India-US Relationship: The Dynamics and Making of a Global Strategic Partnership

Romit Bhattacharjee
The Thinking Press
Published in
20 min readFeb 1, 2020

“India-U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a “global strategic partnership”, based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues.” But what triggered the relationship to develop unto this extent? According to history, Indi-US were never very close allies but in today’s context they have close relations. The emphasis placed by the Government in India on development and good governance has created opportunity to reinvigorate bilateral ties and enhance cooperation under the motto — — “Chalein Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go”, and “Sanjha Prayas, Sab ka Vikas”(Shared Effort, Progress for All) adopted during the first two summits of Prime Minister Modi and President Obama in September 2014 and January 2015 respectively. The summit level joint statement issued in June 2016 called the India-U.S. relationship an “Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century”.

This research paper attempts at exploring how the bilateral relations developed, how both the countries have strategic and economic interests in different sectors and what programmes and summits they have held together for keeping strong bonds. This also critically examines the approach of the current Indian Government toward keeping relations by efforts in counter-terrorism, economic assistance and various other agendas.

Relationship during the Cold War

The Beginning

It was just a matter of two years that India had got its independence, and it had made its proclamation of observing a neutral disposition in the developing Cold War between United States and its allies and Soviet Union of Russia. India strengthened its stance by further playing an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement[1]. This proclamation was preceded by Jawaharlal Nehru’s visit to USA for a multi-week program with the then US President Harry S. Truman. This visit and the formal proclamation of neutrality set a tone for the US-India relations and also amity between Delhi and Moscow[2]. Subsequently President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959 visited India and addressed the Parliament. The first form of military aid came during the India-China war of 1962. Nehru wrote to president Kennedy and eventually Washington extended its support to India with air assistance and arms[3]. USA also chalked out the discussion in which McMahon Line[4] was recognized as the border. The relations between India and US continued to be harmonious until the India-Pakistan War of 1965.

Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim state became a part of India, Pakistan continued to believe that the state rightfully belonged to them. Hostilities intensified as the Pakistani army tried to take control over Kashmir by force in August 1965. Both the forces engaged in military clashes across the border. The attempt by Pakistan was unsuccessful and the war reached a stalemate[5]. The global ongoing Cold War came into play this time affecting politics in this region. US Officials regarded Indian leadership with caution due to India’s leadership in the NAM and its prominent role in the Bandung Conference in 1950[6]. But after India’s considerable loss against China in the War of 1962, USA was motivated in providing military supplies to India. But India after the clash joined hands with USSR, which did not go down well with the Western power bloc and India-US relations but still kept on providing considerable amount of help throughout the 1960s and 70s. But the India-USSR ties led the shift towards a USA-Pakistan relationship which was much more consolidated and consistently positive. US regarded Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state and appreciated Pakistan for joining SEATO[7] in 1954 and The Baghdad Pact 1955 (now known as CENTO)[8]. Although gathering appraisal, Pakistan’s real object was to develop its military and defensive capabilities which were weaker to India’s.[9] After Kashmir was invaded, India moved the UN to internationalize the regional dispute. The UNSC passed resolutions to US and UK to cut down arms supplies to both the belligerents.[10]

Further degradation of the India-US Relations; CTBT, Non-proliferation and India’s intimate relations with Russia

The dispute over Kashmir and correlating tensions went up and down resulting in further US concern over South-Asia. More stress was laid in the prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.[11] The US Congress had already sparked interests in this region as it had previously imposed sanctions on India restricting it from undertaking any kind of nuclear research and development activities. Moreover India too imposed a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. US for further assurance set up CIA as a watchdog over the Indian territory. India and Pakistan continued to ignore US and international pressure to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[12]. Pakistan maintained its position, “to sign the CTBT only if India agrees to sign it first”.[13]

In spite of that, India on May 1998, conducted a total of five underground nuclear tests, breaking a 24 year-old self-imposed moratorium. Pakistan followed claiming six tests in the very same month. These unannounced tests attracted heavy criticisms. It came as a terrible setback for the decades of non-proliferation efforts in South Asia initiated by the USA. On May 13th 1998, President Clinton imposed heavy military and economic sanctions on India for conducting nuclear tests invoking Section 102 of the Arms Control Act. Some effects of the sanctions included: termination of $21 million in FY1998 as economic development assistance, postponement of $1.7 billion in lending by the International Financial Institutions, as supported by the Group of 8 (G-8)[14], prohibition of loans or credits from US banks to the Government of India, and termination of Foreign Military Sales under the Arms Export Control Act[15].

