The Simulacrum

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Rethinking NATO ~ The Realities of Defense Spending and the Need for Reform

Freedom Preetham
The Simulacrum
Published in
20 min readFeb 2, 2025

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NATO remains the world’s most powerful military alliance, yet it is often misunderstood. Public discourse oscillates between those who claim that the United States funds the entirety of NATO and those who view the alliance as an outdated Cold War relic. Both perspectives miss critical nuances. NATO’s common budget is small relative to its strategic importance, and its effectiveness hinges on the defense spending of its individual members.

In this analysis, I examine a fundamental question: Is NATO a vital force for modern security, or a Cold War artifact clinging to outdated relevance? Does it function as a dynamic framework for collective defense, or has it devolved into a geopolitical illusion, a relic of a long-vanished Soviet threat, repurposed without adaptation to the tectonic shifts in global power? In an era where conflicts are shaped by cyber warfare, economic coercion, and asymmetric threats, is NATO evolving to meet these challenges, or does it merely preserve an illusion of deterrence while burdening its most capable members?

This blog does not advocate for the defunding or dissolution of NATO. I find such interpretations as unequivocally misplaced. I argue the opposite in this blog.

Theme of What the Blog Analyzes and Advocates

  • NATO remains a crucial alliance, but its continued relevance depends on its ability to adapt to modern security realities.
  • The alliance must enforce burden-sharing — the U.S. should not be the financial and military backbone while European nations underinvest.
  • NATO must modernize beyond traditional deterrence — cyber warfare, AI, and economic threats must be integrated into its security framework.
  • Expansion must be strategic, not symbolic — adding nations without military readiness dilutes deterrence and risks U.S. entanglement in conflicts of no strategic value.
  • The U.S. should not subsidize European defense indefinitely — Washington should transition from primary security guarantor to strategic enabler, encouraging Europe to embrace its full responsibility.

A Funny Account of Understanding the Difference Between the Common Budget vs Defense Spending

First, let me offer a simple yet entertaining analogy to clarify the difference between NATO’s common budget and the defense spending of its member states. If you grasp this section, consider your work done, you can skip the rest and call it a day. Alternatively, if you prefer to dive straight into the serious discussion, feel free to move on to the next section.

Imagine 32 friends decide to stand up to the bullies in their neighborhood. They form a club called Brotherhood Against Bullies (BAB), where they all agree that if one of them gets attacked, the rest will step in to defend. A noble idea.

Since every club needs funds for basic upkeep, they agree to pay a small fee based on how rich they are. This money covers club paperwork, the rental of a small meeting hall, and an annual summit where they eat sandwiches, drink coffee, and remind themselves how strong they are. The richest friend pays about $160, while the poorest pays around 50 cents. This is the club fee.

But here’s the thing. This fee does not actually help them fight. No bully has ever been deterred by a well-maintained clubhouse, an embossed membership card, or a quarterly newsletter. What really matters is whether these 32 friends have the skills, strength, and weapons to make their enemies think twice before attacking.

Now, let’s introduce Amer Ika, one of the club’s founding members. Unlike the others, Amer takes this seriously. He signs up for MMA training, lifts weights daily, practices combat drills, and builds an arsenal. If trouble comes, he is ready.

The problem? The other 31 do not train as much, they have internal problems or just not as motivated. Instead of training, they convince themselves that simply being in the club is enough. Some buy brooms and tiki torches, claiming that their symbolic commitment to self-defense matters more than actual preparation. Others prefer to spend their money on nice things, reassuring themselves that if a fight ever happens, Amer will take care of it.

Now comes the real issue, the rules of the club state that if any of the 31 members gets attacked, Amer and others has to step in and protect them. This is non-negotiable. Even if the person being attacked has done absolutely nothing to prepare for a fight, Amer is obligated to use his skills, weapons, and strength to defend them.

Meanwhile, if Amer himself gets attacked, the tiki torch and broomstick gang is technically supposed to help, but let’s be honest, their support is mostly symbolic. They wave their brooms around, shout motivational phrases, and maybe send a strongly worded letter to the bully, but at the end of the day, Amer is still the one doing most of the heavy lifting.

This is NATO. The club fee is the common budget, a small administrative cost that keeps things running. The real deterrence comes from how much each member actually invests in their own defense. Right now, Amer Ika (the U.S.) is sweating in the gym, mastering combat techniques, and stockpiling weapons, while most of his friends are skipping every training session.

