Myanmar’s Trap: Tug of War Between Democracy and Autocracy
Since the military coup in early February 2021, the situation in Myanmar remains critical with no settlement in sight. Whilst the international community has condemned the military junta and the US imposed heavy economic sanctions on the country, no other intervention has been undertaken to avoid a full-scale civil war between the civil rebellion and the army.
The United Nations delegated the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to aid in civil de-escalation within Myanmar, however, many of the states thus far have been reluctant to intervene. The local turmoil poses a threat to regional stability such as influxes of Burmese refugees into neighboring states. Yet, the nature of the regional political actors such as China, Indonesia, or Singapore mitigates any room for potential action. Will the ASEAN countries and China be willing to contradict their most important principle of non-interference in domestic affairs for the sake of their own interests and regional stability? How can a stalemate be avoided if Southeast Asian powers are paralyzed by their political agencies?
February 2021, a tale of two crises.
The military coup d’état orchestrated by the Tatmadaw to overthrow Aung San Suu Kyi’s government sparked outrage from the generations used to the new rules of democracy and grew tired of military rule in Myanmar. Massive protests were organized in the whole country after the military took over, who violently responded by imprisoning protesters, journalists, and government officials and cutting electricity and internet access.
The junta declared martial law in several cities including Myanmar’s biggest city, Yangon. The number of civil casualties has been difficult to approximate; official figures from April 2021 report more than 700 civilians dead at the hand of the army. In response to the ongoing violence, fractions from all walks of everyday life like doctors, students, blue and white collars have been joining the ranks of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), have been undergoing military training of their own, hidden in the jungle, to prepare themselves for when they meet their opposition.
The military coup adds further burdens to an already vulnerable Myanmar. The health sector is particularly impacted. Already under pressure because of the pandemic, more than 70% of doctors, nurses, and healthcare workers have abandoned their state hospitals and clinics in protest of the coup and the violent repression. The Burmese healthcare system threatens to disappear. Medical staff has been operating in underground networks, like pagodas and temples, to treat the wounded, as well as coping with the impact of the pandemic. The important reaction of the health sector really demonstrates the discontentment of the population against the military.
Despite the double health crisis of Covid and the breakdown of the medical structure, the military junta also seized an opportunity. As international travel is shot down, the pandemic prevented any foreign journalists or international observers from reporting the gravity of the situation. Human Rights Watch also accuses the junta of crimes against humanity committed while conducting violent repression against the population. In December 2021, Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to two years of prison, and one month after, in January 2022, she was convicted for four more years of imprisonment, 573 members of her cabinet were also arrested and 12 were killed. Besides abiding by the United Nations’ 2005 Responsibility to Protect and helping the Burmese population, the regional actors have several interests at stake that depend on Myanmar’s stability.
A concentration of regional interests
The ASEAN has economic, political, and security interests in Myanmar. On the economic side, the important trade flows between its members are disrupted by the crisis, weakening ASEAN’s competitiveness. The issue can be particularly critical if chains of supply and production are interrupted. Furthermore, a regional conflict is very unattractive for foreign investors who might fear repercussions on different countries of the association.
Politically, the Burmese situation poses a serious challenge to the ASEAN. The most sacred principle of the regional institution is non-intervention. Yet the military coup represents an opportunity for structural changes within the institution to expand its functions beyond the pure economic relationship. The Myanmar crisis is a test for the ASEAN, to reaffirm or redefine its legitimacy in Southeast Asia before other powers take its place.
ASEAN’s powerful neighbor, China, is also interested in Myanmar and could get involved to secure its assets, which would ultimately undermine ASEAN’s legitimacy over regional security issues. The main Chinese concern in Myanmar is the well-functioning of its grand project of the Belt and Road Initiative. This project relies on the “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor ‘’ and the civil turmoil put a stop to the construction of the roads following the pipelines (from North to South) to the parts of Kolhata and Kyaukphyu. Stopping the multiple strikes as well as the anti-Chinese movements and destruction of Chinese factories is crucial for the CCP. Thus, China and the ASEAN countries have incentives to intervene to pacify the situation in Myanmar, but they are hampered by their principle of non-interference.
To be a democracy or not to be
The lack of consensus in the Association of Southeast Asian nations is blocking any kind of response from the institution. This can be explained by the sympathies of some of the Southeast Asian governments to the power seizure of the Burmese junta. The World Bank uses the Policy Score, a dataset to measure democracy and autocracy. In 2018, four members of the ASEAN scored as anocracies (Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia) and two members are considered autocracies (Vietnam and Lao). The authoritarian states in the forum aren’t particularly discontent with the renewed military government in Myanmar. Another authoritarian government in the meetings could certainly represent an opportunity to have a new ally during voting or elections sessions — especially when it shares the same opinion on human rights or freedom of the press. The Burmese military junta represents a less contentious member than the democratic government of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Albeit the military coup is more a poisoned gift to China rather than an opportunity. China has to mitigate more and more violent anti-Chinese sentiments and protests against its diaspora, facilities, and investments. China is slowly recognizing that the military junta has difficulties protecting Chinese assets. The CCP needs to continue its past efforts to nurture diplomatic and economic relationships with the National Unity Government through the policy of the “good neighbor” to soothe Burmese public opinion. Yet pushing for the reinstatement of democracy will contradict Chinese efforts to silence democratic movements, especially while the CCP is asserting its grip over Hong Kong.
Additionally, given the scale of the civilian resistance to the coup d’état, foreign actors recognize that the only way to calm the situation is to grant democratic concessions acceptable for the Burmese population. But China and the ASEAN are hesitant to restore democracy because allowing democratic compromises in Myanmar would send a paradoxical political message domestically, where freedoms are restricted. Between political, journalist, and social media censorships, death penalty, discrimination and persecution of minorities, China, and the majority of countries of the ASEAN are not respecting the rights of their own population. Reporters Without Borders ranked countries according to their abuse score against journalists and media. The ASEAN scored very poorly in 2021, ranging from Malaysia in 119th to Vietnam in 175th on a list of 180 countries. China is 177th. If these regional actors want to interfere to calm the Burmese population by reinstating some freedoms, this may backfire domestically and reignite pro-democracy movements like the Milk Tea Alliance or protests such as those in Thailand in 2019. The risk of political and social backlash is too important for China and the ASEAN to undertake diplomatic or military measures to mitigate a civil war.
The Association under the chairmanship of Brunei eventually put the Myanmar crisis on its agenda in April 2021. The forum reached a “Five-Point Consensus” which incorporated agreements over humanitarian aid and special envoys as well as calls for peace. It lacked an official and unilateral condemnation of the coup or concrete sanctions, which was extremely disappointing for the Burmese population.
The resistance in the shadows.
While regional actors are hesitant to take active measures and western sanctions aren’t affecting the military junta in Myanmar, civil resistance is also far from stopping the violence. Myanmar’s shadow government, the National Unity Government (NUG), although not internationally recognized, already met with Western officials and the ASEAN. The latter invited one of the parallel government ministers to a summit on climate. Supported by the population in Myanmar as well as the diaspora, the shadow government sold bonds to fund their revolution against the junta and collected more than $6.3 million. The NUG formally launched in September 2021 the “people’s defensive war” against the military junta, escalating the risks of a stalemate in Myanmar.
The battle of David against Goliath has not reached its most critical point just yet, but the desire to overthrow the military dictatorship has never been so strong in Myanmar.
