Why the Boeing’s X-32 Lost the JSF Competition
A missed opportunity for the company
by William Markowitz [SYST0660, 21 March 2024, v1]
1 Executive Summary
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was an initiative to create a multi-role, multi-service fighter aircraft. Two companies were selected to create prototypes: Lockheed-Martin and Boeing. Lockheed’s X-35 eventually won the competition over Boeing’s X-32. The X-32 showcased many advanced capabilities and had several successes during the JSF demonstration phase but ultimately lacked in several significant capability demonstrations versus the X-35. And, anecdotally, the X-32 had been created as a showcase of Boeing’s potential capabilities available for the JSF and was therefore different than the offering for production, while the winning X-35 was designed as the production prototype for the JSF.
This paper will describe the successes and failures of the X-32 in the context of several of the INCOSE Systems Engineering processes that directly affected the X-32’s development and subsequent loss in the competition.
2 Introduction
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the US Department of Defense’s most expensive weapons system program. As of April 2022, the estimated program cost is over $1.7 trillion to buy, operate, and sustain.[1] This would have been a significant part of the Boeing business base had they won the competition and been awarded the production contract.
The Boeing entry into the JSF competition was the X-32. It was intended to showcase Boeing’s advanced technologies in fighter aircraft design and development, though it was ultimately remembered more for its ungainly appearance than its capabilities. Figure 1 shows the X-32.
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines a set of processes describing systems engineering processes and activities on any project intended to formalize the design, development, testing, and use of the target system to ensure the system meets the needs of the stakeholders. The decisions behind some of the program directions, successes, and failures of the X-32 during the JSF competition will be examined in the context of several of these systems engineering processes.
3 X-32 Origins: The Joint Strike Fighter Competition
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program originated from the merger of two advanced fighter aircraft development programs in the early to mid-1990s, the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) and the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) projects. The CALF was a joint Air Force-Marines program intended to produce a replacement for the F-16 as well as provide the Marines with a short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) capability. The JAST was intended to develop a single family of aircraft to replace several disparate US and UK aircraft. In 1994 Congress ordered these two programs to merge into the single Joint Strike Fighter program.[3],[4] The original potential market for JSF aircraft was estimated at 5,000–8,000 aircraft worth over $200 billion, including potential export orders.[5]
3.1 JSF Requirements
This process was initiated by some basic needs of each service:[6]
• Navy: A first-day-of-the-war, survivable strike fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F
• Air Force: A multirole aircraft (primary air-to-ground) to replace the F-16 and A-10 and to complement the F-22
• Marine Corps: A STOVL aircraft to replace the AV-8B and the USMC F/A-18
• United Kingdom Royal Navy: A STOVL aircraft to replace the Sea Harrier.
The fundamental program requirements of the JSF demonstration program were for the contractors to develop an aircraft that would demonstrate the following:[7]
1. Conventional take-off and landing, per US Air Force
2. Carrier take-off and landing, per US Navy
3. Short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL), per US Marine Corps and British Royal Navy
4. Ground demonstration of a production representative aircraft.
Each service produced requirements for sortie rate, flight handling characteristics, range, payload, low observable characteristics, logistics footprint, and target costs. The JSF was expected to operate as part of current and future multi-service ‘system of systems’ information networks. The program also set requirements for some of the required support systems, such as training systems and avionics.[8]
3.2 JSF Stakeholders
A stakeholder is an individual or entity with a right, share, or claim to a system and its characteristics that meet the respective needs and expectations[9]. As a large, complex, multi-service weapons system there are a large number of stakeholders in the JSF. Considerations for these stakeholder needs drive much of the system design.
The following organizations were the major stakeholders of the JSF program:
• US Air Force
• US Navy
• US Marine Corps
• UK Royal Navy
In addition, there were individuals and groups of individuals within these entities that were also stakeholders in the program. These individuals and groups would operate, support, or rely on the aircraft in the performance of their duties:
• Pilots
• Maintainers
• Logisticians
• Mission Planners/Commanders
• Mission Analysts
Each service has its own set of the stakeholders listed. Each service also has different processes and requirements for performing tasks requiring weapons and logistics systems, further complicating the requirements that were flowed down to the JSF aircraft and support systems.
