Implementation of Electronic Voting Machines in the United States: An Analysis
The past decade and a half have provided renewed discussions on the usage of electronic voting machines as opposed to the better-understood, albeit less modern paper ballots. This sense of concern has been highlighted in the recent election cycle, where many have declared these machines to have been tampered with by the Russian government to promote the candidacy of POTUS Donald J. Trump. Even in Georgia, there have been similar allegations of election machine tampering for the candidacy of Brian Kemp, the current governor (Bajak, 2017). These voting machines are ubiquitous in American society, with 13 states still using Direct Recording Electronic Machines (DREs) without the use of paper, and 43 states still using voting machines that are no longer manufactured (Verified Voting, 2019). These privately funded voting machine manufacturers have had a large stake in elections administration ever since the 2000 election, where many argued that voting mishaps like the “hanging chads” in Florida precincts (Elving, 2018) led to George W. Bush unfairly winning the election. However, in recent years, many people have proposed moving back to paper ballots for similar reasons; they say that moving back will preserve election security and help maintain America’s status as a bastion of democracy.
The debate on whether or not electronic voting machines should be maintained in U.S. election systems is incredibly complex. Americans inherently want a safe, rapid, and secure method of voting that is not interfered with by external factors. Therefore, analysis of this debate should separate the argument into components, assessing whether Electronic Voting Machines tabulate votes significantly more rapidly than paper ballots, store votes securely, and can be used reliably for many elections. Despite proponents touting the efficiency of these electronic voting machines, the reversion to paper ballots for elections align more with American values of security and integrity in elections. This reversion to paper ballots is not akin to moving back to the Stone Age, but rather akin to protecting the values of America itself, and should, therefore, be implemented.
Electronic Voting Machines, by design, are meant to make the counting of votes more effective so that elections can be processed more rapidly. Congressional Research Surveys and independent testers from the National Academy of Science both agree that electronic tabulation methods to a central tabulation authority are likely to be quicker than processed counts through paper (Celeste, Thornburgh, & Lin, 2006) (Fischer, 2001) when implemented correctly. However, the magnitude of the difference in times from electronic voting to paper setups may be overstated. There exist many methods that paper ballots themselves can be tabulated in a quick, “automatic” manner, including optical mark-sense voting tabulation methods (Jones, 2010). Optical mark-sense voting tabulation methods automatically can count paper ballots through a secure scanning system, which allows the vote from a paper ballot to be quickly tabulated. Paper ballots have an advantage in terms of familiarity; people have used pencil and paper generally at a younger age than they have used a graphics interface, and increased familiarity with an election ballot logically correlates with a quicker turn-around time in precincts, and quicker times to vote leads to greater trust in the voting process (Stewart & Ansolabehere, 2013). There exist documented examples of election machine malfunctions on Election Day, which dramatically increased the amount of time needed to vote, including in states like Georgia (Cassidy & Long, 2018). Paper ballots require less maintenance; even in the very unlikely event that the optical scanning machine breaks, votes can still be tabulated, as they exist in a paper form to begin with, while in DREs in many states, there often are no paper backups. Ultimately, the effectivity of an election and turnout is directly proportional to trust in the electoral process. Ironically, in an information age, voters seem to trust tactile printed paper ballots that can be securely stored as opposed to machines where the storage of the vote is controlled by an external device. This trust is by far more important than any efficiency brought by Electronic Voting Machines that lack a paper trail.
The security of the makers of Electronic Voting Machines themselves is of great interest when examining whether these machines are valuable for electioneering. These machines are not produced by government bodies, but rather by private manufacturers who are approved by the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Private manufacturers who wish to have their machines used often resort to unethical measures, to say the least. For example, Elections Systems & Software (E. S. & S.) is known to offer state elections officials “airfare on trips to places like Las Vegas,” which was widely disavowed by ethics officers (Halpern, 2019). (These machines, incidentally, were the same machines purchased by Georgia for the 2018 election.) While supporters to private election manufacturing see it as a way to cut costs, rights to what machines should be used in elections should not be given to the lowest bidder, but rather as a well-informed decision taking into account the security and integrity of the machines.
