A Gleam of Light in Asia
How The U.S. Backed a Genocide in Indonesia
Abstract
The failed coup of Indonesian president Sukarno allowed the United States an opportunity to facilitate General Suharto in an anti-communist campaign which resulted in one of the most violent genocides of the 20th century in which an entire political party was systematically tortured, captured, and/or killed. The United States’ heavy-handed involvement in the manipulation of variables that led to the coup and the mass killings exemplify its orientalist, imperialistic attitude toward Asian (especially communist) countries during the Cold War. The paradigm in Indonesia that emerged from the genocide was a panoptic society structured by ideological screening, mass surveillance, and systemic propaganda. The tools for a panoptic society were supplied by the United States in order to ensure that Indonesia did not fall to communism. The case of the US’ involvement in the events of 1965–1966 exemplify the notion that the US viewed Asian (especially Muslim majority countries) countries with a “plantation mentality”; in which Indonesia needed to be saved from itself by implementing a panopticon in Indonesian society so that communism (the threat) could be eradicated. The orientalist view of the US government precipitated a panoptic society, which is in itself an example of orientalism. The New Order (Suharto’s regime) would not have had the resources to install a panoptic society without foreign aid. The US government is at fault for facilitating the genocide and panoptic society that followed the coup of 1965; the reason the US became involved is because of the orientalist policy that it governed with at the time (and even still today). Indonesia is only one example of European or North American governments bolstering genocides, dictators, and propaganda to “Westernize” Asian countries catalyzed by an orientalist policy. As a result of the United States’ orientalist policy, the panopticon was introduced to Indonesia.
A Brief History of Indonesian Mass Killings 1965–66
Mass killings were carried out across several islands (Java, Bali, and Sumatra) of Indonesia from 1965–1966 (Robinson 17). The killings occurred as a genocidal political purge of Indonesia’s communist party by the head of the military, General Suharto, in an effort to neuter President Sukarno’s political power and assume control. Death toll estimates range between 400,000 to 3 million (Robinson 18).
In October of 1965, 6 generals were abducted and executed in the middle of the night. The head of the military, General Suharto, promptly accused the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) of the crime. This was a political move by Suharto, his goal was to turn the tide of public opinion against the PKI and use that as a justification to eliminate it and thus remove Sukarno’s support, allowing him to eventually assume the office.
Almost the entire PKI was either detained, tortured, beaten, or summarily executed by the early months of 1967. Around April of 1967, Suharto had removed enough political and societal influence and power from Sukarno to officially take the office from him. Suharto ruled with dictatorial rule for the following three decades until 1998.
Foucault
Panopticon
Michel Foucault is perhaps best remembered for his book Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Ideas from Foucault’s 1975 work will be used as a methodology to dissect, interpret, analyze, and organize the events of 30SM (30 September Movement) and how the horrific conclusion is an example of Foucault’s notion of power structures on a societal scale. This section of this essay will explore how Foucault’s ideas of power and control apply to the horrific conclusion of the 30SM and how “docile bodies” affect the efficiency of power (Foucault 138). “Docile bodies” are the bodies of citizens who are strictly disciplined, to make them docile, and thus easier to control.
Foucault believed that power, and how it is exerted, had changed. Between the 18th and 19th century, punishment changed from public executions to the more contained (and hampered from public view) prison system. Historians believe that the way in which punishment was dealt became more progressive and less violent, leading to the prison system, and this evolution came about because humanity became more humane in its notions of punishment. Foucault believed that this change came not through altruistic means of searching for a more humane way of jurisprudence, but as a new art of control on a societal scale. Foucault’s notion was that the birth of the prison system created a “panopticon” in society in which denizens behaviorally self-regulate themselves due to a constant risk of surveillance (Foucault 196).
The term panopticon was coined by Jeremy Bentham, Foucault then took the notion of a panopticon and developed it into a social theory known as panopticism. A panopticon conceptually consists of a circular prison with a guard tower in the center, separated by an open field. The guards in the tower are invisible to the inmates, as are the inmates to each other. Bright lights positioned on the guard tower block the sight of the inmates, which causes them to be unaware of the potential gaze of a guard.
“Docile Bodies”
Foucault focuses on the notion that the site of control within a societal power structure is within the body, the physical and spatial self. The body is the site of manipulation from which the source is affecting its power. The physical body becomes the tool to assert and maintain strict rules, regulations, expectations, timeframes, or spatial confinement. For Foucault, the fruition of a docile body creates “increased utility” but also “increased political obedience” (Foucault 138). During the mass killings, the average citizen became involved in the killings, often assisting the military. In fact, many death squads that carried out the barbaric killings were average citizens. Citizens that may or may not have taken issue with communism were easily coerced into participating in the killings.
Foucault created four categories by which bodies are made docile; each category is apparent in all societies, to varying degrees. The categories are cellular, genetic, organic, and combinatory. Cellular is the spatial manipulation of the body. Genetic can be seen as the imposition of exercises that takes a given amount of time and is constituted by progress i.e. homework and drills. Organic are temporally established rituals or routines for the body (the physical self) to follow.