• Contractors: Boeing, Lockheed, and their subcontractors, suppliers
Each of the two teams creating the aircraft also had interests in decisions made about how both the aircraft, its supporting systems, and the business case contract evolved and their eventual resolution.
3.3 JSF Environment
The JSF aircraft was required to operate in a very broad range of physical environments[10],[11]. It was required to perform both day and night in adverse weather conditions, at altitudes ranging from near zero to 50,000 feet. It was required to operate from airfields in a variety of environments: desert (hot/dry/dusty), jungle (hot/humid), and arctic (cold). It was also required to operate from aircraft carriers, where humidity and salt-fog conditions have detrimental effects on complex equipment.
Furthermore, carrier flight operations impose significant environmental requirements for aircraft. Navy aircraft carriers drove requirements for catapult take-offs and arresting gear landings; resistance to extreme shock and mechanical stress of these operations must be designed into all components at all levels. The UK and Marine Corps LHD carriers contained short decks but no launch or arresting gear; this is a different but likewise extreme environment for an aircraft, driving a significant part of the aircraft design.
In addition to these physical environments, the JSF aircraft as a system was required to operate in a virtual environment. The JSF aircraft sensors and communications systems must interoperate with other military communications networks and databases. As an example of this, Figure 2 shows a high-level system overview of the ‘JSF Virtual Strike Warfare Environment’, a virtual modeling environment. This environment was used to explore how the JSF would participate in multi-service operations as well as to develop enhanced operational concepts for the aircraft’s use. The aircraft operated in this virtual environment both as an individual weapon system as well as part of a larger force encompassing multiple weapons, sensors, communications systems, and missions over several services.[12]
3.4 Demonstration Aircraft Contract Award
Studies supporting the program were submitted by four aerospace companies: Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, McDonnell-Douglas, and Northrop. In November 1996 contracts were awarded to Boeing and Lockheed-Martin. Both companies were given $750M to produce two demonstration aircraft and were prevented from using their own money to finance development. This limitation promoted the adoption of low-cost manufacturing and assembly techniques and prevented companies from bankrupting themselves.[14] Rather than a ‘fly off’ each team was to develop and conduct separate testing regimes to demonstrate capabilities that would support their production proposals.
Boeing’s aircraft was designated ‘X-32’ while Lockheed Martin’s aircraft was designated ‘X-35’.
4 X-32 Design
Several INCOSE systems engineering processes describe architecture development, system design, and the reuse of accumulated knowledge. Boeing utilized methods and practices to implement these processes for developing new designs and reusing existing company knowledge.
Much of Boeing’s cost-saving strategy was centered around design reuse. Boeing had previously proposed a supersonic fighter with a gravity-reducing engine utilizing vector-pushing nozzles in the 1960s, but no information on that program was publicly released beyond images published in Aviation Week.[16] However, Boeing had been doing work in the field of advanced supersonic fighter aircraft and technologies since then. In a 2003 interview, the X-32 chief test pilot recalled that the initial X-32 design was a derivative of a stealthy aircraft concept from a secret ‘black’ program that Boeing had in their portfolio.[17] Additionally, Boeing leveraged handling qualities and control laws used in the F-18 fighter[18]. And Boeing leveraged robust aircraft manufacturing capabilities. These would be a key strategy in the X-32 production proposal.
Another aspect of Boeing’s design strategy was to lower manufacturing g costs by minimizing differences between aircraft variants. Therefore, all variants of the plane were designed around a one-piece carbon fiber composite wing, designed as a thick delta wing for good flight performance and a large fuel capacity for a long range.[19] An additional cost-competitive strategy of reuse led Boeing to choose a direct traction thrust vectoring system for STOVL[20]. These decisions drove much of the design of the aircraft: location of engine and exhausts, cockpit location, wide fuselage, and the large intake.[21]
The program decided to make two different demonstrator aircraft. The X-32A performed the roles of conventional take-off and landing as well as carrier-based takeoff and landing. The X-32B was the STOVL version. Figure 4 shows the two X-32 aircraft.