In the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the ties between India and USA worsened. The Soviet Union sympathised with the East Pakistanis and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini’s foray against Pakistan during the war. To have a broader view on the matter, it was an attempt in recognizing East Pakistan’s success as Independent Bangladesh to weaken the position of its rivals — USA and China. The Soviet assured India that if a confrontation with US or China developed, it would take counter measures. This is when the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation came into existence. By November 1971, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan Alexei Rodionov warned Pakistan by a secretive message, “it will be embarking on a suicidal course if it escalates tensions in the subcontinent”.[16]

The United States on the other hand extended all kinds of support possible to Pakistan: moral, political, economical and material. US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger just denied any kind of talks of persuasion. The US administration had an impression that Pakistani help was required to stop the Soviet influence in South Asia which was gaining dominance in the form of an alliance with India. Pakistan had close formal relations with USA and People’s Republic of China throughout the Cold War. Nixon had already apprehended that an Indian invasion of Pakistan meant total Soviet domination of the region. The global position of United States was under a threat of being undermined along with the regional position of its tactical ally, China. So Nixon encouraged and appealed to Jordan and Iran to send military supplies to Pakistan, while encouraging China to keep increasing arms supplies to Pakistan. He had given Pakistan such a prime position that his administration absolutely ignored reports of genocidal activities meted out to the natives in East Pakistan. This received widespread global criticism but Nixon remained focused in the retention of interests in the subcontinent.[17]

Nixon deployed Task Force-74 led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal when a Pakistani defeat in the eastern sector seemed inevitable[18]. To garner further support UK too deployed an aircraft carrier HMS Eagle in the Bay[19]. As a counter move to that, Soviet Navy too dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers from Vladivostok. They trailed the US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean . They also stationed a nuclear submarine to ward off the threat posed by The Enterprise. Finally, when it was apparent that India was going to disintegrate and invade Pakistan in a matter of weeks, Nixon spoke to the USSR Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev[20] and urged Brezhnev to restrain India from doing so and understand its responsibility. Post war, India emerged as a dominant player in South Asia and United States too accepted the new balance of power.[21] USA engaged in strengthening bilateral relations with India for the near future.

The relationship between Soviet Russia and India continued to be better as time progressed. Throughout the 1980s, the USSR helped in building India’s military prowess by supplying arms and providing military assistance. This military relationship of many decades has been inherited by the present day Russian Federation as well. Russia still remains the top arms supplier for India with a stake as high as 68%.[22] The Mikoyan-Gurevich Fighter Jets popularly known as MiG-21 which still remains one of the most appraised commissioned was given to India by Russia. India’s Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also made a couple of visits to Russia during his tenure to strengthen the bond of bilateral ties further. This mutual affection for each other between India-USSR automatically rendered US as a not-so-important ally during the course of those years. Hence the relationship between US and India never really got a scope to bloom during that time.

Relationship post the Cold War

Improvement in Relations post 9/11;war on Terrorism

In the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, India took an unprecedented step of offering the United States all co-operation and the use of India’s bases for war on terrorism. This offer brought about sea changes in the existing India-US relations which was mucked in around four decades of political instability during the Cold War. This marked improvement in bilateral ties starting from the Clinton administration and acceded by Bush with a strong emphasis in mutual counter terrorism measures. In 2001, the US-India Counter Terrorism Working Group met to discuss about measures against Taliban-fostered terrorism. In the next meeting in 2002, the Working Group discussed additionally on cross-border terrorism and cyberterrorism. In the next meeting both the countries discussed diverse topics ranging from counterterrorism to regional security; space and scientific collaboration; civilian nuclear safety and broadened nuclear ties[1].US and India started sharing best practices and information with each other through coordinated programs, military exercises and a myriad of other interactions at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

The counterterrorism group also initiated discussions between US Technology Support Working Group and its Indian counterpart on India’s needs, including but not limited to counterterrorism equipment and technology tools, necessary for enhancing border management. One more important initiative — established after the 9/11 attacks — was the U.S.-India Cyber Security Forum, which held its first meeting at New Delhi in April 2002, and the second at Washington, DC, in November, 2004. The first meeting of the U.S.-India Cyber Security Forum recognized the increasing interdependency between India and the United States in the information technology arena.[2]

