Why Political Inclusion is the Next Step to Forge Peace in a Post-conflict Colombia
The ‘Final Agreement To End The Armed Conflict And Build A Stable And Lasting Peace’ reached by the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP) was signed on November 24th, 2016. After half a century of civil war, this agreement came as a democratic victory for the country. But it also brought about a new challenge: the construction of the peace. More precisely, preventing the revival of the armed conflict requires the recognition of the main problems that led to the struggle in the first place. As outlined in the agreement, the necessary changes include a rural reform, the strengthening of political participation, a solution to the problem of illicit drugs, the terms of the end of the military conflict, a system of justice and truth for the reparation of victims, and a verification mechanism for the implementation of those changes. However today, more than 3 years and a half after the agreement, the fulfillment of some of those goals is lagging behind. In its latest report on the state of implementation of the agreement, the Kroc Institute reveals that the point on political participation is the least advanced of all.
Indeed, while the agreement does offer a legal framework capable of structurally improving Colombian democracy, the application of this framework is for the moment obstructed by the lack of institutional response to some obstacles that impede the political participation of all. The absence of action to secure the political integration of the traditionally neglected and most affected communities, as well as new political actors like ex-combatants, threatens the durable establishment of electoral pluralism.
The historical context of political participation in Colombia
In the agreement, political participation was highlighted as a key priority for peacebuilding. This flowed from the necessity to treat the historical and recurrent representational crisis of the country’s party system. Traditionally, up to the early 2000s, Colombian politics lacked diverse voices. The distribution of political power alternated mainly between the Partido Liberal (PL) and the Partido Conservador (PC), creating a stable two-party system that forcefully excluded other political forces. However, this was accompanied by a decrease in partisan loyalty: in 2002, only 31,8% and 10,7% of Colombians identified as supporters of the PL and the PC, respectively. The weakened electoral support for the traditional parties challenged the durability of this institutionalized party system. The two parties became unable to represent broad national interests and were bound to clientelistic practices; that is in exchange for political support, they enacted reforms that favored the particular interests of a minority. Although a new Constitution, introduced in 1991, initiated the opening of the electoral system, there were not enough incentives for new parties to form coalitions with one another.
On top of that, political instability increased as subversive groups, including the FARC, were gaining strength. While they threatened the rise of other political voices at national and local levels, their actions also brought to light the deep stalemate in which Colombian political participation had ended up in.
Advances for pluralism
Flowing from this context, the overarching emphasis was put on the promotion of pluralism and electoral participation. Indeed, the agreement presented itself as a structural transformation of the electoral organization: both through a facilitation of access to the political system, and an increase of the transparency of electoral processes. Access to the political arena was eased thanks to the elimination of the requirement to reach a threshold in Congressional elections to acquire and maintain a legal status. Through a transition system lasting 8-years, political movements and parties gradually acquire rights to financing and access to specific resources depending on their municipal, departmental and national electoral performances. These reforms succeeded in simplifying the transition of social organizations with local political influence towards their establishment as proper parties.
Along with that, the government committed to organize a nation-wide campaign of ID issuance, and to implement mechanisms to ease access to voting stations throughout the country. Those reforms targeted the most rural and marginalized regions of the country. In particular, those communities where the armed conflict prevented the government from installing polling stations. The Colombian Conflict Analysis Resource Center found that these measures had been implemented effectively and that they have had a positive impact on the 2019 electoral period. Amongst others, these elections featured a greater geographic coverage, better access for the voters, and lower degrees of violence on voting day. Data shows that electoral structures have reached more than 500 places where there was no coverage before the end of the conflict.
Institutional obstacles for political inclusion
Yet, the most challenging reforms were the guaranteed political inclusions of, on one hand, the regions most affected by the conflict, and on the other, the political reintegration of the FARC ex-combatants. The agreement planned that for two electoral periods of 4 years, 16 Special Transitory Peace Electoral Districts will represent neglected populations, concentrated in former areas of guerrilla conflict. Only candidates from social organizations, for instance of victims, displaced people, or women, of those territories, will be eligible. They will act as additional territorial representatives to the House in order to prioritize the political reintegration of the traditionally excluded and the communities previously under the FARC’s influence. However, the legislative act for this measure was not approved by Congress in 2017, and no other initiative has been successful since. The peace electoral districts’ failed implementation is perhaps the greatest hindrance for the development of Colombia’s post-conflict democracy. As a necessary mechanism to support the transition of the neglected regions back to the political arena, they are central in filling the gaps where political institutions are still weak. Without their implementation, it is unlikely that local political participation can be enhanced.
Regarding FARC ex-combatants, their transition to a new legal political party, the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC), was fairly successful. The agreement supports their political reintegration for a period of 8 years, by creating 10 guaranteed seats for representatives of their party. Actually, the agreement manages to address some of the FARC’s socioeconomic grievances by emphasizing a socially just agrarian reform and a proper political representation of the rural and marginalized communities. It fits their historic military and political rationale of“the combination of all forms of struggle” and incentivize them to pursue their political aims in a democratic and non-violent manner.
The persistence of violence in the political space
However, the agreement has failed to completely get rid of violence as a mode of political action. Indeed, the systematic murder of ex-combatants and social leaders remains the most crucial challenge for durable political inclusionin Colombia. There is a current lack of effective government response to those murders, which obstructs the improvement of democracy at the local and national level by directly impeding political participation. Julián Gallo Cubillos, a former FARC commander who is now a Colombian senator, said that “the murders continue to riddle peace amidst the stigmatization campaign and the complicit silence of the Government”. He argues that “there has been a general neglect” regarding the reintegrating of former fighters.
In fact, between 2016 and 2019, the country counted 123 assassinations of ex-combatants and between 230 and 415 assassinations of social leaders. That signals that despite the efforts taken in the last 3 years, the historical relation between arms and politics is still at force. One possible reason is the prevalence of a reactive approach to individual cases of violence, unable to evolve into a preventive and collective one. Additionally, the presence of integrated ex-combatants in those communities is crucial for local political cohesion. Because the FARC traditionally had an important presence there, their electoral success depends on popular endorsement. Something they can seek to obtain only in a context where democratic elections are secured.
Accordingly, in the 2019 municipal and departmental elections, pre-electoral violence increased. The Electoral Observation Mission’s risk maps show that despite the risk of political violence being present in a tinier portion of the country, the fact that the number of candidates murdered grew reveals that this risk is actually not declining. Rather, it is being concentrated in areas where it has become more intense, including El Chocó, Antioquia, or El Valle del Cauca, all departments which were expected to be Transitory Peace Electoral Districts. Once again, this highlights that past scenes of the armed conflict require a special institutional attention, without which their reintegration into the political system will remain tainted with political violence.
The necessity to treat the agreement as a state, and not an administration, commitment
The agreement offers a framework capable of improving and strengthening Colombia’s political participation. However, the fulfillment of this essential condition for peacebuilding is hindered by both institutional brakes and the use of political violence. The failed creation of the Transitory Peace Electoral Districts and the lack of political inclusion this creates best sums up why the point of political participation is the least implemented of the agreement. Colombia needs to implement reforms using a territorial approach. By stimulating local democratic expansion, this would also promote the inclusion of those traditionally neglected and those most affected by the armed conflict. But ultimately, to successfully address this challenge and achieve a reform of democracy as broad as the one assumed by the Peace Agreements, there fundamentally needs to be “commitment on behalf of the state that goes beyond partisan political ties and specific government administrations”, as the Kroc Institute representative in Colombia said — a commitment that the current administration has yet to prove.
The bibliography for this article can be found on the post entitled “References” on my profile.