This approach meant that while the two X-32s would showcase Boeing’s capabilities, each aircraft would not be representative of a production prototype. The proposed production aircraft would incorporate features demonstrated by the X-32 while correcting any issues and addressing upgrades but would be different from the demonstrator aircraft. Figure 5 shows illustrations of the proposed production JSF aircraft as well as the production-representative ground test model, in which some differences from the X-32 are visible.
One example of this difference between the X-32 and the proposed aircraft is the wing and tail. The Navy refined maneuverability and payload requirements and the delta wing design fell short of the new performance targets. The X-32 design process was too far along to change, but the original design was judged sufficient to demonstrate the capabilities and technology.[25] This was of several aspects of the proposed system that were different than the demonstrated one.
5 Verification: X-32 Demonstration and Test
The INCOSE Verification process provides objective evidence that a system or system element fulfills its specified requirements and characteristics.[26] This is the process dealing with demonstrating system capabilities and substantiating the aircraft’s performance against requirements. Verification activities perform demonstration and test of the system and answer the question ‘Was the system built right?’
The separate testing regimes allowed both teams to tailor the test programs to show off their respective capabilities in the best light. Boeing’s flight testing started well, with 80% of planned test points accomplished on the first flight. Additionally, the F-18 chase plane reported having to use “lots of afterburner” to keep up, highlighting the X-32’s impressive cruising speed and flight performance.[27] In a 2003 interview, the X-32’s chief test pilot recalls how well the aircraft handled: “They had leveraged F-18 handling qualities and control laws extensively for the X-32….I would take that aircraft to the ship tomorrow.”[28]
However, while meeting or exceeding test objectives during the verification of conventional and carrier-based operations, the X-32 had some performance issues during the verification of the STOVL capabilities. First, the STOVL design caused hot air from the exhaust to be recirculated into the intake, weakening thrust and leading to overheating issues. To correct for this, the X-32B test environment was changed; testing was moved from Edwards AFB to Patuxent River NAS, where the air was thicker and the plane could produce sufficient thrust.[30]
Second, the heavy delta wing design required that STOVL and supersonic flight demonstrations had to be separate, with parts removed for STOVL (maintenance action). Boeing promised that this would not be an issue with the conventional tail design proposed for the production version.[31]
These issues and the lengths Boeing had to go to correct for them marred an otherwise successful demonstration of Boeing’s capabilities.
6 Validation
Validation is the INCOSE process that provides objective evidence that the system, when in use, fulfills its business or mission objectives and stakeholder requirements, achieving its intended use in its intended operational environment.[32] This process answers the question ‘Is this the right system?’ It requires interaction with and feedback from the customer and stakeholders.
The X-32 met all objectives as a technology demonstrator program, showing the capabilities and technologies that could be brought to bear during the Production phase of the program. This was the original goal of the program’s Demonstration phase, where design updates as well as any issues shown by the demonstrator aircraft would be corrected in the final production design. However, there were significant areas where the X-32 failed validation, namely when the validation activities compared the performance of the X-32 against the X-35.
6.1 Validation: Comparing X-32 and X-35
Figure 7 shows the two JSF demonstration aircraft: the Boeing X-32 at left, and the Lockheed-Martin X-35 at right.
The Validation process asks ‘Is this the right system?’ but in a competition, another aspect of this process is to ask ‘Which of these systems is more right?’. The verification process in the JSF program involved the comparison of X-32 performance against program needs and objectives, but it also compared this against the performance of the competing system, the X-35. This is one of the X-32’s shortcomings: while the X-32 achieved its stated program objectives it was found inferior in several areas when compared against the X-35.
First, to demonstrate STOVL capabilities, the X-32 required a change of operating environment from Edwards AFB to Patuxent River NAS. Then STOVL and supersonic flight demos had to be separate, with maintenance action required to remove parts for STOVL. Meanwhile, the Lockheed-Martin X-35 demonstrated vertical takeoff, supersonic flight, then vertical landing, all in one flight. No ‘maintenance actions’ or change of environment was required.[34]
Additionally, the X-32 STOVL was a vectored-thrust direct lift approach. The X-35 design used a remote shaft-driven fan. This design was far more complex and considered riskier than the direct lift design. However, it generated more lift and promised greater payload and longer range for the X-35, and was judged superior.[35]
Finally, the fact that the X-32 demonstrated something different than the proposed design was viewed negatively by the customers.[36] The X-32 was a platform to demonstrate capabilities, with Boeing promising to remedy the shortcomings in a different production aircraft. The X-35, on the other hand, was much more of a JSF prototype, very close to the proposed design.