Scaffolding of Suharto’s Panopticon
Evidence of a Panopticon
The discussed social paradigm of Indonesia and the political and social restrictions imposed by the establishment created an ideal scenario for Suharto to establish an overtly panoptical society. Suharto and his regime were able to implement such an obscenely effective and long-lasting grip of spatial, temporal, political, and social control that Indonesians are still under the influence of its legacy of lies and deceit from the Suharto regime. Surveillance, coercion, discipline, toxic ideas, and propaganda were used to create a strict panopticon in which not only do individuals regulate their own behavior, but they police the behavior of others as well. Textbooks, news, and official accounts all blamed the PKI as an aggressor and toxic party that had to be dealt with for the very sake of Indonesia. But why is it still believed today? Looking at it from a Foucaultian view, the state used the body as a means of subjugation, be it through propaganda, ideological policing, physical violence, mental anguish, or torture. The New Order closed out all other accounts of 30SM and would only allow the official account in schools and in the media. This intense propaganda creates a society that goes beyond that of a panopticon, in democracy, you may be being watched, in an authoritarian regime, you are being watched, which creates a society in which fear of persecution motivates an individual to turn in their neighbor or friend, fearing that the individual might not be suspected if they turn in someone else.
In the late 1960s, Suharto and his regime instituted a system of ideological policing in Indonesian society as a means to instill ubiquitous propaganda (Robinson 252). Mental screenings were used as a tool to create a dragnet that would ensnare any leftists and their sympathizers. Eventually, the mental screening protocols became so pervasive and widespread throughout Indonesian society that even private sector and service providers would employ these screening tactics (Robinson 256). The vetting process was established soon after the events of 30SM. Individuals who passed the test were given a certificate that they were “free from communist influence” (Robinson 253). Initially, these certificates were only required of individuals who were entering politics, civil service, or the military. However, as the screening protocols became more woven into Indonesian society, the certificate became a necessity for nearly all manners of public life and work.
Said and Orientalism
Orientalism
Orientalism is a social theory developed by Edward Said in his 1978 magnum opus Orientalism. Said believed that academic thought in Europe (as well as the US) had a skewed view of “oriental” culture. The terms “West” (Occident) and “East” (Orient) are social constructs established by European philosophers and governments. Said argued that European and North American academics had biased, inaccurate, and stereotyped views of Middle Asian and East Asian countries.
Said believed that European academics often romanticized said countries without ever understanding the true culture. He saw that Europeans often portrayed Asian countries as exotic and enigmatic. This skewed view of Asian culture prevented academia and European governments to ever truly understand their culture, because it was being viewed as something lesser through a “Western” lens that obscured their ability to see the culture genuinely. In addition to the obscured lens, Said believed that Europeans had a belief of superiority in culture, because they could not see the culture in its true form, rather than through an obscured lens. Said went further, he believed that all European and North American academic works concerning the orient were suspect because of the imperialist powers that created it.
Indonesia’s History as a Colony
The United States is not the first North American or European country to have imperialist motives in Indonesia. Indonesia was a colony of the Dutch for over 350 years. The Dutch, like the UK with India, created an oppressive society that impressed European values and they sought to “westernize” or “civilize” the people of the particular country that was colonized. European academics and elites holding this superior mindset is mostly what fueled much of the colonization of North African and Asian countries.
Orientalist Policy in Action
There are many examples in which American media and government organizations portrayed the events in Indonesia as a just cause, an action that was necessary to vanquish an enemy ideology. The comments from journalists and government officials portray Indonesia as a country that needs to be “westernized” from its savage nature. The comments are justified in their minds because communism is being averted, the means justify the ends.
For example, James Reston of The New York Times referred to the Suharto takeover in a June 19, 1966 article as a “gleam of light in Asia” (Robinson 255). This remark exemplifies the sentiment held by the US and the establishment at that time. The comment shows that politicians and journalists saw Asia as a lesser culture that needed to be civilized, such is the sentiment held by the US government at the time.
Suharto — Influence by US Policy
After the failed coup, the United States realized that it had an opportunity to eradicate communism from Indonesia. The US knew that it could make a quid pro quo with General Suharto. The United States influenced an already anti-communist Suharto to use the failed coup as an excuse to then destroy the PKI, neutering President Sukarno’s main pillar of support. The United States wanted to destroy the growing influence of communism in Indonesia so that it would be able to convert the country to a (US-dominated) free global market. The financial, political, and military aid that was provided to Suharto was directly related to the success of the genocidal campaign. As violence and death toll increased, so increased the aid provided from the United States to the Suharto regime. The symbiotic quid pro quo that developed allowed The US to neutralize an enemy ideology by means of supplying the anti-communist regime of Suharto with the means to execute the removal of power of Sukarno, which was the ultimate goal. The means, detaining, torturing, and killing thousands of innocent civilians by the hands of the US-supported death squads, certainly justified the means, the removal of Sukarno, in the eyes of the United States.