At some point, Amer will start wondering why he is the only one paying for serious preparation while everyone else enjoys the safety of the club without putting in the effort. If NATO wants to remain credible, it needs fewer broomsticks and more fighters who can actually hold their own.

This satire is meant to illustrate the difference between NATO’s common budget (the club fee) and actual defense capabilities (military spending). Now that we have that clarified, let’s move on to the serious discussion.

Ahem, also satire is meant to be exaggerated and skewed, not literal.

The NATO Common Budget vs. National Defense Spending

One of the most overlooked aspects of NATO is the distinction between its common budget (club fee in the satire) and the military expenditures (The real defense capabilities) of its member states.

  • NATO’s common budget is approximately $18 billion per year, covering administration, joint exercises, infrastructure, and operational costs. This is a fraction of what member states spend on their own militaries to actually possess defense capabilities.
  • The United States contributes about 16% of this club fee, roughly $3 billion annually.
  • The real imbalance comes from total military spending (the real defense capability) within NATO. The United States accounts for ~68% ($860 billion) of the alliance’s total military expenditure ($860 billion out of NATO’s combined ~$1.3 trillion defense spending).
  • It is a categorical error to conflate the $3 billion administrative contribution with the $860 billion U.S. defense spend. These figures are not only distinct in scale but fundamentally different in purpose and function.

What Is the Purpose of NATO’s Common Budget?

NATO’s common budget is a shared financial pool contributed by all member states, distinct from national defense budgets. Unlike the massive military spending undertaken individually by countries like the U.S., the common budget does not fund armies, weapons, or direct military operations. Instead, it covers the essential operational and strategic needs of the alliance that ensure military coordination and infrastructure are maintained.

This budget, which stands at approximately $18 billion annually, serves three primary functions:

  1. Administrative & Political Infrastructure: Funds NATO headquarters in Brussels, the International Staff, and policy coordination bodies that ensure collective decision-making and diplomatic coherence among members.
  2. Joint Military Infrastructure & Exercises: Finances shared military bases, logistical hubs, communication networks, and training programs to ensure seamless interoperability among NATO forces.
  3. Collective Defense & Crisis Response Operations: Supports peacekeeping, cybersecurity initiatives, and rapid-response missions that require pooled funding rather than national military expenditures.

Why National Defense Spending Matters

Just to remind you, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union. This is NOT an economic alliance or some club to enforce “soft power”. The extent to which NATO engages in non-military interventions, in counterterrorism, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and post-conflict stabilization (e.g., Kosovo, Libya) is all secondary. NATO was and is clearly mandated to bolster “hard defense”. This is the primary mission.

The United Nations (UN) has the charter for soft power, promote human rights, foster social and economic development, and provide humanitarian aid. NATO is not a tool for U.S. economic dominance in Europe. It is a military alliance designed for collective defense, not market control. The U.S. already exerts economic influence through institutions like the WTO, IMF, and global trade agreements.

Do not get this wrong. NATO is a military alliance.

National defense spending is the true foundation of NATO’s military strength. Unlike NATO’s common budget, which is merely an administrative pool for joint coordination, national defense spending is what determines a nation’s ability to project power, deter adversaries, and engage in conflict if necessary. Every NATO member independently determines its own military budget, and this spending is what ultimately sustains the alliance’s operational capabilities.

The disparities within NATO are glaring:

  • The United States alone spends over $860 billion annually on defense, making up 68% of NATO’s total military expenditure ($1.3 trillion combined). Without this, NATO’s military deterrence would be crippled overnight.
  • NATO’s has a defense spending guideline, which requires each member state to allocate at least 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) toward defense spending. This target was formally agreed upon at the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga and reaffirmed in subsequent summits, including the 2014 Wales Summit following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
  • The 2% spending mandate is a political benchmark meant to ensure NATO members contribute fairly to defense.
  • As of February 2025, 9 out of NATO’s 32 member countries have not yet met the alliance’s defense spending guideline of allocating at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense.
  • Most European nations drastically underfund their militaries, choosing instead to invest in economic welfare while outsourcing their security to the U.S. This creates a dangerous strategic imbalance.
  • Poland, the U.K., and the Baltic states have aggressively increased defense spending, understanding that deterrence requires real military investments. Meanwhile, Germany, France, and Italy continue to hover below the 2% GDP target, effectively relying on American firepower for their own security.

Why This Matters?

The failure to distinguish between NATO’s common budget and national defense spending leads to dangerous misconceptions about NATO’s actual military readiness. The reality is that NATO itself owns no standing military. The alliance is a framework, not a force. Its strength is entirely dependent on what individual nations are willing to invest in their own militaries.

