their peace and friendship. By pursuing an uniform course of justice towards them, by aiding them in all the improvements which may better their condition, and especially by establishing a commerce on terms which shall be advantageous to them, and only not losing to us, and so regulated as that no incendiaries, of our own, or any other nation, may be permitted to disturb the natural effects of our just and friendly offices, we may render ourselves so necessary to their comfort and prosperity, that the protection of our citizens from their disorderly members will become their interest and their voluntary care. Instead therefore of an augmentation of military force proportioned to our extension of frontier, I propose a moderate enlargement of the capital employed in that commerce as a more effectual, economical and humane instrument for preserving peace and good neighborhood with them.

Thomas Jefferson via The National Intelligencer — Read full article

PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA
Whether A Purchase Of Territory Was Not The Most Eligible And Just Step That Could Be Taken.
Monday, October 3, 1803

It is a strong argument in favor of purchase, that the public from the earliest periods of the negociation, looked to it in the event of a favorable issue. That this was the case, there is, at this period, no necessity of the shewing, when all the circumstances attending this affair are fresh in every man’s memory. However dangerous or delusive it may be to be guided by public opinion in nations that are extremely depressed and ignorant, it will in general be both safe and desirable to be governed by it, when the people are well informed.

The negociation had two objects: one, the restoration of our rights of deposit, violated by the Spanish Intendant; the other, security that such violation would not be repeated. The First object might, perhaps, have been attained without purchase. But would the nation have been satisfied with this? If there be any truth in the declarations of the opponents of the administration they would not; and we are certain the friends of the administration would not. What should we, indeed, have been gained by the accomplishment of this object? No other than a right, acknowledged by France, to deposit our goods at New-Orleans, subject to undefined conditions, and revocable, as by Spain, at any moment. Would there have been any safety in this? Would the nation have asserted its dignity by obtaining merely a nominal recognition of a previous right?

It might possibly have obtained some pecuniary compensation from Spain for the injury sustain by our trade. But what proportion would this have borne to the inconveniences of a future slate of insecurity, the risques arising from which, being always contemplated as possible, would have had a steady and conflant tendency to depress the price of produce and discourage the spirit of adventure? To have contended for one at the expense of the other would have been to seize the shadow and neglect of the substance.

It then be ascertained, that neither the public feeling, nor the security of our rights, would have been satisfied by a mere resolution of the deposit, it only remains to consider whether any thing short of purchase would have been effectual.

We might have obtained New-Orleans by force. Of this there can be no doubt. But would this have given us the secure and indisturbed possession of our right? Is there a man in the nation who does not believe that the use of force on our part would have produced it on the part of France? If used by us it would not have been merely to regain the right of deposit, but to protect its future enjoyment. This could only have been done by the conquest of New-Orleans, or, which amounts to the same thing, the occupation of it by a military force.–Nor would this alone have been sufficient. A national arrangement would have been also required to command the mouth of the river. The effect would have been war with France.

The absurdity of France giving us New-Orleans for nothing, need not be considered. Nations are too seldom just, and never generous. She would have been an equivalent; and that could only be found in money, or partial commerical stipulations in her favor. Against the latter every voice among us is united.

They, therefore, who object to a purchase, and who still insist upon the necessity of obtaining the secure possession of our rights, have had no other alternative than war. A more distinct consideration of the policy and effects of war is reserved for the solution of the sixth enquiry.

The National Intelligencer, Washington D.C. — Read full article

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Matthew R. Kochakian
The Paper: News from the Past

Ars longa, vita brevis. Designer, engineer, & founder. Recent grad: @nyustern.