Euthyphro’s Dilemma
One of the most fundamental, contentious topics in the field of philosophy has been the discussion about the precise nature of ethics and morality. The nature of ethics and morality is only slightly different from a discussion of the content of ethics and morality itself, though they are undoubtedly intimately related. This is the slight difference between discussing why do moral values have moral forces on us, and discussing what should these moral values consist of.
I found it helpful to divide the field of ethics into three hierarchical levels:
- Metaethics: A subfield of ethics that seeks to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, or psychological status of moral thoughts and moral practices. We ask ourselves questions such as: Is morality a matter of subjective taste or objective facts? Are there things such as moral facts? If such facts exist, how can we acquire them?
- Normative ethics: This is the field we most commonly associate with philosophy, where we discuss general theories that seek to systemize right and wrong behaviors.
- Applied ethics: This is a more practical field of ethical issues that discuss specific contentious issues like human rights, bioethics, environmental ethics, etc.
In Western culture, discussions of ethics and morality are frequently intermingled with religious values. This has a very long tradition going back to even before the birth of Jesus Christ.
For many people, moral commitment comes from religious commandments, but there has always been a philosophical tension between our impression about the status of God and God-given commandments themselves.
This tension is first explored by Plato in his dialogue Euthyphro. This is the famous Euthyphro Dilemma.
Background:
The dialogue Euthyphro portrays a conversation between Socrates (Plato’s teacher) and Euthyphro, just weeks before the trial of Socrates in 399 BC. Euthyphro is on his way to prosecute his father for manslaughtering. One of Euthyphro’s family’s workers had killed a slave, and Euthyphro’s father tied the worker up and threw him in a ditch. While Euthyphro’s father was debating on what to do about his worker, the worker had already died in the ditch.
It was uncommon for a son to have the conviction to persecute his father, as most people considered this to be impious. In the encounter with Socrates, the discussion quickly developed into a conversation about the nature of piety, for the concept of piety in ancient Greece did also have a broader sense that means righteousness.
Socrates asked Euthyphro about the definition of piety, of which Euthyphro gave a sequence of answers, and Socrates gave a corresponding sequence of responses.
The first answer Euthyphro gave was that piety is what Euthyphro is doing right now, persecuting his father for the crime of manslaughter. Socrates objected to this first definition of piety since this is an instance of piety rather than a general definition of piety.
The second definition Euthyphro gave was that piety is what is loved by the gods. Socrates also considered this to be an unsatisfying definition, for the Greek gods were known to disagree among themselves. If some actions are potentially loved by some, but hated by others, then there will be situations where somethings are pious and impious at the same time, which is contradictory.
The Dilemma:
Euthyphro refined his definition again: now claiming that pious is what is loved by all the gods.
“What all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.”
Socrates then responded by a question, in which he gave Euthyphro two options to choose from:
- Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious?
- Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?
Why can’t we choose both?
In such a dilemma, we cannot choose both. Because choosing both will yield a circular argument. As the first option explains god-loved with piety, the second option explains piety with god-loved. This shows that piety is not really the same thing as god-loved. If we choose the first option and explain god-loved with piety, then the factor that explains piety must be something else, a further unsolved problem.
In a discussion of metaethics, we can extend the problem piety so that it becomes a more general metaethical discussion:
- God commands it because it is right.
- It is right because God commands it.
What’s the difference between these two?
In the first option:
Gods love pious because it is pious. We explain why something is gods-loved by using the definition of piety. Similarly, God commands something because it is right. So the standards of right and wrong must have to be established independently of God’s opinions, prior to God’s commands.
But there are theological implications with choosing this first option, namely that we have to shed our image of God as an omnipotent being. God did not establish moral truths. Instead, God is bound by moral truths just like us, which means that God is not an absolutely independent moral agent.
If God is absolutely good, then God must be absolutely bound to an independent set of moral standards, which also compromises the freedom of God. In a sense, God has no free will and is powerless to act against a set of external rules.
What then are these external rules? Is God then not some law-giver, but merely an agent that serves as the transmitter of these eternal moral laws?
In the second option:
Something is pious because it is loved by the gods. We explain piety in terms of the gods-loved. In a general extension, we consider something is right because Gods command it. God commands certain actions not because they are good, not does God prohibit actions because they are evil, but rather actions become good only if they are commanded, and evil when they are prohibited. There are no other moral standards other than God’s will. God exists as the sole arbitrator of right and wrong: morality will not exist if God does not give commandments.
Believer of the second horn of the dilemma must also face several potential issues. First, there is no rational reason for believing in God’s will, since there is no moral standards other than God’s will. If morality is ultimately not based on reason and arbitrarily dependent on God’s will, then there is also the issue of the status of morality as an objective enterprise.
Also, if we cannot measure God by moral standards, then it is really tough for us to describe God as good or wise. God doesn’t really act on good reasons, but rather on his arbitrary will. Saying that God is morally good is a meaningless statement, for whatever he does is good anyway. How can we distinguish the all-powerful God from an all-powerful demon?
“Is pious pious ’cause God loves pious? Socrates asked whose bias do y’all seek? All for Plato, screech” — JAY-Z No Church in the Wild
Of course, we can avoid the dilemma all together if we just reject the central assumption of the dilemma, which is that God exists, and there are some relationships between God’s existence and moral laws. That way, we can find some other grounds for morality.