  1. NATO’s military credibility is built on national defense spending, not its central budget. The common budget covers bureaucracy, coordination, and infrastructure, but it does not buy tanks, deploy troops, or fund combat operations. Military power exists only if nations choose to invest in it.
  2. U.S. military dominance is what sustains NATO’s deterrence posture. Without America’s disproportionately large defense spending, NATO would not function as a serious military alliance. Europe, despite its economic power, has failed to develop an autonomous security capability that could deter threats without U.S. intervention.
  3. Underfunding by European members weakens NATO’s ability to deter and respond. Real deterrence does not come from NATO summits or joint declarations, it comes from well-equipped armies, force projection capabilities, and rapid response infrastructure. When key European nations fail to meet their defense commitments, they do not just weaken their own security, they weaken NATO as a whole.

The fundamental truth is that without sustained national military investments, NATO’s common budget is nothing more than an administrative shell, an alliance in theory but not in force. The ability to deter adversaries, counter hybrid warfare threats, and project strength across geopolitical fault lines does not rest on bureaucratic funding mechanisms but on the hard power of national defense investments.

European nations have a choice: either increase their defense spending and take real responsibility for NATO’s security, or accept the long-term strategic consequences of dependence, irrelevance, and vulnerability.

Understanding Europe’s Perspective on Defense Spending

For decades, European nations have deprioritized defense, relying on U.S. military power to sustain NATO’s deterrence. While often framed as complacency, this reality stems from historical, political, and economic factors that differ from Washington’s approach.

  • Post-WWII Demilitarization — After World War II, many European nations, especially Germany, shifted toward economic rebuilding instead of military expansion. This pacifist orientation still shapes policy today.
  • Economic Priorities Over Defense — The European Union prioritized trade, infrastructure, and social programs over military self-sufficiency, assuming NATO, largely funded by the U.S., would provide security.
  • Diverging Threat Perceptions — Poland and the Baltics see Russia as an existential threat and have increased defense spending. France, Germany, and Southern Europe prioritize diplomacy and economic stability over military buildup, weakening NATO’s cohesion.
  • Political Constraints — Many European governments face public opposition to military expansion, with voters demanding economic and social spending instead. This makes it politically difficult to meet NATO obligations.

What Does America Get from NATO, and Is It Still Working?

For decades, NATO has been framed as an essential pillar of U.S. global strategy. It extends American geopolitical influence, stabilizes Europe, and ensures a collective deterrent against adversaries. But in a shifting international order, where China, cyber warfare, and asymmetric threats are reshaping power dynamics, the question remains: Does NATO still serve U.S. strategic interests, or has it become a liability that hinders America’s ability to reorient toward the future?

What America Gains from NATO

Geopolitical Leverage Over Europe

  • NATO ensures that European nations remain aligned with Washington’s strategic priorities, preventing them from developing an independent security architecture that could challenge U.S. interests.
  • A militarily autonomous Europe could lead to divergence on key issues, including relations with China, economic warfare, and military intervention doctrines.

Forward-Deployed Infrastructure

  • The U.S. leverages NATO’s bases in Germany, Poland, and Italy as critical nodes for global force projection.
  • Without NATO, Washington would need to renegotiate dozens of bilateral security agreements, complicating operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Russia’s periphery.

A Force Multiplier That Reduces U.S. Burden

  • NATO enables the U.S. to outsource certain security responsibilities to allies, minimizing the need for direct military engagement in every European crisis.
  • While many European nations underfund their defense, NATO forces still provide logistical and operational support in key deterrence missions.

Economic and Defense Industry Advantages

  • NATO nations purchase American weapons systems (F-35s, Patriot missile batteries, HIMARS), reinforcing U.S. dominance in global arms sales.
  • The approved arms sales to all the NATO allies in 2022 ($28 billion) represent approximately 3.3% compared to the U.S. defense spend of $849.8 billion. (So not much of recovery there).
  • European dependence on U.S. intelligence-sharing and cyber-defense networks further entrenches Washington’s influence over NATO’s security operations.

But despite these advantages, NATO’s long-term strategic utility for the U.S. is eroding in several ways.

Where NATO No Longer Works for America

Over-Reliance on U.S. Military Spending

  • Over 68% of NATO’s total defense spending comes from the U.S. European allies, despite economic power, continue to underfund their militaries, leaving Washington to bear the financial and strategic burden.
  • If European members refuse to meet their own security commitments, NATO shifts from a collective security pact into an expensive American subsidy for European defense.