After the 26/11 attacks in the city of Mumbai in India, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in support of India urged Pakistan to arrest all the suspects and perpetrators and destroy all terrorist settlements of the country as a measure to keep the ties intact between India and Pakistan.[3] India and the United States signed the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) in July 2010 in order to deepen collaborative efforts, and intensify exchanges. This agreement is reflective of the determined effort made by the two governments towards combating terrorism and ensuring the citizens’ security. These efforts included the exchange of law enforcement practices, reciprocal visits of senior-level officials to discuss lessons learned, the conduction of joint military training exercises, and the joining of forces in the international community on key counterterrorism issues. The Indian government was granted access to David Headley, an American national who confessed to participating in planning the 26/11, 2008 Mumbai terror attack . Apart from this investigation, assistance was also provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel in the 2006 Mumbai bombing attack and the 26/11, 2008, terror attack.[4]

In November 2010, a Homeland Security Dialogue was inaugurated by President Obama during his India visit to further deepen operational cooperation, counterterrorism technology transfers and capacity building. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano subsequently travelled to India in mid-2011 and met with then Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram, as well as representatives of private industry, in an effort to promote bilateral counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation. Another round of this dialogue was held in May 2013, with six sub-groups steering cooperation in specific areas. Agency to agency engagements are being fostered on a wide array of relevant issues, including counternarcotic, counterfeit currency, illicit financing and transnational crime, infrastructure security, transportation and trade, coastal security, and large-city policing. In 2015,police commissioners from India paid a visit to the United States to learn the practices of megacity policing.[5]

India-US Nuclear Deal

The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India is known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspection..0s) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India’s first nuclear test in 1974.[6]

The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement. The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by the U.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. The agreement will also help India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.[7]

After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007, it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India from the communist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance. The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections by some parties. The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be “consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act”. The bill was signed on October 8, 2008. The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India’s “de facto” status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India arguing that it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework by formally recognizing India’s strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The reaction in the U.S. led academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously refusing to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[8]

In India, the proponents of the agreement cite economic considerations as one of the topmost factors in their support of the agreement. Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India’s economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share. It is India’s stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,780 MWe to 20,000 MWe by 2020. India’s parliament passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages bill on August 25, 2010, which allows the operator to sue the supplier in case of an accident due to technical defects in the plant.[9]

On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi. But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the U.S. President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India’s concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement. US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8. The new law, called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries. The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.[10]

Contribution of the Modi administration in retaining bilateral relations with the USA

As soon as Narendra Modi of the NDA took charge as the Prime Minister of India he visited United States to hold strategic talks with President Barrack Obama and members of US Congress in September 2014. He also reached out to the captains of US commerce and industry, the American Civil Society and the think-tanks. A statement of future vision and relations was also issued. In exchange of this visit, President Obama got hosted by his Indian counterpart as a Chief Guest in India’s Republic Day. A Delhi Declaration of Friendship was issued on the occasion. A Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region was also adopted. In January 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry led the U.S. delegation to the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in Ahmedabad. Modi again visited the US to have another round of bilateral talks but this time also with businesspersons, media personnel, academicians and potential leaders of the Silicon Valley. In 2016, Modi again visited USA to be a part of a multilateral Nuclear Security Summit on 31st March-1st April. It was a pledge for security of nuclear materials as a priority and prevent nuclear terrorism. In the same year, Donald Trump was elected as the President of US. As soon as he assumed charge, he had a number of telephonic conversations with Modi intending to have dialogues in the future.[11]

Throughout the course of the next fifteen months, a number of bilateral tri-force drills took place, and a few economic summits happened between the two nations. A hefty amount of FDI was also drained into the Indian economy by the US. In 2017, the high-level exchanges have continued. Minister of State(I/C) Petroleum & Natural Gas Shri Dharmendra Pradhan visited Houston and Washington DC in Marchand met US Energy Secretary Mr. Rick Perry. Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley visited the U.S. in April for the IMF-WB meeting and met with his U.S. counterpart. National Security Adviser and Foreign Secretary have visited the U.S. in March and interacted with a wide cross-section of top U.S. policymakers. From the U.S. side, NSA H.R. McMaster visited India in April.[12]

Indo-US relationship made great strides in 2017, with President Donald Trump keeping his electoral promise of being the “best friend of India” inside the White House. India was the only country for which the Trump administration came out with a 100-year plan; an honour not accorded to even America’s top allies.[13] But there is a prominent issue that both the sides need to resolve their differences on. The issue regarding the H1-B visas had been taken up strongly by Modi to the Trump administration. It attracts foreign specialised workers to come to the US for employment, many of them from India and China. On April 18, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order that directed federal agencies to implement a “Buy American, Hire American” strategy. This statement indicated that the indigenous Americans would be reasserted their position in the service, labour and IT sectors over the Indians. So the issuance and renewal of H1-B visas would be cut short.[14] Modi had talks with Trump about the “spirit” of such visas. As per reports by the Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister Narendra Modi successfully convinced Trump to admit that Indian skilled professionals have a big contribution in strengthening the US economy.[15]