Elections, by definition, are supposed to give all eligible members of a population a voice in the future of an area. Eligible members of a population include citizens with disabilities; what system of conducting elections is necessarily better for citizens with disabilities? In theory, election machines would be considered ideal for citizens with disabilities. Election machines can be made to include Braille keyboards and audio interfaces for visually impaired people, and vendors now can include methods to help people with neurological disabilities vote by using “sip and puff” plug-ins (2005). Arguments promoting election machines often state that these machines allow the opportunity for such citizens to have a secret ballot, something that is necessary for a democracy to function effectively (Sink, 2000). But does this actually work in practice? In March 2004, Sequoia voting machines were used for an election, which was seen to be a test of how well these election machines cater to visually and physically impaired people (Theisen, 2005). Studies actually found these machines to be “unacceptable” and were “anything but user-friendly.” While these accommodations were meant specifically for disabled people, it also meant that people who work the elections often lack the knowledge on how to properly provide disabled people voting access, as opposed to paper ballots where the system in place to accommodate for disabled people has improved simply as a byproduct of a longer time with the system. Election machines can be used effectively to help more people exercise the opportunity to vote, but it cannot be the only option available; paper ballots are often preferable by many with disabilities, and voters should at least be offered a choice on what system to use, instead of one option that may be less-than-optimal.
Such machines have also been known to continue to market significant vulnerabilities on Election nights. Such vulnerabilities are sometimes discovered after the fact; it was not until after the 2016 election when the full extent of Russian interference in voting machines was realized. But often, even when there are known concerns with a system, American manufacturers/governmental bodies tend to be lethargic at best fixing the system. Georgia is a peak example of this lethargy. A critical.security patch was provided by the company that produces voting machines as a result of a concerned user-tester realizing that a simple memory card wipe, which requires no passwords or explicit access, can ultimately lead to obtaining administrative rights on the machine being given to the ordinary masses. However, this patch, which was installed in 2005, has not yet been applied to Georgia’s voting machines (Norden & McCadney, 2019), which indicates that there still exists a critical security risk of using electronic voting machines (DREs) like those that were used in Georgia. In general, machines that do not give a receipt and keep an internal log of memory for accumulation or tabulation are inherently hackable; it should be our responsibility to minimize the damage.
Ultimately, Electronic Voting Machines, while theoretically useful and efficient, are actually inefficient and downright dangerous. Voting, among other things, seems to satisfy Occam’s Razor: the simplest solution is most likely the correct one. That is not to say that there are Electronic Voting Machine options that are not inferior to purely paper-based systems — optical mark-sense voting tabulation systems seem to be effective in expediting the process of counting and tabulating votes as compared to purely paper ballots. Georgia has passed a new bill requiring the Electronic Voting Machines in the state to be replaced with new machines, which were used in many local pilot counties on November 5, 2019, as well as the recent presidential primary elections in March of 2020. Many of the complaints and incidents that occurred from these new machines are said to be due to “human error,” (Bunch, 2019), including four touchscreen monitors and one scanner taken out of service. Georgia’s March 2020 primaries have also seen similar levels of difficulty of implementation, with numerous anecdotal accounts from my family and friends noting the amount of time needed to actually cast a ballot this election cycle. It is not feasible to say that these issues were a product of malice; as Robert J. Hanlon famously said, “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.” Human error is a plausible excuse, but not an excuse that should be made. To minimize incidents of procedural error, one must simplify the procedure; to simplify the democratic procedure, it is best to revert to paper ballots.
References
Bajak, F. (2017, October 27). APNewsBreak: Georgia election server wiped after suit filed. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f.
Bunch, R. (2019, November 19). State: Voting failures ‘human error’. Retrieved from https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/news/local_news/state-voting-failures-human-error/article_293d3eb0-30cc-5fcd-9a5a-36a0a20bb54e.html.
Cassidy, C. A., & Long, C. (2018, November 7). Machine breakdowns, long lines mar vote on Election Day. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/6fb6de6fdb034b889d301efd12602e21.
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