Flourishing within the Chaos — Bolsonaro’s Surge in Popularity During the Pandemic

Ian Chalfon
The Political Economy Review
6 min readNov 4, 2020

The Covid-19 crisis has been a true test for governments: each executive leader’s response to the crisis has made it abundantly clear which people are competent in running a country, and which are not. One of the many figures who has proved incapable in handling the crisis is Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro. From dubious decisions to outrageous public appearances, Bolsonaro continues to do a poor job in leading the country, yet he now boasts the highest approval ratings he has ever had since his inauguration.

To truly grasp the dire state Brazil is in, I believe some numbers are necessary. In our last quarter, Brazil had the biggest decrease in GDP in its entire history, at 9.7% — an astonishing drop that was about 2.5 times greater than our previous greatest fall of 3.8% during the 2008 financial crisis. The country currently has an unemployment rate of 13.7%, and of the people who are employed, 40.6% have informal jobs. This means that more than half of Brazil’s labour force does not have a steady income or is unemployed.

Furthermore, Brazil’s handling of the pandemic is among the worst in the world. On October 10th, the country exceeded a mark of 150’000 registered deaths by covid-19, but the actual number may very well be higher. Testing has been extremely poor in Brazil, with only 10 million ‘quick’ tests — which are less effective than standard molecular tests — provided by the government as of last April, a small amount for Brazil’s population of 210 million. Due to limited testing, patients who die under the suspicion of covid-19, but were not tested, have their cause of death written down as “severe acute respiratory syndrome”. This leads to unreliable data that stifles policymakers’ ability to handle the crisis and only serves to spread misinformation and mayhem.

When a country is in this bad of a state, it is anticipated that political and popular support for the incumbent leader decrease. Bolsonaro, as always, defies our expectations.

Datafolha’s most current study shows that since last August, Bolsonaro has had the best approval ratings since the start of his government in 2018. 37% of Brazil’s population are of the opinion that Bolsonaro’s government is either ‘good or great’, 27% believe the government is ‘regular’, and only 34% think it is ‘bad or terrible’.

Jair Bolsonaro’s approval ratings as of 12/08/2020. Source: Datafolha.

Another notable fact is the swiftness of the shift in the public’s perception of Bolsonaro. In the span of two months, his ratings of ‘good or great’ increased by 5 percentage points, his ratings of ‘regular’ increased by 4 percentage points, and his ratings of ‘bad or terrible’ dropped by a massive 10 percentage points.

Lastly, what is perhaps most interesting is to see who Bolsonaro’s supporters are. The president’s approval ratings are highest among men, those with only primary schooling, and those without a steady income, according to Poder360. This is surprising given that the impacts of the pandemic have disproportionately affected the poor — they are supposed to be those worst off due to the actions of the government.

How, then, does Bolsonaro manage to have such high approval ratings? I believe the answer lies in the policies he has supported during the pandemic.

Ever since his beginnings as a politician, Bolsonaro supports policies that rely on great government spending. However, during his campaign for presidency, one of the big swaying factors for many voters was his promise to push for free-market policies in the economy, with special support for a government spending cap.

Bolsonaro retained his loyal following of liberals and libertarians until the pandemic compelled Congress to create an emergency aid scheme to support those in need with monthly payments.

At first, the president was against the policy altogether, sticking to his liberal views and pleasing his followers. However, due to pressure from Congress, he yielded to an initial R$200,00 a month, then opted by himself to raise the payments to R$600,00. Shocking to no one, this made him lose a big share of his original supporters.

However, the defence of this measure was exactly what catapulted his approval ratings. Recall that most of Brazil’s workforce does not currently have any steady income from their jobs, and about 40% never even knew the security that a steady income can bring. Now, 44% of households benefit from the emergency aid scheme, and people with informal jobs feel safer than ever, even in the midst of a global crisis.

Bolsonaro makes an appearance at an anti-democratic protest. Source: El País, SERGIO LIMA / AFP.

Doubling down on the support for social and populist policies, Bolsonaro is defending the Renda Brasil (now Renda Cidadã) — a social transfer scheme that stems from Lula’s left-wing government. This indicates that the president’s current supporters will likely not abandon him after the pandemic and emergency aid go away.

Even though right-wing politicians do not approve of his populist policies that encourage government spending, Bolsonaro can fall on his newfound allies in the centrists for support. The president has appointed many centrist politicians to high-echelon positions in government, notably appointing Kássio Nunes Marques for minister of the Supreme Federal Court. Currently, institutions run by centrists control an aggregate budget of over BRL70 billion. Furthermore, Bolsonaro has ended investigations pertaining to the Carwash Operation; this move greatly benefits the centre, as many centrist politicians were being investigated for corruption by the Operation.

I think it is important to stress how beneficial this partnership is for both Bolsonaro and the centrists. Bolsonaro has good popular support and enough clout and charisma to sway voters but was never taken seriously as an instrumental part of government. This year, Bolsonaro had his position as president challenged by cries for impeachment from both the general population and members of Congress. On the other hand, the centrist parties are the biggest and most powerful parties in Brazil’s legislative and judiciary branches but have little popular appeal. Bolsonaro can then bolster the centre’s popularity by supporting their candidates in the 2020 municipal elections, and the centrists can give more stability to Bolsonaro’s government. Due to this newfound alliance, it is likely that Bolsonaro’s fervent right-wing speeches and authoritarian actions will diminish, as he readjusts his political expression to better please the centrists.

It is worthy to note, however, that Brazilian centrists are notoriously opportunistic. Seeing Bolsonaro’s high approval rates, they may have formed an alliance simply to gain support for their candidates in the 2020 municipal elections. Being so, it would not be surprising to see the centre abandon its support for Bolsonaro if he ever happens to lose his popularity.

In this way, the 2020 municipal elections will prove pivotal for Bolsonaro’s re-election in 2022. If he is able to elect centrist candidates through his endorsement, then these future mayors may in turn endorse Bolsonaro in 2022. Even so, due to unusual conditions and the fact that many Brazilians are not informing themselves about municipal candidates, this election is likely to inherently favour incumbent mayors, especially those who have done a good job in handling the crisis in their cities. This will make Bolsonaro’s goal of electing unpopular centrist candidates even more difficult.

All in all, Brazil finds itself in a state of chaos, with the man behind the mayhem being seen by many as the saviour. Bolsonaro’s populist policies may give him short-term popularity, but when Brazil’s spending cap is broken, and money reserves run out, he will be unable to rely on these measures. If the president is able to accrue support in the 2020 municipal elections and successfully form a lasting partnership with the centre, then it may very well be that he has enough support for a re-election in 2022. However, if he cannot do so and continues to rely on expensive populist measures, he will likely lose political power and leave Brazil in economic ruin.

Sources and references for my articles can be found on my author page, under “Article References”.

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