A Growing Transatlantic Rift
Earlier this week, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and President Joe Biden announced a trilateral defense alliance that would provide Australia with hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear submarine technology from the United States and the United Kingdom. While the deal is ostensibly Transpacific in nature, there is a transatlantic angle as well. This agreement comes at the expense of a French defense contractor, Naval Group, who had entered into a $41-billion-dollar deal in 2016 to provide French-made, diesel-powered Attack-class submarines for the Australian Navy.
This arrangement has made France, to put it lightly, furieux. French President Emmanuel Macron has recalled his Ambassadors from Canberra and Washington for consultations, an extraordinary move for NATO allies or partners. France in general, and Macron specifically who involved himself in talks between his nation and Australia, feel betrayed. The Franco-Aussie deal was more than a simple (albeit incredibly expensive) trade arrangement; it was a step towards a closer alliance between France, the EU, and Australia. It was to be the “backbone” of Macron’s policy in the Indian and Pacific regions.[1] To add insult to injury, the negotiations took place without France knowing, and they were informed of the deal only days before the public announcement.
From the point of view of the United States, it makes strategic sense to provide Australia with top-of-the-line technology in furtherance of Biden’s policy of Chinese containment. The existing French deal would not have provided the Australian Navy with submarines suitable for America’s goal. This is in direct opposition to Macron’s hesitation to confront and the EU’s plan of “cooperation, not confrontation” with China. [2] [3] It also may speak to the geopolitical realities of 2021. Except for a few unfortunate years before 1800, America has always found a friend and partner in France and, since 1945, Western Europe as a whole. Initially, it was a relationship of necessity as the United States was alone in the world against Great Britain. Then, as America gained power and prestige, it allied itself with France and other nations against German aggression and later used that power to help rebuild Europe under the Marshall Plan to provide the United States with an economic partner in the post-war era. NATO was another partnership with a quid-pro-quo. The United States would help defend Europe against future Soviet expansion, but to do so, American troops must be in Europe so that defense would be there rather than here. In other words, diplomacy is never altruistic.
To France and Europe as a whole, this feels like a continuation of the America First style of international relations that Donald Trump popularized. Throughout Macron’s term of office, he has constantly pushed for greater cooperation within NATO. He has spoken out against its “brain death” while at the same time proposing a “strategic autonomy” that would allow Europe to forge its own path regarding not only defense but also economic and energy policies. While the tone of the Biden administration has been an improvement over its predecessors, the outcomes have remained the same. The United States’ interests must be pursued even at the expense of long-standing policies and alliances. Macron himself is reckoning with domestic politics. His most likely barrier towards a second term in office comes from his far-right and Marine LePen’s Rassemblement National party. However, candidates from all parties will likely use this against him as a sign France’s former prestige has fallen even farther. As he prepares for his reelection next Spring, he will have to defend not only his actions while in office, but France’s honor on the world stage, hence the recalling of his American Ambassador — the first such recall in Franco-American history.
While this instance may ultimately be much ado about rien, it does not do much to change the momentum of American foreign policy nor European perceptions of American attitudes about the rest of the world. If anything, this only confirms the fears that any assumed Trumpian anomaly has grown into a permanent change. For the past five years, increasing unilateralism without even consulting European allies has been pushing them farther away. It looks like the powers in Europe can no longer expect the United States to return to the multilateral doctrines that, until recently, dominated transatlantic relations, and calls for greater European defense capabilities are only growing louder. Given the limited defense budgets of European nations, will any expansion into a European military come at the expense of NATO funds? Will domestic politics even allow for such a shift given NATO’s general popularity in the individual states? The French people could provide the first answers when they go to the polls in April and either opt for another candidate or give Macron another mandate for closer European integration.