Conclusion
The annihilation of the PKI to render Sukarno helpless, the systemic propaganda, and ideological screening created a paradigm in Indonesian society that closely resembled a panopticon. The catalyst for facilitating Suharto’s panopticon was the orientalist attitude that was held by US establishment and media sources. The US was not concerned with the means by which Indonesia would be saved from communism and it recognized an opportunity (with the coup attempt) to ensure an anti-communist establishment within Indonesia and install scaffolding for a panopticon to ensure that their orientalist attitudes were met.
Appendix A — Further Historical Detail of 30SM
Indonesia gained its independence in 1945 from the Dutch, which briefly regained Indonesia from Japan who acquired it from the Dutch in 1942, who controlled Indonesia as a colony for generations (Robinson 2018). For years, Indonesia had a parliamentary democracy, although it was tumultuous, politically and otherwise. In 1957, President Sukarno established a more autocratic government under the movement called “Guided Democracy” which sought to put more control in the hands of the government as various factions vied for power (Robinson 2018). Sukarno, having led the Indonesian Independence Movement, was distrusting of Western influence. President Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, was in office from 1945 until his ousting in 1967 by Indonesian Parliament. Sukarno had communist sympathies. His main political philosophy, Nasakom (acronym for Nasionalism, Agama and Komunisme — nationalism, religion, and communism respectively) was the basis of his philosophies and general vision for the country under his rule (Robinson 2018). One of his three pillars of support, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), was the third-largest communist party at the time behind China and U.S.S.R. (Bevins 2017). His other two pillars of support were political Islam and the Indonesian Military.
Throughout the late 1950’s and early to mid 1960’s, Sukarno’s influence waned as the military and political Islam slowly gained more influence and became increasingly troubled by, and opposed to, communism (Beech 2017). There became a general distrust for Sukarno because of his communist sympathies. Sukarno met with foreign communist leaders and for most of his presidency he attempted to drive politics to the left. He also became increasingly opposed to western influence, namely the USA, whereas his military was open to Western relations. Communism was not accepted by the mainstream Muslim community of Indonesia. The Indonesian military also held similar feelings toward communism and it was afraid that the country might be susceptible to a communist regime under Sukarno (Beech 2017).
On the 30th of September, 1965, 6 top generals of the Indonesian military were captured and executed by militants who called themselves the 30 September Movement (30SM) (Beech 2017). This group claimed to be in support of Sukarno. According to 30SM, the killings of the top military officials were done so as a preemptive attack to prevent a coup by the Indonesian military that 30SM felt was imminent (Bevins 2017). President Sukarno denounced the movement, citing the murder of his generals as a heinous act. The movement was able to seize Merdeka Square as well as the Presidential Palace. The movement was not organized and efficient and throughout the rest of the day the movement began to show signs of falling apart. Some radio messages were sent but they were inaudible and only served to show the movement’s poor competency and leadership. General Suharto, a high-ranking general of the Indonesian Army, was stationed in the KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Command) building which was in the eastern part of Merdeka Square, which was largely left untouched by the movement. 30SM’s main concern was to seize the main telecommunications tower so that they could broadcast messages but they failed to search the area thoroughly and it turned out to be a very bad thing for the 30 September Movement. General Suharto was able to prey on the movement’s weaknesses and rather easily regained control of Merdeka Square, where the movement officially surrendered.
Within days, the government was unofficially under Suharto’s control and on October 5th, 1965, he began a thorough and damning military propaganda campaign linking the PKI to the events of the 30th of September (Bevins 2017). The propaganda campaign was successful due to the increased influence of the military despite the innocence of the PKI. Sukarno refused to name the PKI as the culprits of the 30SM (Bevins 2017). This move cost him a lot of political points and his power and influence continued to plummet as Suharto and the military gained more control. Suharto claimed that communism in general, and the PKI in particular, were an imminent threat to the very fabric of Indonesia. Suharto used the PKI as a scapegoat in order to cripple Sukarno’s main pillar of support through the mass killing of known or suspected PKI members. Suharto knew that they were not guilty of the crime but he saw it as an opportunity to seize power.
Throughout the remaining months of 1965 and most of 1966, between 400,000 and 3 million people were killed in the political purge of the PKI by the hands of Suharto’s regime (New Order). The Indonesian Parliament, stripped of any support for Sukarno, led impeachment proceedings against him. Sukarno was officially stripped of his power on March 12, 1967 in the presence of the Indonesian Parliament. Suharto took official control shortly thereafter, although he was already the de facto leader.
Suharto used the military to facilitate the creation of an oligarchy whose regime would utterly dominate Indonesian politics for the following three decades. Even today, despite his regime, some Indonesians remember Suharto fondly as someone who stood up for Indonesian interests. Even more, many Indonesians still believe today that Suharto was justified in his actions because he was protecting Indonesia from communism.
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