NATO Expansion Creates Strategic Liabilities

  • Every new NATO member expands U.S. security obligations under Article 5, increasing the likelihood of entanglement in conflicts where Washington has no direct national interest.
  • Would the U.S. truly be willing to go to war over a dispute in the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Baltics? Expanding NATO’s footprint without ensuring European burden-sharing is reckless statecraft.

Europe’s Economic Ties to China Undermine Alliance Cohesion

  • Washington views China as the primary long-term adversary, yet Germany and France maintain deep economic ties with Beijing and resist aligning with a harder stance.
  • The U.S. increasingly wants NATO to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific, yet many European members see China as an economic partner, not a strategic threat.

Without a fundamental restructuring, NATO risks becoming a fragmented alliance, one where the U.S. shoulders an outdated Cold War security framework while its allies pursue independent economic and geopolitical objectives.

What Must Change for NATO to Remain Relevant to the U.S.

  • Europe must take full responsibility for its own defense. The U.S. funds 68% of NATO’s total military expenditure while key European nations underfund their militaries. Germany, Europe’s largest economy, remains below the 2% GDP benchmark, while Poland and the Baltics exceed it, understanding that deterrence requires real investment. NATO cannot function as a passive security guarantee. Security commitments must be contingent on real military contributions. Nations that fail to meet force readiness standards should face reassessment of their access to advanced U.S. military support, joint exercises, and strategic planning.
  • NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific must be defined. The alliance was created to secure Europe, yet the U.S. increasingly expects it to counterbalance China. European allies maintain deep economic ties with Beijing and are reluctant to align fully with Washington’s strategy. If NATO expands beyond its original mandate, European nations must commit military resources to Indo-Pacific security rather than allowing the U.S. to underwrite European defense while they profit from Chinese markets. Washington should push for joint naval deployments in the Pacific, cyber cooperation against China’s digital influence, and intelligence-sharing on Chinese military advancements. If European nations refuse, NATO should remain focused on Europe, allowing the U.S. to redirect resources where they are most strategically necessary.
  • NATO expansion must be based on strategic necessity rather than political symbolism. Each new member extends U.S. security obligations under Article 5, increasing the risk of entanglement in conflicts that do not serve American strategic interests. Nations with weak militaries, unresolved territorial disputes, or structural vulnerabilities should not be granted membership for diplomatic cohesion alone. Expansion must be tied to military capability and strategic value. Candidate nations should be required to meet defense spending targets and integrate into NATO’s rapid response structures before admission. New members must strengthen deterrence, not dilute it.
  • Europe must develop strategic autonomy rather than relying on U.S. force projection. Washington has enabled European military stagnation by serving as both the nuclear and conventional deterrent against adversaries like Russia. This dynamic is unsustainable. The U.S. should transition from primary security guarantor to strategic enabler, helping Europe develop its own deterrence capabilities. This means encouraging the formation of an independent European rapid response force, greater nuclear sharing responsibilities, and increased logistical self-sufficiency. NATO must evolve into an alliance where Europe is fully capable of defending itself while still benefiting from U.S. strategic oversight rather than expecting Washington to shoulder the entire burden of collective defense.
  • Nuclear deterrence must be reevaluated as a shared burden. NATO’s nuclear umbrella is primarily maintained by the U.S., U.K., and France, while most European nations contribute little to strategic deterrence. As global nuclear dynamics shift, Europe must determine whether it is willing to play a greater role in its own nuclear security. The U.S. should not be expected to bear sole responsibility for extended deterrence while European nations hedge their commitments. NATO must either adopt a more distributed nuclear doctrine or clarify the limits of its deterrence commitments to avoid overreliance on Washington’s strategic arsenal.
  • NATO’s energy dependence threatens its strategic autonomy. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has already weakened NATO’s ability to take decisive action. Even as nations shift to alternative energy sources, vulnerabilities remain. NATO must integrate energy security into its broader strategic planning, ensuring that no member state’s dependence on adversarial suppliers undermines alliance-wide decision-making. Energy resilience should be treated as a core pillar of NATO’s deterrence strategy, as economic coercion is increasingly used as a tool of modern warfare.
  • NATO must modernize beyond conventional deterrence. Future conflicts will be shaped by cyber warfare, economic coercion, AI-driven military operations, and space-based defense, yet NATO remains anchored to outdated frameworks. While the U.S. and China lead in AI-driven defense, Europe significantly lags behind, hindered by regulatory constraints and reliance on American and Taiwanese semiconductors, making the alliance vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and strategic dependencies. AI is already transforming warfare, from autonomous drones to AI-enhanced cyber defense, yet NATO lacks a unified AI strategy, exposing its infrastructure to adversaries rapidly advancing in offensive AI capabilities. China is integrating AI into military command, surveillance, and cyber warfare, while NATO remains structurally outdated. The alliance must rapidly integrate cyber defense, economic warfare countermeasures, and AI-driven military strategies. Establishing cyber warfare task forces, AI-driven intelligence networks, and countermeasures for digital warfare is no longer optional. NATO’s survival depends on whether it can dominate the next frontier of warfare before its adversaries do.
  • NATO must address its cyber vulnerabilities as an existential threat. While cyber operations are already a primary battlefield, NATO has no unified cyber defense force. Member states have individual capabilities, but coordination remains fragmented. NATO must move beyond its current approach and develop a fully integrated cyber command. Cyberattacks on infrastructure, financial systems, and defense networks can be as devastating as conventional warfare, yet NATO’s Article 5 framework does not explicitly account for cyber warfare scenarios. The alliance must adapt its collective defense doctrine to reflect the realities of digital-age conflict.
  • The alliance’s global role must be redefined. NATO was created to counter Soviet expansion, but in the 21st century, does its mission still align with U.S. interests? If NATO is to evolve into a broader security framework that extends into the Indo-Pacific, European members must align their strategic objectives with Washington’s priorities. Otherwise, NATO risks fracturing into a divided coalition of nations pursuing conflicting geopolitical objectives. A security bloc that cannot agree on its core mission will not withstand the pressures of great power competition.