6.2 Aesthetics as an Emergent Property
The concept of emergence refers to behavior that is meaningful only when attributed to the whole system entity, not to its parts.[37] For the X-32, the emergent property, and the one that the aircraft is best remembered for, is its appearance: the X-32 does not look light a traditional fighter. An Internet search of the phrase ‘World’s Ugliest Aircraft’ along with ‘X-32’ yields over one hundred results. Figure 8 shows examples of some of the images that were circulated making light of the aircraft’s ‘goofy’ appearance.
Form followed function in the design of the X-32: the requirements drove the use of a wide body, blunt nose, and very large chin-mounted intake. The results were that the X-32 was not an aesthetically pleasing or typical fighter-looking aircraft. By comparison, the X-35 resembled the Lockheed F-22 Raptor and looked more like a fighter. The X-35 was given the nickname ‘Panther’. The X-32, on the other hand, was given the nickname ‘Monica’, referring to the White House intern who was involved in a scandal with President Bill Clinton. And on one of many discussion groups about this topic one pilot posted that “there would have been a pilot mutiny if Air Force brass had embraced the Vomiting Frog over Panther.”[40]
There were no requirements in the program for appearance and no data or records on how appearance factored into the program evaluation. Boeing knew they had a problem with the aircraft’s appearance and said ‘You’re taking it to war, not to the senior prom.’[41] Much of the aircraft’s appearance was remedied in the proposal, where the chin-mounted intake is less prominent in aircraft illustrations. (Refer to Figure 5) However many felt that appearance did play a role in program selection, unofficially. From one of the pilot forums: “I looked at them. Without knowing anything about them, I knew, I knew the Lockheed would win. Hands. down. End of discussion.”[42] It is unknown if sentiments like this prejudiced the selection process but at the least they indicate potential issues for Boeing during the Validation process.
The Validation process involves feedback from stakeholders. This is the main area where Boeing’s X-32 program fell short. It is possible that had Boeing performed the Validation process earlier and much more extensively they could have pulled more advanced capabilities slated for the production phase of the program into the demonstrator aircraft. This could have remedied some of the performance problems in the Verification phase of the program as compared to the X-35. And by incorporating production features Boeing could have possibly minimized or alleviated some of the issues and concerns with the plane’s appearance.
7 Conclusion
The contract for Joint Strike Fighter System Development and Demonstration was awarded on 26 October 2001 to Lockheed Martin.[43] The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program remains DOD’s most expensive weapon system program. It is estimated to cost over $1.7 trillion to buy, operate, and sustain. (Publicly Released: Apr 25, 2022).[44] To date, Lockheed has built over 1000 aircraft for multiple US services, as well as multiple countries, in addition to training equipment and support services.[45] Meanwhile, the X-32 aircraft are relics; the X-32A is in the Wright Patterson Air Force Museum, and the X-32B is in the Patuxent River Naval Air Museum. Nevertheless, this program was considered to be a strategic investment by Boeing. Through this program, Boeing improved design and manufacturing methods as well as advancements in stealth technology. Boeing applied some of these advancements to other programs such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the X-45A Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).[46]
The X-35 performed better during Verification than the X-32 in the demonstrations related to STOVL capabilities. Additionally, the X-35 was very close to the proposed Lockheed JSF prototype, while the X-32 demonstrated something different than Boeing’s proposed JSF design. Both aircraft met the program’s requirements and objectives, but the X-35 was judged superior in technology and performance. And, while the X-32 was a showcase of Boeing’s potential JSF capabilities the X-35 was Lockheed’s JSF production prototype. Finally, while the X-32’s appearance should have played no official part in the evaluation it is possible that it prejudiced the evaluators.
