In Part I and Part II, I described the erosion of trust across the Department of Defense and offered my theory to identify the origin. I also described how leaders in my generation have the skills and opportunity to restore trust across the enterprise to enable innovative and adaptive leaders. This final article in the series provides a framework for requirements (workload) and metrics to correct dangerous errors that led to dishonesty in the Army. We’re doing things because ‘we’ve always done them that way’ and not because it makes any sense. We need to apply a little math and science to our work.

Before we get to potential equations, let’s start with perspective, empathy and expectations. I suffered a rotator cuff injury during CAS3 (an ancient Army course). When I returned to my normal duty station my doctor (a colleague) recommended a steroid shot into my shoulder. I asked how much pain to expect and he replied, “It won’t hurt me a bit!” and laughed hysterically. When leaders task subordinates without an appreciation of the pain, they shouldn’t be surprised when subordinates self-medicate. Drs. Wong and Gerras showed us the drug of choice is dishonesty.

An academically honest requirements framework must consider capacity which depends on resources, infrastructure and processes. I propose a workload management system to define the size of the proverbial dinner plate. The system would limit tasks and protect employees from additional tasks once the plate is full. Leaders create space by completing, delaying or removing existing tasks, and cannot accept tasks unless there’s a space on the plate. This is not wishful thinking. This is prioritization. We need to embrace it, codify it and enforce it. My organization uses a project-based working model. It protects us from major detours but does nothing to reduce random daily and weekly time-vampires.

Some people are extremely competent workaholics capable of carrying five plates while others can’t manage a Fisher-Price saucer. Institutional problems emerge when people who have no business trying to carry five plates attempt this rare feat. These posers dump the excessive workload on subordinates who “review without comment” or report dishonestly. This perpetuates the poser’s illusion of competency. The poser then moves to positions of greater responsibility with a larger pool of subordinates to overwhelm. How is this working out? Is this really the best we can do? What do my kids look like in daylight? What’s it like to have a hobby? Is Outdoor Rec even a thing anymore? Why have I accrued 79 days of leave and why am I in trouble for that, too?

To counter posers, the Army needs to actively limit workload and focus on work quality. It should define the maximum permissible workload based on realistic and non-toxic employee performance of each grade/experience level. Unit manning would drive prioritization and workload volume. A unit of 5 would not bear the same administrative workload of a unit of 200, which currently happens with Unit Status Reports. Every external task should include a labor estimate and a rubric-driven priority level. In 1980, the government established precedence along this line (“burden measure”) for the civilian sector, but chose not to follow its own rules. The Army system would take this concept further by comparing supply to demand, setting off a flag whenever the time demands of a given task exceed the available supply. That flag would force a supervisor to reject/delay the new task or remove/delay an existing task to make room based on priorities dictated by current circumstances.

Like email, supervisors could establish rules to automate certain decisions and the system would send an accepted/denied/delayed message to the task owner. Almost immediately, headquarters staff at all levels would find the amount of rejection unacceptable, but liberating. This process would filter out “fill in the spreadsheet with your unit’s information” taskers which would drop off forever or inspire efficient processes, information systems and cross-talk, allowing units to query databases rather than launch data calls.

The Army could expand or contract available workload based on variables such as “work hours per day” which would be set to 8 for steady-state garrison work. Work hours could be adjusted higher or lower for recovery, morale, major exercises, critical actions or legitimate crises. Expansion beyond 8 hours would necessarily apply to all assigned personnel, forcing (automating) an organizational overtime cost for civilian labor to temper hasty decisions and abusive leaders. This supply/demand/price interaction is ECON101 stuff.

Units could also influence workload by investing in efficient processes, software and data systems. Any step that consumes time without adding value would quickly be eliminated. At a previous assignment, a Gantt chart exercise showed my staff of three required 14 additional people to meet a project timeline, assuming everything went as planned. Faced with reality, the organization could assign more people to the project, cancel the project, invest in more efficient systems or push the timeline to the right. The project timeline moved so far to the right that it was eventually cancelled.

Once the Army defines the maximum acceptable workload, units would fill the white space with METL tasks (training, execution and evaluation). In the remaining space, the Army would allocate “Organizationally Prioritized Training (OPT)”. HQ DA would choose one OPT topic each year to address a recognized, total-force, evidence-based shortcoming. Corps level headquarters would choose two and Division level headquarters would choose three. All remaining white space belongs to Brigade (or equivalent) level units to dictate or allocate to lower units as appropriate.