Exploring Alternative Security Arrangements

A recurring counterargument suggests that Europe could form a separate security framework outside of NATO, potentially through a stronger EU defense pillar or a Franco-German-led European security alliance. While these ideas have gained traction, they remain structurally and strategically insufficient.

  • The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative seeks to enhance defense integration, but it lacks a unified military command, nuclear deterrence, or rapid deployment capabilities.
  • A European-only security framework would struggle with political cohesion, as EU nations have vastly different strategic priorities, military capabilities, and threat perceptions.
  • Without NATO, Europe would face greater vulnerabilities, as no alternative framework currently exists that can provide the same level of strategic deterrence, intelligence-sharing, and military integration.
  • Rather than replacing NATO, a stronger European defense pillar should complement it, ensuring that Europe can stand on its own while maintaining transatlantic security ties.

Europe Agrees and Responds with Increased Defense Commitments

In response to calls for greater European responsibility within NATO, European nations are actively enhancing their defense postures through increased spending, collaborative initiatives, and strategic reforms.

Elevated Defense Spending:

  • Commitment to Higher Expenditure: The 23 EU members of NATO are preparing to raise their defense spending targets above the current 2% of GDP, with discussions of reaching 3% or even 5%, acknowledging the need for enhanced defense capabilities. (reuters.com)
  • Germany’s Initiative: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has urged Germany to significantly boost its defense spending and production, emphasizing the necessity of preparing for potential conflicts to maintain peace. (welt.de)

EU Defense Initiatives:

  • Coalition Formation: The EU is considering forming a “coalition of the willing” that includes the UK and Norway to strengthen continental defenses, aiming to address a €500 billion defense funding gap and enhance military capabilities. (ft.com)
  • Strategic Partnerships: UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer is engaging with all 27 EU leaders to discuss defense cooperation, seeking agreements similar to those under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, highlighting the urgency of European defense in light of recent geopolitical events. (theguardian.com)

National Adaptation Efforts:

  • Baltic States’ Commitment: Countries like Lithuania are supporting increased defense spending targets, with Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda backing the call for NATO members to allocate at least 5% of their GDP to defense, citing ongoing regional threats. (apnews.com)

Final Thought ~ NATO’s Crossroads

NATO’s survival depends on its ability to adapt. An alliance that fails to modernize while adversaries refine next-generation warfare is not just ineffective, it is an accelerating liability. A NATO that lacks superiority in cyber, AI, and space warfare is unprepared for modern conflict. A NATO that cannot mobilize forces with speed and precision is incapable of deterrence. A NATO that allows some members to remain fully invested in collective defense while others rely on outdated security guarantees is structurally unsustainable. The world is no longer defined by the Cold War framework that birthed NATO; alliances today must be agile, technologically advanced, and built on shared risk, not passive reliance. NATO must transform into a high-readiness, strategically autonomous force with enforceable burden-sharing, or it will collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.