Boeing’s use of system engineering processes helped them to create a design to achieve program performance objectives. But had Boeing put less emphasis on the cost-savings and geared the demonstration aircraft more toward production versions from the beginning, as well as putting more emphasis on the Validation process’ feedback activities earlier and more often, the X-32 might have been a more capable, more attractive aircraft. In a 2003 interview, the X-32 chief test pilot stated that “had Boeing put forward a more refined design from the beginning, it’s possible that the Joint Strike Fighter competition might have gone differently.”[48]
References
[1] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105128
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[3] Steidle, Craig E. ‘The Joint Strike Fighter Program’, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol 18, №1 (1997), pg 6. https://studylib.net/doc/14308552/t-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-craig-e.-steidle
[4] Petrescu, Relly Victoria Virgil. ‘About Boeing X-32’, Journal of Aircraft and Spacecraft Technology 2019, pg 41. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3417339
[5] https://www.aerotechnews.com/blog/2021/07/29/boeing-x-32-versus-lockheed-martin-x-35-battle-of-the-x-planes/
[6] Steidle, Craig E. ‘The Joint Strike Fighter Program’, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol 18, №1 (1997), pg 7. https://studylib.net/doc/14308552/t-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-craig-e.-steidle
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-32
[8] Steidle, Craig E. ‘The Joint Strike Fighter Program’, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol 18, №1 (1997), pg 9–13. https://studylib.net/doc/14308552/t-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-craig-e.-steidle
[9] INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, 4th ed. Wiley & Sons, 2015, pg 265.
[10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-32
[11] Steidle, Craig E. ‘The Joint Strike Fighter Program’, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol 18, №1 (1997), pg 9–13. https://studylib.net/doc/14308552/t-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-craig-e.-steidle
[12] Adagio, F., Lawler, J. ‘National Joint Strike Fighter: Visualization and Mapping Data Within the Virtual Strike Warfare Environments’, Proceedings of the Vector Moving Map Symposium, 3–4 Aug 1999. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA531171.pdf
[13] Steidle, Craig E. ‘The Joint Strike Fighter Program’, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Vol 18, №1 (1997), pg 11. https://studylib.net/doc/14308552/t-the-joint-strike-fighter-program-craig-e.-steidle
[14] Petrescu, Relly Victoria Virgil. ‘About Boeing X-32’, Journal of Aircraft and Spacecraft Technology 2019, pg 41. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3417339
[15] https://aviationhumor.net/the-joint-strike-fighters-program-history/
[16] Petrescu, Relly Victoria Virgil. ‘About Boeing X-32’, Journal of Aircraft and Spacecraft Technology 2019, pg 39. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3417339
[17] https://www.twz.com/44157/test-pilot-explains-why-the-x-32-lost-to-what-became-the-f-35
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[19] https://www.eaa.org/eaa/news-and-publications/eaa-news-and-aviation-news/bits-and-pieces-newsletter/03-09-2015-aviation-words-angle-of-attack-aoa-alpha#:~:text=The%20angle%2C%20alpha%2C%20is%20measured,but%20then%20so%20does%20drag
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[32] INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, 4th ed. Wiley & Sons, 2015. pp 89.
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[34] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-32
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[37] Guide to the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBoK), ver 2.9, 20Nov2023, pg 96. www.sebokwiki.org.
[38] https://i.imgur.com/3ju8arH.jpg
[39] https://www.deviantart.com/vinni-pooh/art/Smiling-Boeing-X-32-JSF-475017517
[40] https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-x-32-was-nicknamed-monica-why-because-shes-got-a-big-mouth-shes-ugly-andshe-ss-like-a-certain-white-house-intern-who-was-famous-for-her-oratory/
[41] https://www.twz.com/44157/test-pilot-explains-why-the-x-32-lost-to-what-became-the-f-35
[42] https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-x-32-was-nicknamed-monica-why-because-shes-got-a-big-mouth-shes-ugly-andshe-ss-like-a-certain-white-house-intern-who-was-famous-for-her-oratory/
[43] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_X-32
[44] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105128
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[46] https://planehistoria.com/boeing-x-32/
[47] https://planehistoria.com/boeing-x-32/
[48] https://www.twz.com/44157/test-pilot-explains-why-the-x-32-lost-to-what-became-the-f-35