The Defence Framework Agreement (2005) was updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015. The two countries now conduct more bilateral exercises with each other than they do with any other country. India participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July-August 2016 for the second time with an Indian Naval Frigate. Bilateral dialogue mechanisms in the field of defence include Defence Policy Group (DPG), Defence Joint Working Group (DJWG), Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG), Senior Technology Security Group (STSG), Joint Technical Group (JTG), Military Cooperation Group (MCG), and Service-to-Service Executive Steering Groups (ESGs). the U.S. recognised India as a “Major Defence Partner”, which commits the U.S. to facilitate technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of its closest allies and partners, and industry collaboration for defence co-production and co-development. Cooperation in counter-terrorism has seen considerable progress with intelligence sharing, information exchange, operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology and equipment. India-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Initiative was signed in 2010 to expand collaboration on counter-terrorism, information sharing and capacity building. India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism held its 14th meeting in July 2016 in Washington DC.[16]

Concluding Remarks…..

India-US had its fair share of dynamics of it itself. At times it remained tumultuous, and at times; pacific. But India-US relations are a long term policy. Both the UPA and NDA Government has overseen the growth of India-US relations; there is a clear bipartisan support for greater Indo-US engagement[17]. India obviously being a nuclear giant, holds importance for USA in cooperation for world peace. It also sits in a place between Pakistan and China in the subcontinent; a strategic position where US interests lies. Also India has a fifth largest navy and fourth largest air-force; on top of that they have the third largest army having robust defensive capabilities. The USA remains important to India for its economic success. The USA also helps India debarring any kind of hostilities with China or Pakistan. As India wants a greater role in the UN Security Council, the interests of New Delhi lies in US. Both the countries have mutual cooperation regarding climate change, USA has also remained one of the top sources for foreign direct investment in India. It has also been a potential suppliers of arms and military assistance to India.

The Silicon Valley factor is mutually important. Around 40% Indians work in the Silicon Valley and a significant number of them hold prime positions. They are the workforce and the brains behind the success of the Silicon Valley. If they are removed USA is bound to suffer consequential damages in the service sector. Now, from the perspective of India, if these people are put back in the Indian service sector, then due to rise in population many of them might remain unemployed which will affect the economic growth index. So both the countries have considerable amount of interests in the Silicon Valley

Undeniably, the diversity of ties and both countries’ engagements with other nations on various issues through different perspectives would create more challenges in the future. But, the Indo-US strategic partnership despite occasional hiccups is indeed a smart policy for the long run and is in the mutual interest of both the countries. As such, the Indo-US relationship should be seen as a marathon and not a sprint.[18]

Bibliography

References

https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-relations.

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/99695.htm.

https://www.theworldreporter.com/2011/10/1971-india-pakistan-war-role-of-russia.html.

https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/09/archives/mr-nixon-and-south-asia.html.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-us-relationship-makes-great-strides-in-2017/articleshow/62238834.cms.

https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-us-relations/217101.

[1] India-U.S. Relations: Brief for the US Congress by Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress USA (Mar 12, 2019, 10:24 PM) https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-us-relations/217101.

[2](Mar 12, 2019, 10:20 PM) https://www.lindenwood.edu/files/resources/127-138-before-and-after-9-11.pdf.

[3] Mumbai terror attacks: Rice arrives in Delhi to solve India-Pakistan relations, The Guardian, Dec 03, 2008 (Mar 12, 2019, 10:08 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/03/mumbai-terror-attacks-india-pakistan-suspects.

[4](Mar 12, 2019, 10:20 PM) https://www.lindenwood.edu/files/resources/127-138-before-and-after-9-11.pdf.

[5](Mar 12, 2019, 10:35 PM) https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf.

[6] Ibid.

[7] (Mar 20, 2019, 10:35 PM) https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Jane Perlez, U.S. Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build an Alliance, Aug 20, 2008 ( Mar 20, 2019, 11:40 PM) http://www.indianembassy.org/US_Media/2001/aug/U_S_ Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build an Alliance.html.

[10] Ibid.

[11](Mar 13, 2019, 12:22 AM) https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf.

[12] Ibid.