For the United States, the stakes are even greater. If NATO remains a framework where Washington provides deterrence, carries the operational burden, and funds the majority of military power while key European economies underinvest, then it is no longer an alliance, it is a security subsidy. The question is not whether NATO benefits the U.S., but whether it does so at the expense of America’s ability to address the defining geopolitical challenges of the 21st century. If NATO cannot evolve, Washington must recalibrate its commitments before the alliance becomes a costly distraction at the very moment strategic flexibility is needed most. History is unkind to alliances that refuse to adapt, NATO must choose its future before that choice is made for it.

Counterarguments and Rebuttals

Some argue that NATO remains indispensable as a stabilizing force, that European underinvestment is a result of historical and economic constraints rather than negligence, and that the U.S. benefits from its leadership role in the alliance. While these perspectives acknowledge certain realities, they fail to address the deeper structural issues that threaten NATO’s long-term viability.

“NATO provides the U.S. with strategic power projection and military bases, which justify the costs.”

  • This is true, but at what price? The U.S. already enjoys global power projection through its own vast network of overseas bases. The question is not whether NATO provides advantages but whether the current cost-benefit ratio still makes sense given Europe’s refusal to invest proportionally. The U.S. does not need NATO in its current form, it needs capable, self-reliant allies that contribute equally to deterrence.

“European nations have historical reasons for lower defense spending, such as post-WWII pacifism and economic priorities.”

  • While this context is important, it does not justify a permanent state of military dependence. Germany, for example, has had decades to transition from historical restraint to responsible burden-sharing, yet it still lags behind smaller nations like Poland in defense commitments. Economic prosperity without security is an illusion. Europe cannot expect American military guarantees while choosing to underfund its own survival.

“The U.S. benefits economically from NATO through weapons sales and defense contracts.”

  • While NATO members purchase American weapons, this does not offset the massive U.S. taxpayer-funded military spending that keeps the alliance viable. Selling F-35s and missile systems to allies is economically beneficial, but it is not a substitute for true military burden-sharing. If NATO cannot sustain itself without overwhelming U.S. financial and operational dominance, then it is not a true alliance, it is a strategic dependency.

“Focusing on the 2% GDP target is too simplistic, other contributions (troops, hosting U.S. bases) matter too.”

  • While these contributions are valuable, they do not negate the fundamental issue of underinvestment in combat readiness, modernized weapons, and logistical capabilities. NATO cannot function effectively if some nations send troops but lack the military infrastructure and technological superiority required for high-intensity warfare. Hosting U.S. bases benefits both sides but does not replace the need for Europe to field capable, independent defense forces.

“Europe’s security should be Europe’s choice, if they prioritize economic growth, why should the U.S. force them to rearm?”

  • Security is not an optional investment; it is the foundation upon which economic growth is built. Europe’s choice to underinvest in defense is not made in isolation, it creates vulnerabilities that the U.S. is then forced to compensate for, distorting American strategic priorities. Nations cannot claim sovereignty over their economic policies while outsourcing their security responsibilities to Washington.

“Pushing Europe too hard could lead to a rival European security structure, which might weaken U.S. influence.”

  • A stronger European defense framework does not weaken NATO, it strengthens it. The goal is not to dismantle NATO but to transition toward a structure where Europe plays an equal role in deterrence. A more self-reliant Europe is in America’s interest, it would allow Washington to focus more on China and emerging threats rather than permanently subsidizing European security.

“NATO’s strength is in its unity, and focusing too much on financial contributions risks fracturing the alliance.”

  • True unity is built on shared risk and shared responsibility, not political cohesion alone. An alliance where some nations consistently invest in deterrence while others free-ride does not foster real unity, it fosters resentment and strategic weakness. The only way to preserve NATO is through structural reforms that ensure all members contribute meaningfully to collective security.

“NATO’s role is evolving beyond traditional military deterrence to focus on cyber threats, economic stability, and political cohesion.”

  • While NATO must evolve, it cannot substitute conventional deterrence with soft power alone. Cybersecurity and economic policies matter, but they do not deter Russian military aggression or prepare the alliance for next-generation AI-driven warfare. NATO must modernize its approach without sacrificing hard power readiness.

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Freedom Preetham
Freedom Preetham

Written by Freedom Preetham

AI Research | Math | Genomics | Quantum Physics

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