None of the OPT topics or content would be pre-defined, meaning Soldiers wouldn’t sit through EEO training just because an EEO program exists. They would sit through EEO training because the command identified an evidence-based shortcoming and developed tailored content to address the shortcoming. EEO programs would be expanded or eliminated using evidence-based metrics. This approach applies to all programs. Soldiers will no longer passively aggressively select “chase after the guy who stole your Blackberry” even though they know it’s the wrong answer because they’ve done the same training five times already. Soldiers will hear something new about Information Assurance for a change, and then only if there’s an evidence-based shortcoming. The OPT program would encourage units to train people efficiently. A unit OPORD could include a human trafficking or OPSEC scenario, or both, to raise awareness and address evidence-based shortcomings rather than test Soldier mouse-clicking speed. This model limits the number of 10,000 foot screwdrivers to just six and encourages units to tailor training based on shortcomings.

The term mandatory training should become a regrettable historical footnote, forever linked to the overly directive and controlling Boxer environment. It’s difficult to adequately describe the bitter, cynical and self-serving message today’s mandatory training trackers send. They are error-prone and represent a check-the-block, results don’t matter as long as the numbers look good, CYA approach typically associated with toxic leadership. Training compliance provides no measure of effectiveness; it only measures the ability to comply or lie. The Army must shun compliance tracking and embrace effectiveness measures including appropriate cost considerations. Success comes from beating a comparable standard or meeting/exceeding some target at an acceptable cost, based on trend and incident analysis. The Army must measure impact, not effort. In other words, the Army must measure the shade.

The best way to measure the effectiveness of proficiency training is through demonstrated performance (target practice, for example). Generalized deficiencies, however, should be identified by the incidence (occurrence rate of new cases) rate for a given population/unit. Training effectiveness to correct generalized deficiencies should be based on the change in incidence following training. We are unnecessarily burdened by the Boxer model that mandates and measures training frequency without evidence to support the deficiency for a given population and without a measurement of training effectiveness. This flawed model consumes valuable resources and comes with an unacceptable opportunity cost, especially as military budgets and end strength shrink.

If you’re still reading, you’re smart enough to understand this last part on metrics without an in-depth explanation. An appropriate deficiency/training effectiveness metric might be the incidence (per 10000 Soldiers) of EEO complaints or substantiated EEO complaints compared to the Army, DOD or demographically matched (age, gender) civilian population. One metric might be a unit’s incidence of Information Assurance breaches compared to the Army, DOD or federal government rate. Another metric might be a unit’s incidence of motor vehicle accidents compared to the Army, DOD, or demographically (age, gender, locale) matched civilian population. Others might be a unit’s incidence of sexual harassment complaints, or substantiated sexual harassment complaints, or sexual assault claims, or sexual assault prosecutions, or sexual assault convictions, or cold weather injuries, or summer grill fiascos, or urinalysis failures, or suicide attempts, or suicides, or confirmed CBRNE exposures, or financial crimes, or civilian personnel rating system infractions, or suspected terrorism links, or ethics violations, or hostage situations (SERE), or fraternization cases — each compared to an appropriate standard. Using incident metrics, training can be tailored and evaluated appropriately.

The erosion of trust and prevalence of dishonesty across the Department of Defense are deep wounds that require more than a Band-Aid and an encouraging pat on the back to heal. We can restore trust by providing more autonomy to leaders at the lowest levels, assigning realistic workload, directing deficiency training only when indicated and measuring effectiveness rather than compliance. These changes will allow future leaders the space required to foster innovation. Measuring effectiveness will help the Army choose better leaders. Toxic leaders thrive in a compliance-state and self-destruct when key measures depend on effectiveness. Effectiveness measures require leaders to BE GOOD not just look good.

You can do your part by effecting and supporting smart change and rejecting flawed policy, metrics and effort. Soldiers and civilians can provide valuable feedback during after action reviews and on command surveys to tell leaders how to make the Army better. At every level, Soldiers and civilians can influence policy by sending a DA Form 2028 directly to the policy proponent listed in the front of the publication. When you recommended a change, you’ll have to include a reason. My default reason will be: “Current policy is inefficient and does not support the Army Operating Concept (TRADOC Pam 525–3–1). This change is required to enable innovative and adaptive leaders.”

Let the healing begin.