[13] India-US relationship makes great strides in 2017, The Economic Times, Dec 25, 2017 (Mar 13, 2019, 12:23 AM) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-us-relationship-makes-great-strides-in-2017/articleshow/62238834.cms.

[14] PM Narendra Modi discussed ‘spirit’ of H1B visas with Donald Trump: Sushma Swaraj, The Economic Times, Jul 20, 2017 (Mar 13, 2019, 12:46 AM) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-discussed-spirit-of-h1b-visas-with-donald-trump-sushma-swaraj/articleshow/59685866.cms.

[15] Ibid.

[16](Mar 13,2019, 01:03 AM) https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf.

[17]Monish Tourangbam, INDO-US RELATIONS: A REALITY CHECK ( Mar 13, 2019, 01:24 AM) https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-us-relations-a-reality-check/.

[18] Monish Tourangbam, INDO-US RELATIONS: A REALITY CHECK ( Mar 13, 2019, 02:24 AM) https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-us-relations-a-reality-check/.

[1]The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organization comprising of certain countries which did not want to be aligned with any of the major power blocs (USA and USSR) of the world. It maintained amity with both the blocs and had a neutral stance. It was started in 1961. The first head signatories to this group were Yugoslavia, India and Egypt.

[2] ( Mar 04, 2019, 07:48 PM) https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-relations.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The McMahon Line serves as the border in the north-eastern Tibetan region between India and China although its status has been conventionally disputed by the Chinese Government. It came into existence through the Shimla Convention 1914 signed between Britain and Tibetan representatives. But China does not regard this convention as it does not consider Tibet to be a sovereign state and hence it does not have the power to enter into treaties.

[5] US Department of the State Archive: India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Mar 05, 2019, 01:09 AM) https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/99695.htm.

[6] Ibid.

[7]Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) is an organization to prevent communism getting ground in the region. It began in the year 1954. The principal signatories to this treaty were US, France, Britain, Pakistan, Thailand, New Zealand, the Philippines and Australia.

[8] Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was formed at the urging of Britain and the US intending t counter the threat of Soviet expansion into vital Middle East oil-producing regions. It was dissolved in 1979 after Iran withdrew due to death of the Shah. It was composed of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

[9] US Department of the State Archive: India-Pakistan War of 1965 (Mar 05, 2019, 03:44 PM) https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/99695.htm.

[10] Ibid.

[11]India-U.S. Relations: Brief for the US Congress by Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress USA (Mar 05, 2019, 05:20 PM) https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-us-relations/217101.

[12] The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the Treaty banning all nuclear explosions — everywhere, by everyone. The Treaty was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996. Since then, the Treaty has reached near-universality. 182 countries have signed the Treaty — the last country to do so was Trinidad and Tobago on 8 October 2009 which also ratified the Treaty on 26 May 2010. 154 countries have ratified the Treaty — most recently Ghana on 14 June 2011. India and US are yet to ratify it.

[13] India-U.S. Relations: Brief for the US Congress by Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress USA (Mar 05, 2019, 05:27 PM) https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-us-relations/217101

[14] The Group of Eight (G8) refers to the group of eight highly industrialized nations — France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia — that hold an annual meeting to foster consensus on global issues like economic growth and crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism. The forum enables presidents and prime ministers, as well as their finance and foreign ministers, to candidly discuss pressing international issues.

[15] India-U.S. Relations: Brief for the US Congress by Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress USA (Mar 06, 2019, 12:24 AM) https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-us-relations/217101.

[16] Sanskar Srivastava, 1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain (Mar 11, 2019, 09:38 PM) https://www.theworldreporter.com/2011/10/1971-india-pakistan-war-role-of-russia.html.

[17] John P. Lewis, Mr. Nixon and South Asia: War on the Subcontinent, N.Y. Times, Dec 09, 1971 on Page 47 (Mar 11, 2019, 11:36 PM) https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/09/archives/mr-nixon-and-south-asia.html.

[18] Sanskar Srivastava, 1971 India Pakistan War: Role of Russia, China, America and Britain (Mar 11, 2019, 11:38 PM) https://www.theworldreporter.com/2011/10/1971-india-pakistan-war-role-of-russia.html.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Carina van de Wetering, CHANGING US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD INDIA: US-INDIA RELATIONS SINCE THE COLD WAR, 2016, 69.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Arvind Gupta, Deeper defence & security cooperation with Russia enhances India’s strategic choices (Mar 12, 2019, 01:55 AM) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/deeper-defence-security-cooperation-with-russia-enhances-indias-strategic-choices/articleshow/62200689.cms.

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