Can Covid-19 Pave the Way for a Post-Racial Politics in Malaysia?
Malaysia’s economic response to the global pandemic involves a recovery plan structured around need, not race. Amidst an unfamiliar power vacuum in government, this could lay the foundations for changes to the country’s monolithic politics.
Ethnic Divisions and the New Economic Policy
Ethnic divisions in Malaysia date back to the struggle for independence. Much of these divisions were caused by the economic imbalance between majority ethnic Malay and indigenous (collectively “Bumiputra”) population (60.7%), and the ethnic Chinese (20.8%) and Indian (6.2%) minorities. Race riots in 1969, sparked by a strong election outcome for non-Malay opposition parties, paved the way for a new national effort to correct this racial imbalance. This was implemented through a series of measures that were unveiled in 1971 known as the New Economic Policy (NEP).
The NEP sought to strengthen the economic grip of the Bumiputra population by affording them favourable treatment in access to education, housing, and corporate share ownership. These privileges were enshrined in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution to ensure their protection. At an individual level, policies included preferential borrowing rates from financial institutions, admission quotas into higher education institutions, and preference to Bumiputra businesses for the undertaking of government contracts.
The wide-reaching NEP simultaneously shored up political support during the 1970’s and 80’s for the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the lynchpin party in the government’s ruling coalition from independence in 1957 to 2018. Strong economic growth generated an unprecedented 4.1% annual increase in employment during the 1970’s. This consequently lowered levels of absolute poverty amongst Bumiputra communities from 64% in 1970 to 23% in 1989.
A Divisive Legacy
Where some hail the NEP as a catalyst to this socio-economic mobilisation, others argue that its effectiveness urgently requires re-evaluation, and that its legacy has in fact been one of greater ethnic polarisation and economic disparity. Bumiputra elites, profiting from government assistance, benefited from affirmative action at the expense of poorer Bumiputras who were in greater need. And political representation soon reflected their dominance, with the materialisation of an unwritten rule that prime minister and senior government positions must be held by Bumiputras.
By 1990 it became evident that the NEP, now rebranded as the National Development Policy (NDP) was inextricably linked to growing Bumiputra nationalism. Conservative politicians purveyed narratives of growing secular currents ready to subvert Bumiputra privilege, whilst reformists shied away from addressing the issue, fearing the further alienation of Bumiputra voters. The weaponisation of the special privileges served to distract from the failure of the government to address more fundamental concerns of discerning voters. This included the rising cost of living and the corruption that was permeating through all levels of society. Bumiputra supremacy had become an entitlement and required protection from those who sought to delegitimise its sanctity.
As the Opposition started to moderate and diversify its ethnic composition, it began gaining support from the growing Malaysian middle class who demanded greater ethnic inclusion, anti-corruption efforts and better governance. Opposition traction was strengthened by several corruption allegations against UMNO leaders, including Prime Minister Najib Razak who was implicated in a corruption scandal involving the sovereign wealth fund, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) in 2015.
Najib’s administration would become the first UMNO-led government to lose power in 2018, a clear and comprehensive demonstration from the Malaysian electorate that they possessed the ability to hold their government accountable and were increasingly concerned with pragmatic issues pertaining to the modern global economy, not ideological fearmongering.
Bridging Ethnic Differences
The new multi-racial Pakatan Harapan (PH) government collapsed in February 2020 under relentless pressure from a rebranded, explicitly ‘Malay-first’ UMNO-led coalition. The subsequent unelected Perikatan Nasional (PN) government, appointed by Malaysia’s King, with a razor-thin parliamentary majority, comprises of parties that fashion themselves as Malay-dominant and protectors of the race.
The coronavirus pandemic has further highlighted the precarious position of the Perikatan Nasional coalition. Instead of drawing on the familiarity of old ethnic divisions, politicians on both sides of the divide are remarkably championing calls for unity and social cohesion. Dr Noor Hisham, Malaysia’s Director-General of Health, has embodied the non-partisan nature of the fight against the virus. Malaysian’s have rallied around his reassuring stance, reliance on empirical data and unwillingness to bend to political narratives.
There is a palpable understanding amongst Malaysians that the pandemic is blind to racial division and should not leave one Malaysian worse off than another. A consensus has slowly but surely formed that minority communities and those hit hardest from the pandemic should be equally entitled to assistance and opportunities for a brighter and more secure future. In structuring the economic recovery, the government’s focus has thus shifted from blanket policies predicated on race to ones that are based on need. Wage subsidies, loan moratoriums and assistance for small-medium sized businesses are part of a wide-ranging set of measures being made available to all Malaysians regardless of race.
Youth Driving Long-Term Solutions
But can the pandemic usher a new dawn in Malaysian politics? No short-term panacea exists, and progress often follows a complex path, but the concerted efforts implemented now can deliver long-term solutions. Education remains the cornerstone to cultivating a post-racial political landscape. It delivers economic prosperity and drives social mobility, that will in turn engender a burgeoning middle class. Education also fosters the debate and discussion of new ideas. Mazlee Malik, Pakatan Harapan’s Minister for Education, took the unprecedented step of enabling local varsities to form political societies. Encouraging young Malaysians to actively partake in determining the course of their futures is especially important in this moment, as the pandemic disproportionately affects young people, who are more likely to lose their job or suffer a fall in earnings compared to older workers.
Syed Sadiq, Malaysia’s youngest ever cabinet minister, is another politician attempting to disrupt the status quo. Having secured the monumental constitutional amendment of lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years of age during his term, he is now using his clout to galvanise Malaysia’s youth, who comprise 32% of the registered electorate, under a united political movement. The inception of such a movement looks set to challenge the recalcitrant race-based structures in Malaysian politics and displays a growing readiness from moderate Bumiputra leaders to chart a new meritocratic future for all Malaysians.
Barack Obama once quipped that “a politics solely based on tribe and ethnicity is a politics that is doomed to tear a country apart. It represents a failure of imagination”. As the country’s ethnic majority, it is incumbent upon the Bumiputra base to form the engine that will ignite this change. By confronting the past and committing to a rejection of racially divisive narratives, politicians have the power to chart a new course in Malaysia’s history. And while race will remain a salient fault line in the consciousness of Malaysians, the coronavirus pandemic presents a window of opportunity to move beyond this which has never been clearer.
Sources and references for my article can be found on my Author Page, titled ‘Article References’
